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INTRODUCTION 
Good lead counsel is hard to find.1 We, Congress, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (―SEC‖), and the public trust that class counsel 
will be a good and faithful agent so long as a lead plaintiff is there to 
monitor her every move.2 Problem is, good lead plaintiffs are hard to 
find, too. In part, we expect too much: the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (―PSLRA‖) insists that a lead plaintiff monitor the class 
attorneys and hopes that she will prevent strike suits and deter 
fraud;3 Rule 23(a)(4), on the other hand, demands that the lead 
plaintiff adequately represent class members with diverse risk 
 
 1. This derivative comes, of course, from FLANNERY O‘CONNOR, A Good Man Is Hard to 
Find, in A GOOD MAN IS HARD TO FIND AND OTHER STORIES 1, 1 (1955). 
 2. ― ‗She would of been a good woman,‘ The Misfit said, ‗if [there] had been somebody there 
to shoot her every minute of her life.‘ ‖ Id. at 23. Of course, counsel‘s behavior is also constrained 
by reputational concerns, ethics rules, and the desire for repeat clients. Still, the lead plaintiff 
typically raises ethical violations and certainly controls repeat business. 
 3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006). 
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preferences, sophistication levels, and desired remedies.4 Contrast, for 
example, this lead-plaintiff heroine in securities-fraud class actions 
with a run-of-the-mill class representative from a small stakes, 
negative-value class action who we hope might have read the 
complaint and whom we openly dub a ―figurehead.‖5 
It doesn‘t help that the lead plaintiff‘s PSLRA and Rule 23(a) 
obligations may steer her in opposite directions. She may monitor the 
class attorney like a hawk and squelch attorney opportunism at every 
turn, but when her self-interest conflicts with the interests of those 
she represents, the zealot becomes the oppressor. For example, 
because institutional lead plaintiffs are more likely to continue to hold 
stock in a defendant corporation, they may push for corporate-
governance reforms, which means that their advocacy will work to the 
detriment of former shareholders who want to maximize their 
monetary recovery. This is but one of the predictable divides that often 
exists between institutional and individual investors. Yet, when 
judges appoint a lead plaintiff, they look principally for the best 
monitor with the largest financial loss and consider adequacy only 
secondarily. Contending that the lead plaintiff‘s primary function is to 
monitor plaintiffs‘ attorneys loses sight of her obligations as an 
adequate class representative—the tether to class members‘ 
constitutional due process rights. Nevertheless, courts push the 
adequacy question back to the class-certification stage where it might 
rightly belong if certification was still just another hurdle to trial as 
opposed to the last judicial checkpoint before settlement. 
The solution is simple enough to state succinctly: Appoint lead-
plaintiff groups with members who represent the class‘s diverse 
interests. But when courts have appointed cohesive groups in the past, 
the groups have underperformed. The prescription is thus to select 
lead plaintiffs whose diverse preferences and motivations mirror those 
of the class. This solution addresses two interrelated process-based 
problems: (1) that institutional lead plaintiffs tend to inadequately 
represent individual investors and (2) that lead-plaintiff groups have 
 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (―[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.‖); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–45 (1940). 
 5. See Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in 
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 165 (1990) (describing the class representative, at times, as 
―nothing more than a figurehead with little or no function‖ and playing ―almost no role in the 
actual prosecution of the class action‖); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs‟ 
Attorney‟s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 94 (1991) (explaining that, ―because the 
named plaintiff is a figurehead,‖ courts should inquire more into the adequacy of the plaintiffs‘ 
attorney than that of the named plaintiff).  
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performed poorly historically, which translates into higher agency 
costs and lower settlement values. Parts I and II explore each problem 
in turn. 
Part I.A contextualizes the problem of inadequate 
representation by situating the representative relationship within a 
larger governance theory. While the PSLRA incorporates class 
members into class governance through the lead-plaintiff appointment 
process, Rule 23(a)‘s typicality and adequacy provisions set forth the 
constitutional due process qualifications for serving as that 
representative: the representative must have suffered similar harm 
and share similar claims as those of the class and her interests must 
not conflict with class members‘ interests. These qualifications 
legitimize the institutional arrangement. Unlike democratic 
governments where a majority vote legitimizes representatives 
through consent, the judge is the only actor standing between self-
nominated class attorneys and lead plaintiffs, on one hand, and the 
class itself, on the other. But judges fail to recognize their role in 
legitimizing the arrangement; from an adequacy standpoint, they 
increasingly tolerate what they should ordinarily view as debilitating 
structural conflicts between individual and institutional investors. 
Rule 23(a)(4) assumes that the representative‘s self-interest 
overlaps with the interests of the represented such that a lead 
plaintiff pursuing her own interest will benefit others. But, as Part I.B 
explains, this is not the typical case in securities class actions: 
institutions‘ interests diverge from individual investors‘ interests in 
predictable ways. For example, institutions are likely to engage in 
derivatives trading, which means they may experience fewer true 
losses and be subject to unique defenses; plus, they‘re more likely to 
continue to hold shares in the defendant corporation, which means 
they may prefer different remedies than would former shareholders. 
Institutions often have ―portfolio monitoring agreements‖ with 
plaintiffs‘ law firms (where the firm alerts the institution any time it 
might have a significant enough loss to serve as lead plaintiff), which 
gives their attorneys incentives to skew settlement terms and claims-
filing practices to favor the institution and encourage repeat business. 
And institutions, individual investors, and attorneys have risk 
preferences that vary dramatically depending on how much money is 
at stake vis-à-vis their overall wealth.6 
Courts could address these conflicts without the need for 
congressional action by selecting small lead-plaintiff groups that 
 
 6. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 288, 307–08 (2010). 
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reflect the spectrum of class members‘ views. But thus far, few judges 
choose groups with adequacy in mind, and the cohesive groups they do 
select perform poorly. Part II.A provides a descriptive account of when 
courts have appointed groups of individuals, institutions, or a mix of 
the two. It summarizes judicial preferences on group size, members‘ 
relationship, cohesiveness, formation, and decisionmaking. Perhaps 
surprisingly given the PSLRA‘s preference for institutions, groups 
serve as lead plaintiff in roughly thirty percent of securities class 
actions.7 Judges seem more willing to appoint a group when its 
members have a preexisting, cohesive, or cooperative relationship. 
Homogeneity and cohesion, in other words, are currently desirable 
characteristics for a lead-plaintiff group.  
But empirical evidence shows that cohesive groups perform 
poorly as monitors—their attorneys receive higher fees and the 
defendant settles for less. Part II.B explores why. Securities scholars 
claim that judges should rarely—if ever—appoint groups because 
doing so is inconsistent with the PSLRA, shifts control from the 
plaintiffs to their attorneys, and adds to collective-action and free-
rider problems. Curiously, neither proceduralists nor securities-law 
scholars cast these failings as group decisionmaking problems. And 
yet, by drawing from the group decisionmaking literature, which 
spans multiple fields within the social sciences, it becomes apparent 
that the very criteria judges prefer in selecting groups—preexisting 
relationships, group cohesion, and evidence of coordination—are the 
same factors that cause paradigmatic group problems—namely, group 
polarization and confirmation bias.  
Accordingly, Part III.A sets forth the normative claim that 
appointing small, cognitively diverse, richly representative lead-
plaintiff groups best addresses both adequate-representation problems 
and poor group performance. Evidence from the social sciences 
suggests that cognitively diverse groups—groups with diverse 
perspectives, interpretations, and heuristics—are more capable 
problem solvers and thus reach better solutions than homogeneous 
ones. But we cannot deem lead plaintiffs‘ decisions qualitatively good 
or bad in a vacuum; because class members have heterogeneous 
preferences, we can make that judgment only after considering 
whether the decision reflects the preferences of the governed. That is, 
if we measure a lead plaintiff‘s success only in monitoring terms, we 
 
 7. James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical 
Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 369 tbl.1 (2008); see also 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead 
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1623 tbl.3 (2006). 
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fail to evaluate how she performs her primary function as an adequate 
class representative. Monitoring is simply a more specific adequate-
representation requirement: the faithful representative, as an agent 
for the class, should not hire another agent on her principal‘s behalf 
without ensuring that the second agent—the attorney—performs as 
promised. Thus, this Part builds on the two basic assumptions 
established in Parts I and II: that average class members are diverse 
and that the representative fulfills her obligations by pursuing her 
own self-interest, which must be similar to those she represents. 
Without more than one representative, these assumptions are 
incompatible. 
Part III.B then takes up the mechanics of designing a 
representative lead-plaintiff group. In particular, it recognizes that 
adequate representation and cognitive diversity share the same goals 
of encouraging information sharing and dissent and thereby ties 
interest diversity to cognitive diversity. It then explains how courts 
can leverage intraclass conflicts to construct a representative group. 
Part III.C suggests that encouraging a competitive lead-plaintiff 
selection process likewise gives the judge more options from which to 
choose, fosters dissenting norms, and erodes the near monopoly on 
securities class actions by a handful of plaintiffs‘ firms. Given the well-
known wedge between class counsel‘s interests and class members‘ 
interests, once the judge appoints a representative lead-plaintiff 
group, lead counsel should allocate lead plaintiffs more 
decisionmaking autonomy and give their input more weight. Put 
simply, class counsel should consult and take direction from the lead-
plaintiff group on matters that implicate members‘ values and 
litigation objectives or affect the case‘s merits in much the same way 
that an attorney consults with her client in individual litigation. In 
short, if lead plaintiffs are to adequately represent their constituents‘ 
interests, monitor the lawyers, and minimize agency costs, then, 
consistent with the PSLRA‘s goal of increasing client control, they 
should have more decisionmaking authority. 
Finally, Part III.D concludes by contrasting this Article‘s voice-
based reforms with Professor Coffee‘s well-known arguments 
advancing exit through opting out8 and explains how selecting a 
diverse lead-plaintiff group is a normatively better solution. It does so 
by considering pragmatic concerns, including due process, adequate 
representation, and institutional legitimacy; institutional concerns, 
such as efficiency and fairness; and regulatory concerns, including 
deterrence. Ultimately, a representatively diverse lead-plaintiff group 
 
 8. Coffee, supra note 6, at 326–27. 
2b. Burch_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/2011 11:43 AM 
2011] OPTIMAL LEAD PLAINTIFFS 1115 
appropriately reinstates opting out as a last resort rather than a first 
choice and thereby makes the class-action objection process more 
meaningful. 
I. LEAD PLAINTIFFS, INADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVES 
Both the PSLRA‘s lead-plaintiff provision and Rule 23(a)(4)‘s 
adequate-representation standard aim to diminish two sources of 
disloyalty: (1) the now familiar principal-agent problems between class 
counsel and the class itself; and (2) the largely ignored but deeply 
rooted conflicts between class members, particularly the lead plaintiff 
and the class. But remedying one does not necessarily cure the other. 
One can vigorously monitor the attorney, but care only about one‘s 
own self-interest. When that self-interest is misaligned with other 
class members‘ interests, the vigorous monitor becomes an unwitting 
tyrant. 
The problem is that when judges follow the PSLRA, they seek 
the best monitor. This leaves adequacy principally as an afterthought, 
and certainly—reason the courts—something that they can address 
later, during class certification.9 But that rationale worked best when 
certifying a class began the process and was not the prelude to 
settlement that it has become today. This Part begins by describing 
the lead plaintiff‘s obligations to the class members and the public at 
large and then highlights the tension that can result when the two 
point in different directions. It then explores the specific conflicts of 
interest that tend to arise most frequently between class members and 
analyzes the resulting due process concerns. Finally, it explains why 
the ability to opt out of a securities class action fails to satisfactorily 
resolve these conflicts of interest. 
A. The Lead Plaintiff‟s Obligations and Legislative Aspirations 
By now, attorney-client agency problems in the class-action 
context are widely known. Simply put, the attorney‘s self-interest as 
the litigation‘s financier makes her a creditor and the litigation a joint 
venture with the plaintiffs.10 Class members, on the other hand, have 
a small stake in a big problem and thus have little incentive to invest 
significant time into understanding the litigation or monitoring the 
 
 9. See infra Part III.B.3, which addresses this problem in more detail. 
 10. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Kutak Symposium: Professional Responsibility and the 
Corporate Lawyer,13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 331, 340–41 (2000) (―[I]n the class action, the 
plaintiff‘s attorney is not simply an agent; the attorney is also the financier of the class action. . . 
. What‘s more, the attorney is not just a creditor; the attorney is a joint-venturer . . . .‖). 
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attorneys. Rule 23‘s traditional answer to this conundrum is to 
designate a class representative to ―fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class‖ and ensure that the representative‘s claims and 
defenses mirror those of other class members.11 Known as the 
―adequacy‖ and ―typicality‖ requirements, these restrictions along 
with numerosity and commonality govern, in part, when courts may 
certify class actions.12 
In securities classes, the call for oversight and attorney 
monitoring is more explicit. The PSLRA creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the plaintiff with the largest financial stake who 
satisfies Rule 23‘s requirements is the ―most adequate,‖ or ―lead 
plaintiff.‖13 Congress hoped that appointing lead plaintiffs would 
entice institutions with the largest losses to take on this role and, 
because they had more to gain financially by litigating, they would 
closely monitor their attorneys.14 Put differently, the assumptions 
underlying the PSLRA are somewhat linear: (1) securities class 
actions supplement the government‘s regulatory function by 
incentivizing plaintiffs‘ attorneys to act as private attorneys general, 
(2) but private attorneys may act self-interestedly, which necessitates 
monitoring by the principal (the class members), and (3) appointing 
plaintiffs with the largest losses to perform that monitoring function 
helps cabin attorney self-interest and further the government‘s 
regulatory function.15 Making these assumptions explicit exposes a 
duality for lead plaintiffs—their role includes fulfilling public 
regulatory aspirations as well as protecting class members‘ due 
process rights. 
 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (typicality); id. R. 23(a)(4) (adequacy). 
 12. Id. R. 23(a). Of course, a class must meet not only all of Rule 23(a)‘s requirements, but 
also one of Rule 23(b)‘s requirements. Id. R. 23(b). Most securities class actions proceed under 
Rule 23(b)(3). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. (In re IPO), 
214 F.R.D. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 81–82 (2d 
Cir. 2004). Courts designate lead plaintiffs based primarily on which plaintiff has the largest 
financial interest. In re IPO, 214 F.R.D. at 121; see also In re Crayfish Co. Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ. 
6766, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10134, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2002). 
 14. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1596. 
 15. The theory is that, as a shareholder in the defendant corporation, an institution would 
balk at a lawsuit with frivolous claims. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1597–1602; Cox et al., 
supra note 7, at 365. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: 
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) 
(critiquing private attorneys general); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities 
Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 539 (1997); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The 
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 716–17 (1941) (setting forth the 
classic argument in favor of private attorneys general); William B. Rubenstein, On What a 
“Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2146 (2004) 
(discussing the role of plaintiffs‘ attorneys as private attorneys general). 
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To be more explicit regarding the first assumption, securities 
class actions supplement public enforcement efforts through: (1) 
deterring fraud by making it less profitable and allowing investors to 
recoup their losses, improve corporate governance, and monitor 
management,16 and (2) compensating injured investors. Jill Fisch 
explains the link between deterrence and compensation as follows: 
―For shareholders and directors to use the disclosed information to 
monitor [companies], it must be incorporated into equity prices,‖ 
which, in efficient markets, ―occurs through informed secondary 
trading.‖17 Even though many investors diversify their holdings to 
eliminate firm-specific risk, informed, secondary-market traders 
heavily research particular corporations, use that information to 
invest, and thus limit their diversification to profit from their 
research.18 It is these investors who make secondary markets more 
efficient by relying on disclosed information, but who are likewise 
disproportionately saddled with the cost of securities fraud.19 
Consequently, compensating these investors encourages them to 
continue to provide a public good (efficient markets), which, in turn, 
enhances company monitoring and deterrence.20 This explains one 
link between compensation and deterrence and suggests that focusing 
purely on achieving deterrence through corporate-governance reforms 
misses the complementary role that compensation might play by 
enforcing mandatory-disclosure obligations. 
Compensation and deterrence are likewise linked through the 
class action‘s institutional arrangement. Once Congress enables 
private attorneys to act on behalf of a class and pursue class members‘ 
property interests, it must ensure that class members are treated 
equitably and that the institutional arrangement is legitimate. 
Because securities-fraud class actions involve monetary compensation, 
they trigger the ―property‖ portion of the Due Process Clause‘s 
protection against deprivation of ―life, liberty, or property, without due 
 
 16. See Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not 
Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 310–18 (arguing that mandatory disclosures ―enhance efficiency 
by improving corporate governance and increasing liquidity‖); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
“Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action 
Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 290–92 (arguing that shareholders have the sophistication and 
activism to serve as effective monitors). 
 17. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 333, 345–47. 
 18. Id. at 346. 
 19. Id. at 346–47. 
 20. See id. at 347–48 (explaining that, because the costs incurred by informed traders 
―produce a positive governance eternality, . . . compensation [for informed traders] is both 
desirable and noncircular‖). 
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process of law.‖21 Due process for class actions includes adequate 
representation, notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity 
to opt out.22 
Both due process and the need to legitimize private plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys‘ actions on behalf of the class require that the lead plaintiff 
faithfully represent class members. These obligations include 
monitoring class attorneys by selecting counsel and lowering the 
attorneys‘ fees,23 but they also include avoiding structural conflicts 
between class members and between class members and class counsel, 
ensuring a fair settlement through voicing objections, and 
representing plaintiffs‘ interests throughout the litigation process. At 
times, these obligations to the class may conflict with what the public 
at large might prefer. For instance, maximizing class members‘ 
settlement amount does not always correlate with optimal fraud 
deterrence, whereas requesting corporate-governance reforms does 
little to promote former stockholders‘ interests. 
The more worrisome disconnect, however, occurs when the lead 
plaintiff lacks the information and incentive to perform the private 
function of protecting other class members. Even though adequate 
representation requires the absence of intraclass conflicts,24 but the 
lead plaintiff is both poorly positioned to acquire this sort of 
information and poorly incentivized to voice concerns along these 
lines. Because courts assume that a class representative pursuing her 
own interests likewise pursues the class‘s interests, when this is false, 
lead plaintiffs who do notice an intraclass rift have little reason to 
mention it.25 Class counsel is similarly disincentivized. Raising 
significant intraclass conflicts would require designating additional 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 22. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (adequate 
representation); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (opt out); Mullane v. 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950) (notice); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 
U.S. 32, 42–45 (1940) (adequate representation); Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 
373, 385–86 (1908) (opportunity to be heard). See generally Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the 
Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 (1997) (discussing the importance of 
giving class members an opportunity to be heard). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2006). Professors Weiss and Beckerman wrote the 
seminal article on monitoring by institutional investors, which prompted Congress to enact the 
PSLRA. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 
(1995). 
 24. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 623; Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42–45. 
 25. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1142 
(2009). 
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lawyers, which would reduce current counsel‘s fee.26 Enter then the 
defendant, an unlikely champion of plaintiffs‘ due process rights, but 
one who exploits potential intraclass rifts as reasons not to certify the 
class or to narrow its definition.27 These incentives, however, last only 
until the defendant decides to settle. Settling shifts the game into a 
peacemaking mode where achieving finality means keeping as many 
class members as possible in the settlement. 
B. Diverse Interests and Conflicts of Interest 
The lead plaintiff‘s wide-ranging obligations to the public as 
well as to class members make her vulnerable to the generalist‘s 
problem: she must be all things to all people and thus pleases few and 
performs few functions well. This is particularly problematic given 
that appointing a lead plaintiff often eclipses further inquiry into 
questions about adequacy and typicality. And the lead-plaintiff 
selection process places the judge in an uneasy quasi-inquisitorial 
role: though the adversarial process helps, adversaries often form 
alliances, withdraw competing motions, and combine forces before the 
judge has a chance to rule.28 This quasi-inquisitorial model 
necessitates a vigilant gatekeeper who will enforce Rule 23‘s adequacy 
and typicality standards, yet judges treat the process gingerly, unsure 
of their judicial or fiduciary obligations.29 Because lead plaintiffs tend 
to be sophisticated and have more at stake than a named plaintiff 
would in a small-claims class action, once chosen, judges tend to trust 
 
 26. Granted, an attorney‘s interest in developing a solid reputation may provide some 
incentive for her to maximize class members‘ interests. Still, because the lead plaintiff selects 
lead counsel, this undercuts the attorney‘s reputational incentive to some degree. 
 27. Yet, courts have held that defendants may not engage in discovery to challenge the lead 
plaintiff‘s adequacy until class certification. Fields v. Biomatrix, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 451, 455 (D.N.J. 
2000). Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, a study by the Federal Judicial Center found ―[i]n all 
or nearly all securities [class action] cases in the four districts, defendants disputed the ability of 
named plaintiffs to represent the class, often basing their arguments on alleged conflicts or 
purportedly unique facts applicable to the representatives.‖ Thomas E. Willging et al., An 
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 81–
82, 90 (1996). 
 28. See In re The Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 215 & n.1 (D.D.C. 1999) (―It 
sometimes occurs that groups which start out in adverse positions form alliances, leaving it to 
the Court to divine the arguments adverse to the alliance and to weigh the relative merit of those 
arguments.‖). 
 29. At least one court has expressed open disdain for having to play a role in the 
appointment process, even though, after Rule 23‘s 2003 amendments, courts play an increasingly 
active role in all class actions. In re Molson Coors Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 147, 149 
n.4 (D. Del. 2005) (observing that having to appoint a lead plaintiff ―consume[s] judicial 
resources,‖ leading the court to question ―whether the right incentives are yet in place‖). 
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them to play a far greater role than a named plaintiff ever would in a 
negative-value consumer class action.30 
Congress hoped that institutions would take on this role. But 
empirical data on institutional lead plaintiffs‘ performance is mixed. 
While institutions do tend to increase overall settlement size, they 
also take cases with the largest defendants.31 Estimates as to how 
often institutions serve as lead plaintiff ranged from eight to twelve 
percent before 2005, to sixty-five percent in 2009.32 By contrast, 
groups of institutional and noninstitutional investors as well as 
groups comprised solely of individuals represent the class around 
thirty percent of the time.33 
1. Institutional Interests Versus Individuals‘ Interests 
When institutions serve as lead plaintiff, they may not 
adequately represent other class members. Adequate representation 
assumes that the named plaintiff (the lead plaintiff in securities class 
actions) will act self-interestedly,34 which works well so long as her 
interests align with the class‘s interests. Because the lead plaintiff 
hires class counsel, when this initial assumption is false, inadequate 
representation taints not only the relationship between the lead 
plaintiff and the class, but also between class members and class 
counsel. 
 
 30. See infra Part III.B.3. Compare Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 483 
(5th Cir. 2001) (―Any lingering uncertainty, with respect to the adequacy standard in securities 
fraud class actions, has been conclusively resolved by the PSLRA‘s requirement that securities 
class actions be managed by active, able class representatives who are informed and can 
demonstrate they are directing the litigation. In this way, the PSLRA raises the standard 
adequacy threshold.‖), with In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 738–39 (9th Cir. 2002) (―Although 
Congress made several important changes in the [PSLRA], it pointedly did not change the 
requirements of Rule 23. Indeed, it incorporated Rule 23 explicitly in one portion of the  
statute . . . and enacted language that is identical to Rule 23‘s typicality and adequacy 
requirements . . . .‖). For the Seventh Circuit‘s opinion on the judge‘s role as a fiduciary for a 
certified class, see Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 31. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1624 tbl.4, 1625. 
 32. ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2009 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 10 (2009) (―Cases involving institutional investors as lead plaintiffs are 
also associated with significantly higher settlements‖); Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1623 tbl.3 
(noting that single institutions served as lead plaintiff in around eight percent of the cases 
studied); Cox et al., supra note 7, at 369, 378–79, 385 (presenting data from 773 settled securities 
class actions between 1993 and 2005).  
 33. Cox et al., supra note 7, at 369 tbl.1; see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1623 tbl.3. 
 34. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. h (2010) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES] (―By acting in ways that help themselves, these parties should help others 
automatically.‖). 
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After the PSLRA, plaintiffs‘ law firms sought to maintain their 
competitive advantage by courting large institutions, developing 
repeat relationships with them, and encouraging them to serve as lead 
plaintiff.35 This courting process may involve ―pay-to-play‖ practices 
where plaintiffs‘ law firms contribute to the political campaigns of 
those selecting counsel for public or labor pension funds as well as 
hiring lobbyists to meet with the officials who control those funds.36 
Lobbyists encourage pension funds to serve as lead plaintiff and to 
then select the lobbyist‘s law-firm employer as lead counsel.37 These 
practices forge repeat relationships and inhibit competition in ways 
that lack merit and transparency. And because other eligible 
institutions like banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies 
maintain commercial relationships with the defendants or defendants‘ 
customers, public and union pension funds are the institutions that 
typically take on the lead-plaintiff role.38 
 
 35. John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why 
“Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 420, 425 (2008); Jill E. Fisch, 
Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the 
PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 63–64 (2001). 
 36. Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions: A Look at 
Lawyers‟ Campaign Contributions, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1725, 1726–27 (2009); Stephen J. Choi et 
al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions 2–3 (U. Mich. Law & Econ., Empirical 
Legal Stud. Ctr. Paper No. 09–025, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527047. But see 
David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class 
Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (2010) (casting doubt on the pay-to-play 
theory and finding ―no support for the theory that unions drive beneficiary board members to 
obtain lead plaintiff appointments‖). The Cendant litigation is one of the best-known examples. 
See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.N.J. 2003), aff‟d, 404 F.3d 173 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (approving the lead counsel‘s fee of $55 million, plus interest); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
„Pay-to-Play‟ Reform: What, How and Why?, N.Y. L.J., May 21, 2009; Cox & Thomas, supra note 
7, at 1611–13 (describing the pay-to-play practice in Cendant).  
 37. A search by Jim Cox and Randall Thomas for the sixteen law firms regularly engaged in 
shareholder litigation found that in six states three of the best-known law firms disclosed hiring 
lobbyists, including the law firms of Milberg Weiss, Abbey Gardy & Squitieri and Bernstein, 
Liebhard & Lifshiz. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1613–14; see also Robert B. Thompson & 
Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 186–87 tbl.12 (2004) (listing the law firms bringing the largest number of 
Delaware complaints).  
 38. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1609; see also Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions 
Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 877–80 (2006) (noting the failure of mutual funds to participate as lead 
plaintiff in securities class actions). At the end of 2006, pension funds accounted for the largest 
block of institutional investor assets, public pension funds held an aggregate share of 10 percent 
of all U.S. stocks, and private pension funds held approximately 13.6 percent of the equity 
market. Barry B. Burr, Institutional Investors Increase Ownership of U.S. Companies to an All-
Time High, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.pionline.com/article/20080905 
/REG/809049969. 
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Law firms‘ courting process also involves ―portfolio 
monitoring,‖ where the law firm keeps abreast of the institution‘s 
holdings and notifies it whenever it suffers a significant enough loss 
that it could serve as the lead plaintiff in a related class action. 
Portfolio monitoring is a preexisting contractual relationship between 
the lead plaintiff and class counsel. Preexisting relationships typically 
give courts pause, particularly when counsel has no relationship with 
other class members and no subclassing exists.39 But most courts find 
free portfolio monitoring in exchange for retaining the law firm 
unproblematic; they refuse to disqualify the lead plaintiff unless they 
find a stronger connection, like long-term friendships or familial 
relationships.40 
Although courts have been slow to recognize it, portfolio 
monitoring is both widespread and troubling.41 The few courts who 
agree reason that the practice ―creates a clear incentive for [the law 
firm] to discover ‗fraud‘ in the investments it monitors‖ and thereby 
―fosters the very tendencies toward lawyer-driven litigation that the 
PSLRA was designed to curtail.‖42 Plus, regularly depending on the 
same law firm makes it unlikely that institutions will bargain for 
 
 39. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 832–33 (1997) 
(―[T]here should be a strong presumption against class certification in any type of case in which 
there are preexisting contractual relationships between plaintiffs‘ counsel and one segment or 
section of the proposed class and no preexisting contractual relationship between the plaintiffs‘ 
counsel and another section of the class . . . .‖); see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 626–27 (1997) (explaining the need for subclasses). 
 40. See London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1253–55 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding 
the class representative inadequate based on an ongoing friendship and former business 
relationship with class counsel); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 93–95 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(observing that class representatives may be inadequate when he may be ―more interested in 
maximizing the ‗return‘ to his counsel than in aggressively presenting the proposed class‘ 
action‖); In re UTStarcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 04–04908 JW, 2010 WL 1945737, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. May 12, 2010) (finding the class representative adequate despite its portfolio-monitoring 
agreement with class counsel); In re Am. Italian Pasta Co. Sec. Litig., No. 05–0725–CV–W–ODS, 
2007 WL 927745, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2007) (finding class representatives and class counsel 
were both adequate despite a ―prior, long-standing relationship in which Class Counsel monitors 
Lead Plaintiff‘s investments and advises it of any litigation that may affect them‖); Plumbers & 
Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C 01–20418 JW, 2004 WL 5326262, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004) (finding the class representative adequate despite having a portfolio-
monitoring agreement with Milberg Weiss and serving as lead plaintiff in three other cases at 
Milberg Weiss‘s request); In re Discovery Zone Sec. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 104, 109 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(disqualifying two named plaintiffs as inadequate because the plaintiffs served as class counsels‘ 
personal stockbrokers). 
 41. As one plaintiffs‘ lawyer at Coughlin Stoia acknowledged, ―this portfolio monitoring is 
not something that‘s unique to our firm.‖ Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Credit-
Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, LLC, 616 F. Supp. 2d 461, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also 
Institutional Investors: Portfolio Monitoring Program, MILBERG LLP http://www.milberg.com/ 
practice/practicedetail.aspx?pgid=796 (last visited Apr. 3. 2011). 
 42. Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
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lower attorneys‘ fees or monitor trusted counsel.43 To be fair, some 
pension funds, such as MissPERS, use plaintiffs‘ firms for free 
investment monitoring, but rely on multiple law firms and guarantee 
none that it will be selected as lead counsel.44 In some ways, portfolio 
monitoring is commendable—it encourages institutional investors to 
get involved, enforces substantive rights, and may uncover and deter 
fraud. But ongoing business relationships between the lead plaintiff 
and counsel appear improper, may cause counsel to maximize the 
institutional lead plaintiff‘s return to the class‘s detriment, and may 
encourage counsel to litigate in ways that establish favorable 
precedent for the institution. 
When viewed from an adequacy-of-representation perspective, 
these law-firm-courting practices are less troubling if the institutional 
lead plaintiff‘s long and short-term interests align with the class. But 
that isn‘t the case. Ongoing relationships between institutions and 
class counsel—whether they result from portfolio monitoring, pay-to-
play practices, or lobbying tactics—tempt class counsel to 
inadequately represent the class by favoring the lead-plaintiff 
institution over other class members, including other institutions and 
individual investors. And while other institutional investors receive 
individually tailored legal advice from rival plaintiff firms and opt out, 
most individual investors lack that luxury. 
An institution‘s interest diverges from individual investors‘ 
interests in at least four predictable ways. These differences create 
intraclass conflicts and jeopardize class counsel‘s relationship with the 
class when counsel faithfully pursues the institutional lead plaintiff‘s 
preferences. First, institutions are more likely to trade in derivatives, 
which courts often overlook when calculating which putative lead 
plaintiff experienced the largest financial loss.45 An institution may 
thus have a large voting stake in a defendant company without the 
risks of economic exposure, which means that it did not actually 
experience the largest financial loss.46 Accordingly, it may not pursue 
the class action with the same vigor as a lead plaintiff that truly 
 
 43. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: 
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1529 (2006) 
(questioning ―whether the lead plaintiff provision really encourages greater monitoring of 
plaintiff law firms‖ and asserting that institutions that rely on the same plaintiff law firms ―are 
unlikely to negotiate vigorously with plaintiff law firms for lower fees‖). 
 44. Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 467 & n.3. 
 45. David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions 20–
23 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 10–19, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1601982. 
 46. Id. at 23–24. 
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experienced the largest financial loss and may be subject to unique 
defenses in pressing the class‘s claims.47 
Second, institutions may still own stock in the defendant 
corporation, which means their interests align with the defendant‘s 
long-term financial well-being, whereas former shareholders want to 
recover as much as possible.48 This preference affects whom 
institutions sue and the way they settle claims. For example, an 
institution that cares about the defendant‘s financial solvency may be 
more willing to target the individual officers and directors, whereas 
former shareholders care less about the source of compensation and 
more about the amount. Moreover, institutional lead plaintiffs only 
marginally increase settlement size and thus seem to view settlements 
as trade-offs, not as a means to maximize recovery.49 On the upside, 
targeting the individual wrongdoers and exchanging large recoveries 
for corporate-governance reforms helps deter fraud through measures 
 
 47. Id. at 24, 27–29 (―[A]ppointment of an institutional class members [sic] as lead plaintiff 
carries the risk that they will not have the desired motivation to monitor class counsel because of 
hidden derivatives trading . . . as well as the risk that the institutions will be disqualified at the 
class certification stage because of unique defenses raised by this trading. It is a near certainty 
that the issue of whether the derivatives trader is typical and adequate will have to be litigated, 
which incurs costs for the class . . . .‖); see also Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. 
Tex. 1997). When calculating the ―largest financial interest,‖ some courts use a first-in, first-out 
accounting method, while others have used a last-in, first-out method. But under either method, 
courts focus on purchasing and selling common and preferred stock, not derivatives. Webber, 
supra note 45, at 22–26. 
 48. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1487, 1503 (1996) (describing how, when it comes to damages, class members who are 
continuing shareholders have different economic interests than members who are former 
shareholders); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 533, 546 (1997) (―The litigation objectives of institutional investors may also differ from 
those of the individual investors in the class. Obviously an institution that continues to own 
stock is poorly suited to represent investors who are no longer invested in the company.‖); R. 
Chris Heck, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs 
Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1211 (1999) (―Former stockholders have an incentive 
to claim as much recovery as possible, while present stockholders want to maximize the joint 
values of their recovery plus the value of the stock they still hold.‖); cf. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 
264 F.3d 201, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (―[A]n institutional investor with enormous stakes in a company 
is highly unlikely to divest all of its holdings in that company, even after a securities class action 
is filed in which it is a class member.‖); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 217–18 (D.D.C. 
1999) (―[C]ounsel may assume that the interest of the class is to receive the maximum payment 
possible, even if such payment would threaten the Company‘s ability to remain an ongoing 
concern. But the majority of the [class]—who have indicated that they are typical of the class—
continue to hold their securities; their losses remain unrealized.‖) (citation omitted); Gluck, 976 
F. Supp. at 548 (appointing an institutional investor and reasoning that ―[t]hough considering 
the long term interests of defendant companies might in some circumstances reduce the 
immediate damage payments to the plaintiff class[,] . . . it will also improve the chances that the 
company will experience future growth‖). 
 49. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1636; see also In re Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d at 227, 246 
(3d Cir. 2001) (agreeing to the lead plaintiff‘s request for corporate-governance changes). 
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like electoral accountability for directors, audit procedures, say-on-pay 
initiatives, and increased transparency.50 Targeting the individual 
wrongdoers also avoids the circularity problem—that essentially 
investors are paying investors minus expensive transaction costs from 
the attorneys. The downside, however, is that if the institutional lead 
plaintiff focuses principally on corporate reforms as opposed to 
individual liability, then those reforms may have less punitive and 
deterrent effect. Plus, when institutions and former shareholders want 
fundamentally different remedies, it means that the lead plaintiff‘s 
interest conflicts squarely with those who want to maximize their 
recovery. Accordingly, a single lead plaintiff cannot adequately 
represent the entire class.51 Moreover, instituting corporate-
governance reform through securities class actions circumvents 
democratic voting procedures and other established channels for 
shareholder reforms.52 
 
 50. Governance Reform Latest Settlement Bargaining Chip?, COMPLIANCE WEEK, (Sept. 2, 
2003), http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?returl=/governance-reform-latest-
settlement-bargaining-chip/article/182561/&pagetypeid=28&articleid=182561&accesslevel=2& 
expireddays=0&accessAndPrice=0 (―In most [shareholder litigation] cases, the agreements to 
undertake reform are in addition to financial payments, but in some—including Siebel Systems‘ 
recent announcement that it would limit the stock options given to its directors and institute 
other checks and balances to settle a shareholder lawsuit filed by the Teachers‘ Retirement 
System of Louisiana—the governance changes comprise the bulk of key settlement issues.‖); 
Press Release, Milberg LLP, Milberg and Governance for Owners Unite to Promote Corporate 
Governance, available at http://www.milberg.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/469/GO-
Milberg.pdf (―Milberg has often sought corporate governance enhancements as part of its 
litigation efforts.‖); see also Taub Stephen, First Backdating Lawsuit Ends in Whimper, 
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx? 
returl=/first-backdating-lawsuit-ends-in-whimper/article/184630/&pagetypeid=28&articleid= 
184630&accesslevel=2&expireddays=0&accessAndPrice=0 (noting that Lerach Coughlin, who 
represented CalPERS, was appointed the lead plaintiff in the options-backdating securities 
class-action suit against UnitedHealth and requested ―non-monetary relief, including corporate-
governance reform and forcing the corporate insiders to bear their own legal fees); Louis M. 
Thompson, Jr., The Individual Investor: A Potential „Swing‟ Voter, COMPLIANCE WEEK (May 22, 
2007), http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?returl=/the-individual-investor-a-
potential-swing-voter/article/184919/&pagetypeid=28&articleid=184919&accesslevel=2& 
expireddays=0&accessAndPrice=0 (describing ―the growing role of activist institutional 
investors‖).  
 51. Alexander, supra note 48, at 1505; Fisch, supra note 48, at 546; Heck, supra note 48, at 
1211; see also Anthony Marchetta et al., Corporate Reform Through Securities Class Action 
Settlements, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
900005491591&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; cf. In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig. II, 203 F.R.D. 
189, 192 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (disqualifying two plaintiffs who ―expressed a concern about the 
impact of the case on the company defendant‖). 
 52. Marchetta et al., supra note 51 (arguing that seeking corporate-governance reform 
through litigation ―circumvent[s] the channels through which shareholders properly may seek 
corporate governance changes‖). 
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To date, court challenges along these lines have met with 
mixed success.53 Despite the PSLRA‘s language that the lead plaintiff 
must satisfy Rule 23‘s requirements,54 some courts claim that its 
preference for institutional investors trumps typicality and adequacy 
and that balancing damages with corporate-governance reforms 
during settlement is economically sound and beneficial for most 
investors.55 Other courts recognize that conflict exists, but encourage 
former shareholders to file a separate action.56 
Third, the behavioral economics literature suggests that 
decisionmakers are more willing risk takers when less money is at 
stake.57 This so-called ―peanuts effect,‖ where people take risks when 
playing for ―peanuts,‖ suggests that investors with less at stake in a 
securities class action will be less risk averse when litigating.58 In 
other words, a small stakeholder is apt to litigate toward trial rather 
than to settle. 
But who counts as a ―small stakeholder‖ in any given securities 
class action and what counts as ―peanuts‖ to any claimant depends on 
how much money is at stake vis-à-vis a claimant‘s overall wealth. 
What amounts to peanuts to a corporation where the recovery is a 
fractional percentage of its overall portfolio could be an individual 
investor‘s life savings. For instance, in one recent study, pension funds 
reported recovering an average of $6.75 million a year from 
shareholder litigation, but that constituted on average only 0.035% of 
 
 53. Compare In re Gemstar-TV Guide Int‘l Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 447, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(declining to find a conflict between selling and holding plaintiffs), with In re Cendant Corp., 264 
F.3d at 244 (noting the conflict between holding and selling plaintiffs, but finding that ―Congress 
must have thought that the situation present here does not inherently create an unacceptable 
conflict of interest.‖). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc) (2006); see also Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 
70, 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (―[T]here is no reason to believe that the PSLRA altered the preexisting 
standard by which class representatives are evaluated under Rule 23.‖); H.R. REP. NO. 104–369, 
at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (―The provisions of the bill relating to the appointment of a lead plaintiff 
are not intended to affect current law with regard to challenges to the adequacy of the class 
representative or typicality of the claims among the class.‖). 
 55. See, e.g., Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997). 
 56. See, e.g., In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 111–12 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 57. Harry Markowitz, The Utility of Wealth, 60 J. POL. ECON. 151, 151 (1952); Drazen Prelec 
& George Loewenstein, Decision Making over Time and Under Uncertainty: A Common 
Approach, 37 MGMT. SCI. 770, 770 (1991); Bethany J. Weber & Gretchen B. Chapman, Playing 
for Peanuts: Why Is Risk Seeking More Common for Low-Stakes Gambles?, 97 ORG. BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 31, 31–33 (2005). 
 58. See Michael Gousgounis, Association-Driven Aggregate Litigation: Peanuts Effect and 
Democratization of Litigation Governance 5 (May 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1469046. 
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each fund‘s total assets.59 Because most individual investors hold 
underdiversified portfolios, they are likely to be more risk averse since 
they have more at stake overall.60 Accordingly, in any given securities 
class action, if the plaintiff with the largest claim faces less loss vis-à-
vis its overall wealth, then it is more likely to take risks even though a 
smaller shareholder with her lifesavings at stake would prefer to 
settle. 
Fourth, because institutional investors hold heavily diversified 
portfolios, they may rationally think that, over time, fraud is just as 
likely to benefit as it is to harm them.61 On any given day, the 
institution may be in the plaintiff class suing the defendant 
corporation or in the shareholder group bearing the brunt of 
settlement costs.62 Thus, there is less incentive to incur transactional 
costs from protracted litigation or from monitoring the attorneys. 
2. Due Process Concerns 
It is not a huge leap to suggest that systemic incentives 
encourage institutional lead plaintiffs to inadequately represent the 
class. Still, whether these conflicts amount to inadequate 
representation depends on how we define ―interests‖ and ―conflicts,‖ 
two concepts that remain doctrinally muddled despite prolific 
academic commentary.63 The way in which we approach these terms 
 
 59. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 333 
(2008) (―There is considerable variation in fund recoveries, ranging from 0.209% of fund assets 
down to 0.003% of assets. . . . [F]or many funds, it remains an open question as to whether 
litigation recoveries are economically significant.‖).  
 60. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common 
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 778 (2000) (noting that 
typical individual investors have portfolios with only four stocks); William N. Goetzmann & Alok 
Kumar, Equity Portfolio Diversification, 12 REV. FIN. 433, 433–34, 444, 460 (2008) (finding that 
―on average, individual investors hold underdiversified portfolios‖ with an average number of 
between four and seven stocks, and that under-diversification is greater in retirement accounts). 
The Goetzmann and Kumar study accounted for mutual funds and found that mutual fund 
holders had a better-diversified portfolio. Id. at 435. An earlier 1995 article, which used data 
from 1983, reported that that ―[t]he median US stockholder holds a single publicly traded stock.‖ 
Morgan Kelly, All Their Eggs in One Basket: Portfolio Diversification of US Households, 27 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 87, 88 (1995). The recent economic downturn is making small investors 
even more cautious. Graham Bowley, In Striking Shift, Small Investors Flee Stock Market, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at A1. 
 61. Fisch, supra note 48, at 546. 
 62. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and 
Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1538, 1556 (2006).  
 63. For various academic proposals on addressing adequate representation in the face of 
conflicting interests, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1677–97 (2008); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts 
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likewise depends on which model we employ to frame the relationship 
between class members and their representative. This Section 
explores three models—the Kalven-Rosenfield model, the corporate-
law model, and the governance model—and the ways in which they 
incorporate ―interests‖ and ―conflicts.‖ By unleashing these terms from 
the models to which they are tied and importing the courts‘ current 
use of ―interests‖ into the governance model, judges can continue to 
certify classes by broadly defining interests, but can safeguard 
procedural due process by appointing adequate lead plaintiffs. 
In their seminal article, The Contemporary Function of the 
Class Suit, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield provided one of the 
first modern models for understanding the class‘s relationship to its 
representative.64 They view privately enforcing securities laws as an 
outcropping of or complement to the SEC‘s administrative body.65 As 
such, they implicitly adopted a broad definition of interests.66 As Steve 
Yeazell explains it, the Kalven-Rosenfield view essentially wedded two 
ideas: ―First, it embraces the interest definition of the class, requiring 
no more than an (assumedly) shared interest in recouping losses. 
Second, it links that concept of the interest class not to any particular 
social group but to the general task of law enforcement.‖67 The 
difficulty here, however, is in finding any meaningful line that 
separates the interests of the class representative and the class, on 
one hand, from the public at large, on the other. Still, in 1941, 
plaintiffs opted into rather than out of class actions and thus 
consented to the representation. This counterbalanced an expansive 
view of when someone could represent another‘s interest.68 According 
to the Kalven-Rosenfield view, the divide between institutions and 
individual investors is less troubling—both have a basic interest in 
recovering their losses and enforcing substantive rights.69 
 
of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 581, 582 (suggesting that ―a conflict of interest should be deemed impermissible if a 
reasonable plaintiff, operating under a veil of ignorance as to his or her role in the class, would 
refuse to consent to the arrangement‖); Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class 
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 318–24 (2003); Tidmarsh, supra note 25, at 1137. 
 64. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 686–88, 699. 
 65. Id. at 687. 
 66. Id. at 691–93, 699. 
 67. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 232 (1987). 
 68. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 692–94, 694 n.33, 711. 
 69. Id. at 710, 717–19. One commentator has argued that adequate representation should 
not be a concern so long as class members are not made worse off than they would have been by 
individually controlling their cases. Tidmarsh, supra note 25, at 1151–58 (2009). In response, I 
have argued that this may create problems of its own, including questions about procedural 
legitimacy. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Adequacy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 55, 58 (2010). 
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The absence of actual consent and today‘s iteration of Rule 
23(b)(3) as an opt-out class has necessitated a more robust identity of 
interests between the representative and the represented. These 
changes have likewise reframed the ways in which we view the 
representative‘s relationship with the represented in both economic 
and governance terms.  
The private, corporate-law model, as developed principally by 
John Coffee, casts the relationship between the class members and 
their representatives as one between the principals (the class 
members) and the agents (the attorney and class representative).70 In 
particular, it views the class members‘ relationship to their agents as 
a fundamental problem inherent in the separation of ownership and 
control.71 When owners employ managers to control their assets, as in 
the shareholder-director relationship, the managers may lack the 
incentive to maximize the owners‘ assets. Actors within securities 
class actions are subject to the same economic pressures: the attorneys 
act as financiers, but the class members truly own the claim. 
The public, governance model, as articulated by Sam 
Issacharoff and Richard Nagareda, views the class member-class 
representative relationship as one between the representatives, or 
governors, and the members, the governed.72 Although this model 
encompasses the problem of aligning principals‘ and agents‘ 
incentives, the focus is on the institutional arrangement‘s legitimacy. 
Just as a government‘s legitimacy rests on ―the ability to curb 
oppressive, abusive, or self-serving behavior that may emerge from 
within the newly created governing class,‖ the class action serves in 
part to tax the individual class members and appoint an agent on 
their behalf.73 Recognizing the need for an agent, however, tells us 
little about whether that agent acts properly or whether we should 
presume that the agent‘s actions are legitimate.74 Thus, as in the 
principal-agent relationship in the corporate-law model, the interests 
between the representative and represented must align. But, 
depending on the governance arrangement, what legitimizes the 
 
 70. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class 
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987). Samuel Issacharoff has also applied the labels ―exit‖, 
―voice‖, and ―loyalty‖ to the class context. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the 
Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 366. 
 71. PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, § 1.04 cmt. b. 
 72. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 338–40; Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in 
the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 635–39 (2008). 
 73. Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 339. 
 74. Id. at 340. 
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representative‘s actions on behalf of the governed shifts between 
loyalty through adequate representation, exit through opt-out 
opportunities, and voice through opportunities to be heard.75 
Using the governance model as its template, the American Law 
Institute‘s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation suggests that 
structural conflicts endanger adequate representation.76 Although 
eliminating every conflict is impossible, adequate representation 
protects against conflicts ―that would present a significant risk that 
the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of 
the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds 
aside from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor 
claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.‖77 In this vein, 
courts should pay ―particular attention to conflicts with a significant 
potential to skew the conduct of settlement negotiations‖ and to ―the 
alignment between the economic interests of claimants and their 
lawyers . . . .‖78 
From a structural conflicts-of-interest perspective, an 
institutional lead plaintiff acting self-interestedly, as Rule 23(a) 
assumes it will, may inadequately represent the class. As Sam 
Issacharoff explains, ―When agents have external loyalties, such that 
they will profit off satellite dealings with the defendant, there is no 
basis for trusting their stewardship.‖79 Public and union pension 
funds, the most likely institutional lead plaintiffs, may select class 
counsel based on less transparent influences—portfolio-monitoring 
agreements, lobbyists, or pay-to-play practices.80 Because the lead 
plaintiff typically selects class counsel,81 once selected, counsel has 
nearly every incentive to placate the institution in exchange for repeat 
business. But counsel has few incentives to loyally represent the rest 
 
 75. See Nagareda, supra note 72, at 638. 
 76. PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, §§ 1.05, 2.07(a). Samuel Issacharoff was the reporter on the 
project, and Robert Klonoff, Richard Nagareda, and Charles Silver served as associate reporters. 
 77. Id. § 2.07(a)(1)(B). 
 78. Id. § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 79. See Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 381. 
 80. Pension funds may also have fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (―ERISA‖) that could affect or differ from their lead-plaintiff responsibilities. See 
Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors in 
Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1404–09 (2001). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 77z–1(a)(3)(B)(v) (2006); see also § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(v) (―The most adequate 
plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the 
class.‖); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001) (―[T]he court should 
generally employ a deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiff‘s choices [of counsel].‖); In 
re Flight Safety Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 132 (D. Conn. 2005) (―Lead plaintiffs have 
the discretion to retain counsel of their choice to represent the class, subject to court approval.‖). 
2b. Burch_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/2011 11:43 AM 
2011] OPTIMAL LEAD PLAINTIFFS 1131 
of the class and even fewer incentives to point out rifts between class 
members that would require subclassing and separate representation. 
Yet, when modern-day courts consider the typicality and 
adequacy requirements in securities class actions, they tend to adopt a 
view more akin to Kalven and Rosenfield‘s than the ALI‘s. For 
example, in discussing securities cases, a leading treatise on the 
subject summarizes judges‘ inquiries in Kalven-Rosenfield terms: 
―[T]ypicality may be met when the named plaintiff and class members 
have sustained monetary injury from the defendant‘s conduct and 
seek to recover damages for losses . . . which affect all class members, 
despite individual differences.‖82 
Although broadly defining interests allows courts to certify 
securities classes, it disregards the PSLRA‘s directive to take the 
governance model one step further. The lead-plaintiff appointment 
process directs judges to incorporate class members with significant 
financial interests into class governance, thereby giving voice to the 
governed. Thus, in securities class actions, the institutional 
arrangement‘s legitimacy—at least for individual investors—hinges on 
voice and loyalty. (As explained momentarily, opting out is unrealistic 
for noninstitutional investors without individualized legal advice.83) 
Absent typical claims and similar interests, the voice and 
loyalty rights that authorize the securities class action‘s institutional 
arrangement collapse. The judge, of course, is the one who determines 
typicality and adequacy. As such, judges are the only gatekeepers 
standing between the self-nominated, self-interested would-be class 
representative and the governed. But when judges broadly define 
interests in both certifying the class and in appointing the lead 
plaintiff, they miss the importance of their role in incorporating 
qualified putative class members into class governance. 
 
 82. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:24 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2010); see also Endo v. 
Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 167–68 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Likewise, in their seminal work that led to 
Congress passing the PSLRA, Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman devoted little attention to 
potential conflicts of interest between institutions and the remaining class members. Elliott J. 
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can 
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2109 (1995) (―In class 
actions in which institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, questions relating to typicality 
rarely should arise.‖); see also S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 11 n.32 (observing that Weiss and 
Beckerman‘s article ―provided the basis for the ‗most adequate plaintiff‘ provision‖); Choi et al., 
supra note 38, at 879 (―Weiss and Beckerman devoted relatively little attention to exploring the 
ways in which institutional investors‘ interests might diverge from those of the rest of the 
class.‖).  
 83. See infra Part I.C. 
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C. The Opt-Out Trend 
Given the potential intraclass conflicts, it‘s no surprise that 
plaintiffs opt out of securities class actions. But the opt outs generally 
do not include those most prejudiced by an inadequate 
representative—the individual investors. Instead, institutions opt 
out.84 One 2008 survey of pension funds reported that sixty percent of 
its respondents pursued individual lawsuits instead of remaining in 
the class.85 Those who opted out cited various reasons for doing so, 
such as maximizing their recovery, pursuing additional claims, 
controlling litigation strategy and settlement, suing in a preferred 
(often state-court) forum, leveraging their position to demand 
corporate-governance changes, and receiving settlement funds 
quickly.86 Put simply, institutions prefer to procedurally control their 
claims and attorneys—they want autonomy. Further distilled, though 
they may not fear ―inadequate‖ representation, they want the best 
representation possible where their attorney faithfully and diligently 
works to achieve their desired outcome.87 
Opting out as a large institution makes perfect sense given the 
class action‘s historical purpose. Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are 
designed to serve clients with small-stakes claims or—where cases are 
economically viable but difficult to litigate effectively on an individual 
basis—to amass claims and thereby create a credible threat. For 
instance, as a 1937 SEC report explained, ―The wide diffusion of 
securities has created a situation where the single and isolated 
security holder usually is helpless in protecting his own interests or 
 
 84. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 416–17. 
 85. Choi & Fisch, supra note 59, at 331–32. 
 86. BLAIR A. NICHOLAS & IAN D. BERG, WHY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS OPT-OUT OF 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS AND PURSUE DIRECT INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 4–6, available at 
http://www.blbglaw.com/news/publications/data/00113/_res/id=sa_File1/PLIreprint7_22_09# 
2.pdf; Choi & Fisch, supra note 59, at 331–32; Josh Gerstein, Investors Opt Out of Time Warner 
Class Action Suit, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 8, 2006, at 5. Opt-outs have fared better in several high-profile 
lawsuits. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Time Warner Case Finds a Surprise, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 7, 2006, at 
1 (describing the AOL Time Warner opt-outs); Kevin LaCroix, Opt-Outs: A Worrisome Trend in 
Securities Class Action Litigation, OAKBRIDGE INSIGHTS, Apr. 2007, at 1, 1, 3 (describing opt-
outs in the WorldCom litigation). When plaintiffs opt out and sue either on their own or in 
consolidated proceedings with fewer than fifty plaintiffs, they can avoid the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which applies only to proceedings with class allegations or fifty 
or more plaintiffs. If they opt out after a class-action settlement, then SLUSA‘s stay no longer 
applies. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(D); see also Coffee, supra note 35, at 430–31 (explaining how opt-
outs can avoid federal restraints and move to a more favorable state-court forum). 
 87. See Burch, supra note 69, at 60. 
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pleading his own cause.‖88 Absent the class vehicle to overcome 
collective-action problems, the wrongdoer may go scot-free and be 
undeterred from committing future fraud. 
But here‘s the thing: as times have changed, so has 
institutional ownership in the equities market. In 1966, when the 
Advisory Committee drafted Rule 23 in its modern form, household 
investors owned 83 percent of U.S. equities and institutions owned 
only 17 percent; in 1995, when Congress enacted the PSLRA, 
household investors owned 49.2 percent and institutions owned 50.8 
percent.89 Household investors‘ equity ownership continues to decline. 
In 2008, they accounted for only 36.2 percent of U.S. equity holdings, 
whereas institutions held 63.8 percent.90 
From these statistics, one might wonder why institutions use 
an outdated class vehicle at all; why not initiate their own lawsuit 
instead of remaining in the class and then opting out? In part, the 
answer is tied to competitive plaintiffs‘ attorneys. Plaintiffs‘ attorneys 
work for contingent fees and the larger their client base, the greater 
their fee. Or, if the judge does not select their pension fund as the lead 
plaintiff, then waiting to opt that fund out of the class after the 
defendant proposes a settlement means class counsel will have 
already done much of work for them. Even if the opt-out‘s attorney 
lacks access to the behind-the-scenes information, litigating is a safer 
gamble once the class attorneys shepherd it successfully through the 
pretrial process. The other part of the answer is that institutions 
persist with class actions only until discovering that the proposed 
settlement is undesirable—the payout is too low or it fails to include 
their preferred remedy. Only then does it make sense for the 
institution to leave the pack‘s relative safety and opt out. 
The problem is, opting out is a true option only for institutions 
and the special few receiving individual legal advice. Opting out 
systematically disadvantages smaller, individual investors. They‘re 
faced with a Hobson‘s Choice: theoretically, they could opt out, but 
doing so is not a realistic option; or, they could remain in the class 
where the lead-plaintiff institution chases its own interests, lead 
counsel conspires with the lead plaintiff, the judge prefers to settle, 
and the defendant disproportionately reduces the class‘s share to pay 
 
 88. SEC. & EXCH. COMM‘N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, 
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, 
PART II, at 1 (1937). 
 89. SEC. INDUS. ASS‘N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 66 (2001). Household investors 
include individuals and households of individuals. Id. 
 90. J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 2:29 (2009) 
(citing SEC. INDUS. ASS‘N, supra note 89, at 65). 
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off or prevent the opt outs. What‘s more, when institutions opt out 
they eliminate a would-be objector‘s dissenting voice and add to the 
probability that the small investor—the one the class vehicle was 
meant to protect—will be inadequately represented. Plus, because 
larger institutions create a credible threat against the defendant and 
are more likely to opt out, as the savvy defendant pursues finality, it 
is likely to skew its settlement offer in the institutions‘ favor and 
further prejudice the rest of the class. 
II. LEAD-PLAINTIFF GROUPS 
What then is a court to do? Courts could define ―interests‖ in 
ALI terms across the board, but that would make it more difficult to 
certify a securities class, which would, in turn, undermine private 
enforcement‘s deterrent effect.91 Or courts could subclass based on 
different interests. But, while subclassing would alleviate the 
adequate-representation problem, it may undermine the subclass‘s 
settlement leverage. Divorcing noninstitutional investors from the 
institutions that typically hold large stakes could drastically weaken 
individual investors‘ credible threat against the defendant. And 
suggesting that individual investors opt out of the class vehicle that 
was designed for their very situation is equally implausible. The most 
pragmatic solution, as Part III explores, is to keep with current 
doctrine and define ―interests‖ in Kalven-Rosenfield terms when 
certifying the class, but to understand the judge‘s role in appointing 
lead plaintiffs as one that incorporates qualified representatives into 
class governance. 
Appointing a lead-plaintiff group with members who represent 
the class‘s diverse interests could alleviate systemic conflicts of 
interest and the due process problems they create. But lead-plaintiff 
groups have long been criticized as poor attorney monitors. Since 
Congress passed the PSLRA, courts and commentators have taken 
assorted and conflicting positions on the merits of designating 
multiple institutions or individuals as the lead plaintiff. 
This tension comes, in part, from Milberg Weiss‘s early 
strategy to maintain its market dominance post-PSLRA. While many 
 
 91. As I‘ve elaborated elsewhere, private enforcement through securities class actions 
furthers regulatory goals. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex 
Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 69 (2008) (explaining how securities class actions generate 
positive spillovers). But see Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud 
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) (suggesting that multiple 
enforcers, including private enforcement actions, do not make sense from a deterrence 
perspective). 
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plaintiffs‘ law firms developed close relationships with pension funds 
(a strategy that caused its own conflicts), Milberg Weiss relied on the 
PSLRA‘s presumption that the ―most adequate plaintiff‖ is ―the person 
or group of persons that . . . has the largest financial interest . . . .‖92 It 
cobbled together as many plaintiffs as it took to achieve the largest 
financial interest.93 These large and unwieldy aggregations, however, 
did little to further Congress‘s goal of reinstating client control, 
instilling a viable check on plaintiffs‘ attorneys, or dislodging Milberg 
Weiss‘s near monopoly. When Congress passed the PSLRA, one of its 
most notable targets was Bill Lerach (then a named partner in 
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach), who famously said, ―I have 
the greatest practice of law in the world . . . I have no clients.‖94 Not 
surprisingly then, academics and the SEC opposed Milberg Weiss‘s 
large aggregations and denounced them as inconsistent with 
congressional intent.95 
Despite early efforts to thwart lead-plaintiff groups, courts 
have gradually embraced smaller groups, at least where they 
demonstrate cohesiveness and an ability to control class counsel. 
Academics, however, remain skeptical. Empirical evidence measuring 
settlement size and attorneys‘ fees demonstrates that lead-plaintiff 
groups tend not to perform well on either front.96 Thus, to better 
understand why and under what circumstances courts select groups 
and to develop a working hypothesis about why groups have 
performed poorly, this Part begins by teasing out the criteria courts 
use to appoint groups including group size, members‘ relationship, and 
group cohesion. Next, it examines whether groups form from a 
competitive lead-plaintiff process and how they make decisions. It 
then reevaluates conventional academic criticisms and uses the social 
science literature on group decisionmaking to offer an alternative and 
more likely rationale for underperformance—group polarization and 
confirmation bias. As it turns out, group cohesion and homogeneity—
 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
4(a)(3)(B)(i) (the court ―shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported 
plaintiff class . . .‖). 
 93. Coffee, supra note 35, at 415. 
 94. S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 6 & n.8 (1995) (citing William P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, 
FORBES, Oct. 11, 1993, at 52 (quoting William Lerach)). 
 95. See, e.g., Brief for Securities & Exchange Comm‘n. as Amici Curiae, Switzenbaum v. 
Orbital Sci. Corp., 187 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Va. May 18, 1998) (No. 99–197–A), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/orbital.htm; Fisch, supra note 35, at 69 (―Aggregation is 
inconsistent with the client empowerment objective of the PSLRA and is unsupported by the 
legislative history.‖). 
 96. See infra notes 169–81 and accompanying text. 
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traits courts wholeheartedly embrace in selecting groups—exacerbate 
these conditions. 
A. Court-Appointed Groups: The Lure of Homogeneity and Cohesion 
Although courts and commentators refer to ―lead-plaintiff 
groups‖ generically, group performance varies based on (1) whether 
the group forms from a competitive lead-plaintiff selection process and 
(2) the type of group members (individual investors,97 institutions,98 or 
a combination99). Not all groups are created equal. In a comprehensive 
study of lead plaintiffs and agency costs, Stephen Choi examined lead 
plaintiffs‘ pretrial motions from 2003 to 2005 and found that ―groups 
that form where competition continues to exist for lead-plaintiff status 
correlate with a significant increase in attorney hours (and thus lower 
agency costs) compared with non-aggregating lead plaintiffs.‖100 Lead-
plaintiff groups comprised solely of individual investors did not 
significantly affect the number of attorney hours and thus did not 
decrease agency costs, but groups that included institutional investors 
―correlate[d] with significantly lower attorney agency costs.‖101 
Interestingly, appointing labor union pension funds did not correlate 
 
 97. See, e.g., In re Ribozyme Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 192 F.R.D. 656, 660–62 (D. Colo. 
2000) (appointing five private investors); In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 220–21 
(D.N.J. 1999) (appointing five individual investors); In re Advanced Tissue Scis. Sec. Litig., 184 
F.R.D. 346, 351–53 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (appointing six individual investors). 
 98. See, e.g., Reimer v. Ambac Fin. Group, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 411(NRB), 2008 WL 2073931, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008) (appointing a group of three public pension funds); City of Brockton 
Ret. Sys. v. Shaw Group, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72745, at *10–14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007) 
(appointing two institutional investors); In re Bank One S‘holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 
780, 783 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (appointing a group of six institutional investors); Local 144 Nursing 
Home Pension Fund v. Honeywell Int‘l, Inc., No. 00–3605 (DRD), 2000 WL 33173017, at *4–5 
(D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2000) (appointing a group comprised of five institutional investors); 
Switzenbaum, 187 F.R.D. at 250–51 (appointing five pension funds); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 
182 F.R.D. 144, 147, 149–50 (D.N.J. 1998) (appointing three state retirement funds, except for 
the claim where they had a conflict of interest). 
 99. See, e.g., In re Host Am. Corp. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 102, 105–06 (D. Conn. 2006) 
(appointing a group that consisted of a broker-dealer/hedge fund and two individual investors 
and noting that the group composition would ―provid[e] a diversity of representation reflective of 
the makeup of the class as a whole‖); In re Flight Safety Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 
131–33 (D. Conn. 2005) (appointing one individual and one institutional investor, represented by 
two law firms); In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438–39 (E.D. Va. 2000) 
(appointing one institutional and one individual investor); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (appointing a pension fund, three individual investors, 
and an institutional investor). 
 100. Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions 27 (N.Y.U. Law 
& Econ. Research Paper No. 08–53, June 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1293926. 
 101. Id. at 27–28, 36. 
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with lower agency costs,102 which suggests that some of the same 
practices causing conflicts of interest—such as portfolio-monitoring 
agreements and pay-to-play practices—may affect pension funds‘ 
monitoring abilities. 
1. Courts‘ Criteria 
Courts‘ willingness to designate groups as lead plaintiffs 
ranges from skeptical to accepting. Earlier commentators situated 
courts‘ opinions into three categories: (1) those that liberally appoint 
groups of unrelated investors;103 (2) those that allow aggregation but 
limit the size;104 and (3) those that select only closely knit groups or 
refuse to appoint groups at all.105 But in the past ten years, most 
courts have moved away from the extremes and allow some 
aggregation. 
Given this shift, what was formerly the second category is now 
best viewed as two rough categories. In the first category, courts 
appoint groups of unrelated investors so long as there is no bad faith 
in forming the group.106 These courts employ a ―rule of reason‖ test, 
where they assess the group‘s ability to represent the class‘s interests 
and determine whether the group furthers or inhibits lawyer-driven 
litigation.107 Using this rationale, a court might reject a group that 
tries to bootstrap members to the group at the last minute, but accept 
groups formed in good faith before the filing deadline even absent a 
relationship that predates the litigation.108 The second ―middle‖ 
 
 102. Id. at 36. 
 103. See, e.g., In re Advanced Tissue Scis. Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 352–53 (S.D. Cal. 1998) 
(appointing six out of 250 unrelated individual investors in the McKitty Group). 
 104. See, e.g., In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 217–18 (D.D.C. 1999) (narrowing 
the proposed group from twenty to three); In re Reliance Acceptance Grp., 1998 WL 388260, at *1 
n.3, *3 n.11 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (approving a motion that six members of a larger class of sixty-one 
be appointed to serve as lead plaintiffs). 
 105. See, e.g., Goldberger v. Pxre Grp., Ltd., No. 06–CV–3410 (KMK), 2007 WL 980417, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (―Courts (including this one) view such aggregations of individual shareholders with 
disapproval.‖); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(refusing to aggregate unrelated plaintiffs); In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 
157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that unrelated investors cannot be considered a ―group of 
persons‖). For views from earlier commentators, see Fisch, supra note 35, at 65–69; Heck, supra 
note 48, at 1214–16. 
 106. See, e.g., Barnet v. Elan Corp., 236 F.R.D. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that there 
was no evidence of a group forming in bad faith). 
 107. See, e.g., id.  
 108. See, e.g., Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sci. Corp., 187 F.R.D. 246, 250 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(refusing to appoint a group that was not forthcoming about conflicts and attempted to bootstrap 
members in and out of its leadership). 
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category includes courts that are willing to select lead-plaintiff groups 
that demonstrate cohesiveness—some require a preexisting 
relationship, but most are willing to appoint unrelated members.109 
These courts use a ―case-by-case‖ analysis and prefer groups who 
outline plans for coordination and decisionmaking and demonstrate 
control over their attorneys.110 Thus, courts tend to fall along the 
following spectrum: 
 
Broad interpretation                                              Narrow interpretation 

































 109. See In re Versata, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 01–1439 SI, 2001 WL 34012374, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 20, 2001) (finding that a prelitigation relationship requirement is too rigid because 
―[t]he beneficial characteristics sought in a group with a preexisting relationship-cohesiveness, 
an ability to direct litigation, and collective confluence with the interests of the class can be 
found in unrelated groups on a case-by-case basis‖). 
 110. See, e.g., Crawford v. Onyx Software Corp, No. C01–1346L, 2002 WL 356760, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 2002) (refusing to appoint a group of three individual investors who could 
not coordinate their actions to control their lawyer); In re MicroStrategy Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 
2d 427, 435 (E.D. Va. 2000) (using a case-by-case approach because it allowed maximum 
flexibility to best represent the interests of the class). 
 111. See, e.g., In re Advanced Tissue Scis. Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 347 (S.D. Cal. 1998) 
(appointing six out of 250 unrelated individual investors in the McKitty Group). 
 112. See, e.g., Barnet v. Elan Corp., PLC, 236 F.R.D. 158, 162–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (appointing 
a group of five institutions and one individual with no preexisting relationship). 
 113. See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Verifone Holdings, Inc., No. C 07–06140 MHP, 2008 WL 
3925289, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (―[T]he court also finds that a pre-existing relationship 
between entities that comprise a group is not required if the resulting group is small and 
cohesive enough such that it can adequately control and oversee the litigation.‖); Yousefi v. 
Lockheed Martin, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (appointing a small group of 
unrelated plaintiffs). 
 114. See, e.g., In re Waste Mgmt., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (―[A] small 
group with the largest financial interest in the outcome of the litigation and a pre-litigation 
relationship based on more than their losing investment, satisfies the terms of the PSLRA and 
serves the purpose behind its enactment.‖); In re E.Spire Comm‘n, Inc., Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 
207, 213 (D. Md. 2000) (―Had the Matassa Group been able to show that its members had a 
relationship with each other based upon factors independent of this class action, there would 
then be more support for their argument that they should be presumed to be the most adequate 
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The courts willing to appoint groups consider the following 
factors and rationales, but weigh them differently. 
Size.—On the whole, courts prefer smaller groups and 
principally reject larger ones as inconsistent with the PSLRA‘s 
intent.116 The larger the group, the less members are able to exert 
control.117 Conversely, smaller groups more effectively manage the 
litigation and lawyers.118 The SEC, for example, has opined that 
groups between three and five members are acceptable because the 
―group is small enough to be capable of effectively managing the 
litigation and the lawyers,‖ to ―facilitate joint decisionmaking,‖ and to 
―assure that each group member has a sufficiently large stake in the 
litigation.‖119 Not all courts strictly adhere to this recommendation; 
some simply want to ensure that the group is not too unwieldy to 
manage the litigation.120 
Members‟ Relationship.—Some courts care whether the 
proposed group members are related or unrelated, with some 
 
lead plaintiff. However, they have failed to show that they are a ‗cohesive group,‘ foreclosing 
their appointment as the most adequate lead plaintiffs.‖); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. 
Supp. 2d 845, 846 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (―Where the members of the group do not share business or 
other relationships independent of the lawsuit, however, this court concludes that appointment 
of such an artificial group of persons as lead plaintiffs should be rare under the PSLRA.‖). 
 115. See, e.g., In re Donkenny, Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(expressing concern that appointing a group would allow the attorney to control the litigation). 
 116. See, e.g., Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 627, 636–37 (D.N.J. 2002) 
(considering whether a group of five individuals was too large to represent the class); In re Baan 
Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 217 (D.D.C. 1999) (rejecting a group of 466 shareholders represented 
by a subgroup of twenty shareholders designated by the group and finding that a small 
committee would be more effective and efficient). 
 117. But see D‘Hondt v. Digi Int‘l Inc., No. CIV 97–5 JRT RLE, 1997 WL 405668, at *3 (D. 
Minn. Apr. 3, 1997) (―[A]n equally cogent assertion can be broached that, when more greatly 
numbered, the Lead Plaintiffs can more effectively withstand any supposed effort by the class 
counsel to seize control of the class claims.‖). 
 118. See, e.g., Barnet v. Elan Corp., 236 F.R.D. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (considering size in 
light of ability to effectively manage litigation); Brown v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 
No. 02–611–KI, 2002 WL 31109563 (D. Or. Sept. 24, 2002) (appointing a group of four 
individuals, two of whom were related, but the others were unrelated); In re Baan, 186 F.R.D. at 
217 (―[A] small committee will generally be far more forceful, effective and efficient than a larger 
aggregation.‖). 
 119. Memorandum of the Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n, Amicus Curiae at 1, In re Baan, 186 
F.R.D. 214. 
 120. See Funke v. Life Fin. Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11877(CBM), 2003 WL 194204, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 28, 2003) (appointing nine individual plaintiffs); Weltz v. Lee, 199 F.R.D. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (appointing seven investors); cf. In re Advanced Tissue Scis. Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 
352 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (refusing to appoint over 250 unrelated investors); Chill v. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 408 (D. Minn. 1998) (declining to appoint a group with over 300 members 
because it ―would threaten the interests of the class, would subvert the intent of Congress, and 
would be too unwieldy to allow for the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of this 
action‖). 
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preferring members with a prelitigation relationship,121 others 
protecting against groups aggregated for the sole purpose of becoming 
the lead plaintiff,122 and still others ignoring members‘ relationship 
entirely.123 Courts that disallow groups with unrelated members do so 
for several reasons: some claim that appointing unrelated investors 
improperly interprets the term ―groups‖ in the PSLRA because they 
have ―nothing in common with one another beyond their 
investment;‖124 others worry that unrelated members cannot 
―collectively ride herd on counsel anywhere as well as could a single 
sophisticated entity;‖125 and others reason that absent ―something to 
bind them together as a unit, there is no reason for the individual 
members of the group to speak and act with a uniform purpose‖ and 
adequately monitor their attorneys.126 In short, courts are concerned 
that the plaintiffs‘ attorneys simply manufactured a coalition to form 
the largest financial interest and have their firm designated lead 
counsel. The ―group‖ is thus not a true group, but a hodgepodge of 
investors who happened to enter into retainer agreements with the 
same law firm.127 
Group Cohesion.—When courts do appoint groups of unrelated 
investors, they look for a cohesive group that coordinates its litigation 
efforts.128 These courts reason that a cohesive group ―is more likely to 
 
 121. See, e.g., In re Gemstar-TV Guide Int‘l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 447, 451 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (declining to appoint a group aggregated solely for litigation purposes); In re Waste Mgmt., 
Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (―[A] small group with the largest financial 
interest in the outcome of the litigation and a pre-litigation relationship based on more than 
their losing investment, satisfies the terms of the PSLRA and serves the purpose behind its 
enactment.‖). 
 122. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (―If, for example, a 
court were to determine that the movant ‗group‘ with the largest losses had been created by the 
efforts of lawyers hoping to ensure their eventual appointment as lead counsel, it could well 
conclude, based on [the PSLRA‘s] history, that the members of that ‗group‘ could not be counted 
on to monitor counsel in a sufficient manner.‖). 
 123. See, e.g., Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., No. 8:06–CV–
1716–T–23EAJ, 2007 WL 170556 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2007) (appointing a lead plaintiff group 
based solely on which group had the largest financial interest). 
 124. In re Conseco, Inc. Sec. Litig. 120 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (quoting 
Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 (S.D. Ind. 1999)). 
 125. In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 126. In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 815–16 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
 127. Goldberger v. Pxre Grp., Ltd., No. 06–CV–3410 (KMK), 2007 WL 980417, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (―An amalgam of unrelated individuals undoubtedly is different than a 
joint venture of closely related parties.‖); Telxon Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 813–16 (demanding 
more than the ―twin fortuities‖ of suffering a loss and sharing the same attorney); In re Network 
Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (―The only thing the investors 
have in common, however, is the lawyer. They have no link to each other.‖). 
 128. See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Verifone Holdings, Inc., No. C 07–06140 MHP, 2008 WL 
3925289, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (―[T]he court also finds that a pre-existing relationship 
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function smoothly,‖129 though adequate representation has never 
required smooth sailing and eliminating dissent actually proves 
detrimental to better decisionmaking.130 Nevertheless, courts look for 
evidence of cohesion such as organizational meetings, a cohesive 
identity (such as a prelitigation relationship), decisionmaking 
procedures, information sharing, litigation-management agreements, 
plans for cooperation, and members who have something in common 
besides their investment.131 Courts typically use plaintiffs‘ 
prelitigation relationship as a proxy for cohesiveness.132 
While most courts accept a general allegation that the group 
will coordinate its efforts, others expect specific evidence of how 
members will conduct discovery, coordinate litigation strategy, resolve 
their differences, and make decisions.133 Consequently, plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys stress the group‘s cohesive nature and the absence of 
 
between entities that comprise a group is not required if the resulting group is small and 
cohesive enough such that it can adequately control and oversee the litigation.‖); In re Nature‘s 
Sunshine Prods., Inc., No. 2:06–CV–267 TS, 2006 WL 2380965, at *1–2 (D. Utah Aug. 16, 2006) 
(emphasizing the court‘s concern with plaintiff‘s ability to adequately conduct litigation as a 
cohesive group); Schriver v. IMAPC Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 40607, at *25 
(C.D. Cal. May 1, 2006) ([W]hile not per se impermissible[,] lead plaintiffs under the PSLRA[ ] 
are not adequate class representatives absent a showing that they are able to coordinate their 
efforts in the litigation.‖); In re Flight Safety Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 129 (D. 
Conn. 2005) (rejecting a proposed group because the motion ―contains no indication of how the 
newly expanded group would function, such as whether certain lead plaintiffs would handle 
certain aspects of the litigation or whether decisions would be made by group consensus‖). 
 129. Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8538, 2008 WL 2876373, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 16, 2008); Xianglin Shi v. Sina Corp., No. 05 Civ. 2154(NRB), 2005 WL 1561438, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005); cf. Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sci. Corp., 187 F.R.D. 246, 250–51 (E.D. Va. 
1999) (tying the group‘s inability to communicate who its members are to inadequate 
representation). 
 130. See infra notes 190–202 and accompanying text. 
 131. See, e.g., Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing evidence of a prelitigation relationship as an important factor in 
determining cohesiveness); Freudenberg, 2008 WL 2876373, at *5 (same); In re Enron Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 457–58 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (accepting an in camera ―comprehensive litigation 
management agreement‖ that ―addresses all collective decisions that will be required[,] . . . 
establishes a media policy for counsel that restricts statements to the press, and creates 
procedures for monitoring and managing the litigation,‖ but rejecting the group because it was 
not cohesive and was ―artificially created‖); In re Conseco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 729, 
733 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Honeywell Int‘l, Inc., 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16712, at *13–14 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2000); In re Network Assocs., Sec. Litig., 76 F. 
Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 132. See, e.g., Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 627, 636–37 (D.N.J. 2002) 
(finding that, despite affidavits explaining how the group would work together, its preexisting 
relationship was minimal and there was no ―sufficient connection to bind them together as a 
unit‖). 
 133. See, e.g., Varghese, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (requiring proposed groups to demonstrate an 
ability and desire to work cooperatively); Eichenholtz, 2008 WL 3925289, at *9 (conducting a 
rigorous inquiry into group cohesion and coordination). 
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antagonistic interests.134 But a few go further and include declarations 
from putative lead plaintiffs who jointly commit to pursue the 
litigation and explain how they will consult through ―face-to-face and 
electronic communications,‖ ―share information,‖ and manage the day-
to-day litigation aspects.135 Likewise, courts reject groups with 
members who compete with one another, reasoning that ―investors are 
likely to have different investment strategies and may be subject to 
unique defenses‖ and that coordination problems inherent between 
competitive entities ―will outweigh whatever gains are to be had 
through the grouping.‖136 
2. Group Decisionmaking 
Group cohesion and members‘ relationship go hand in hand, 
but do not automatically translate into better decisionmaking or 
monitoring. Yet, judges only occasionally require plaintiffs to explain 
their decisionmaking processes.137 Though most groups neglect to 
explain how they will decide, those that do show quite a range.138 
Nearly all groups agree to have periodic conference calls, but some 
make decisions through group consensus, while others employ a 
simple one-vote-per-entity voting arrangement, and still others might 
use a proportional voting arrangement based on either the financial 
loss amount or the number of the entity‘s shares.139 One group even 
 
 134. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Pension Fund Group‘s Motion 
for the Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Its Selection of Lead Counsel at 9, In re 
Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 298, 308 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (No. 04–00575); Motion of 
the Israeli Inst. Investor Grp. for Consolidation, Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of 
Lead Plaintiff‘s Selection of Lead Counsel, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
Thereof at 12, Eichenholtz, 2008 WL 3925289 (conclusively alleging that ―[t]he Israeli 
Institutional Investor Group consists of five institutional investors, which are a cohesive, ‗small 
group of manageable size that is capable of joint decision-making regarding the litigation‘ ‖) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 135. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of the Kristen-Straxton Group for 
Consolidation of All Related Cases, Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Approval of the Selection 
of Lead Counsel at 10–11, Freudenberg, 2008 WL 2876373. 
 136. Eichenholtz, 2008 WL 3925289, at *9. 
 137. See, e.g., In re Versata, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24270, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2001). 
 138. See, e.g., In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig., 203 F.R.D. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
(ordering the lead-plaintiff group to coordinate their activities on a number of fronts, but 
providing no indicia of how decisions would be made). 
 139. See Eichenholtz, 2008 WL 3925289, at *9 (―The joint decision-making, however, is 
simply one vote per constituent entity, independent of the number of shares held by the entity.‖); 
In re Host Am. Corp. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 102, 109 (D. Conn. 2006) (including a plan with a 
―dispute resolution protocol if consensus cannot be reached‖); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 226 F.R.D. 298, 308 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (quoting class counsel as saying, ―[t]he clients 
themselves have agreed that they will have periodic conference calls . . . [and] I believe that their 
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went so far as to agree to a dispute-resolution procedure involving a 
retired federal judge or mediator if it could not reach consensus on an 
issue.140 But these groups are the exception, not the rule. 
3. Level of Competition and Timing of Group Formation 
Competition, whether in the marketplace or the courtroom, can 
reduce agency costs.141 When more plaintiffs compete to become lead 
plaintiff, their attorneys might offer to lower their fees, the court has 
more options from which to choose, and competing plaintiffs have 
incentives to uncover potentially disabling conflicts of interest in other 
movants.142 But competition levels vary depending on when groups 
form. Some groups come to the lead-plaintiff selection process already 
intact and then compete,143 others arrive intact and are large enough 
to immediately derail any would-be competitors,144 others voluntarily 
aggregate because of the competitive process,145 and still others are 
court appointed after the competitive process.146 
 
current intention is to make decisions through consensus and agreement as opposed to voting, 
but ultimately they will be the masters of how decisions are to be made‖). 
 140. Declaration of Carolantic Partners, LLC in Support of the Carolantic Group‘s Motion for 
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff Pursuant to § 21D(A)(3)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
at 2, In re Host Am. Corp., 236 F.R.D. at 109 (No. 05–1250, Exhibit E to Docket No. 37–3) (―The 
Carolantic Group agrees that all decisions will be by consensus. In the unlikely event that the 
Carolantic Group is unable to reach a consensus on a given issue, the Carolantic Group and lead 
counsel will present in person (or telephonically to facilitate speedy and efficient resolution) their 
respective positions to a retired federal judge and/or experienced mediator, who will render a 
binding decision.‖). 
 141. Choi, supra note 100, at 34 (observing evidence ―that greater competition for lead 
plaintiff correlates with lower attorney fees‖). 
 142. Id. at 27. In conducting his study, Choi focused principally on whether the lead 
plaintiffs aggregated into groups after other competing plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their 
motions (thus potentially reflecting a side deal) or whether the groups formed in the face of 
continuing competition. His study did not include groups that came to the selection process 
already intact. Id. at 27–28 & n.24. 
 143. See, e.g., In re Doral Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 414 F. Supp. 2d 398, 400–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(considering five groups of unrelated investors that each filed motions for lead plaintiff); 
Cardinal Health, 226 F.R.D. at 305–11 (appointing a preexisting group of six pension funds all 
represented by Lerach Coughlin—but removing two that were subject to conflicts—over one state 
department of treasury, two individual institutional investors, and one family trust). 
 144. See, e.g., Reimer v. Ambac Fin. Group, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 411(NRB), 2008 WL 2073931, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008) (appointing a group of three pension funds that cooperated before the 
litigation through joint conference calls). 
 145. See, e.g., In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 237 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(―Some seventeen days after the parties filed their motions, two of the individual movants . . . 
withdrew their motions and joined forces with the Zarif Group, and the newly reconstituted 
group re-named itself . . . .‖); In re Flight Safety Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 128 (D. 
Conn. 2005) (including two groups—one made up of six individuals, the other with three 
individuals and one institution—that ―joined forces and filed a joint motion‖ before the court 
could rule on the competing motions); In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig., 203 F.R.D. 189, 191 
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When groups form before filing a lead-plaintiff motion, a single 
law firm tends to represent them,147 whereas groups forming from 
competition include more than one law firm.148 As Stephen Choi 
reasons, plaintiffs‘ attorneys are unlikely to form coalitions with each 
other until they ―know the full range of competing motions and thus 
the value of entering into a coalition with another plaintiffs‘ attorney 
firm.‖149 As one court recognized, this practice ―gives new meaning to 
Lord Palmerston‘s quotation: ‗We have no eternal allies and we have 
no perpetual enemies.‘ ‖150 
On occasion, courts manipulate the group by trimming or 
expanding it to further congressional intent or to eliminate conflicting 
interests. For example, in In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, the court removed two pension funds with a net gain that 
were subject to unique defenses.151 It reasoned that group members 
need ―not necessarily rise and fall as a group,‖ and that it could ―break 
apart a proposed group in search of the most adequate lead 
plaintiff.‖152 Likewise, the court in In re Oxford Health Plans designed 
its own group from three competing plaintiffs‘ groups: one pension 
 
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (appointing a group comprised of two competing groups that initially filed and 
each former group‘s counsel as co-lead counsel); In re Donnkenny, Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 
157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to appoint a group as lead plaintiff where competing plaintiffs 
consolidated and proposed that their counsel be appointed as co-counsel). 
 146. See, e.g., Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8538, 2008 WL 2876373, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008) (appointing a group and an individual with the largest financial loss as 
well as the law firms of each as co-lead counsel); In re Star Gas Sec. Litig., No. 3:04cv1766 (JBA) 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5827, at *13 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2005) (appointing an individual with the 
largest losses, an institutional investor, and an individual with the largest losses stemming from 
stock purchases early in the class period); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 
42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (appointing competing groups as co-lead plaintiffs). 
 147. See, e.g., Cardinal Health, 226 F.R.D. at 305–11 (appointing a preexisting group of six 
pension funds all represented by Lerach Coughlin). For a contrary example, see In re Flight 
Safety Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 128 (D. Conn. 2005) (including a group comprised of 
―three individuals and one institution represented by an additional two law firms‖). 
 148. See, e.g., Cell Pathways, 203 F.R.D. at 191 (appointing a group comprised of two 
competing groups that initially filed and each former group‘s counsel as co-lead counsel). 
 149. Choi, supra note 100, at 27–28 & n.24. 
 150. Flight Safety Tech., 231 F.R.D. at 130 (quoting JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT‘S FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS 417:20 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002)). 
 151. 226 F.R.D. at 305–08 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
 152. Id. at 308 (quoting In re Surebeam Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV 1721 JM (POR), 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25022, at *23 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2004)); see also Flight Safety Tech., 231 F.R.D. 
at 131 (rejecting what appeared to be a last-minute coalition between groups, but appointing two 
group members to serve as co-lead plaintiff); Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Tech., 209 F.R.D. 499, 505 
(S.D. Fla. 2002) (removing one member based on inadequacy, but appointing the remainder of 
the group as the lead plaintiff). 
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fund, one group of thirty-five individuals, and one corporation.153 It 
built a group with the pension fund, the corporation, and three 
individuals, and gave each ―entity‖ a single equal vote.154 The court 
explained that this ―provide[d] the proposed class with the substantial 
benefits of joint decision-making and joint funding‖ and, in the event 
of a settlement, would give the court confidence that it was not 
―affected by any possible differences in aims or viewpoints.‖155 
In sum, a few themes emerge from this descriptive overview. 
The PSLRA designed lead plaintiffs to act as gatekeepers—attorneys 
cannot file strike suits without a ―client‖—and as monitors—to rein in 
and watch over attorneys for the class‘s benefit. Thus, initially courts 
were wary of lead-plaintiff groups, particularly large groups contrived 
by the very plaintiffs‘ attorneys that Congress intended to sideline. 
Over time, however, courts began to graft congressional purposes onto 
the word ―group‖ in ways that might further Congress‘s attorney-
monitoring goal. Consequently, courts value cooperation, coordination, 
and group cohesion and use evidence of these traits as proxies for 
client control. Likewise, judges embrace groups with relationships 
that predate the litigation because they form organically, without 
attorney encouragement. Yet, few plaintiffs provide—and few courts 
require—a detailed decisionmaking plan. And only the rarest court 
devotes significant attention to whether the group members 
adequately represent the whole class. Unfortunately, although 
cohesion and cooperation sound intuitively good and harmonious, as 
we will see, they are the same traits that can lead to disastrously poor 
decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the move toward gradually accepting 
groups as lead plaintiffs has enormous potential to adequately 
represent investors with heterogeneous interests. 
 
 153. In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 44–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see 
also Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Co., No. CIV.A. 00–152 (JEI), 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5481, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2000) (―The Court also considers it desirable to 
have both an institutional investor, like Connecticut, and individual investors, like DeValle and 
Green, included as lead plaintiffs since each may bring a unique perspective to the litigation.‖); 
Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (―The Court also 
finds that with the appointment of one lead plaintiff who is an individual private investor and 
one lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, the lead plaintiffs will represent a broader 
range of shareholder interests than if the Court appointed an individual or an institutional 
investor alone.‖). For criticism of the Oxford Health Plans decision, see Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead 
Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or “Look What‟s Happened to My Baby”, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 543, 565–67 (2008). Likewise, there is some anecdotal evidence that the plaintiffs‘ 
lawyers in Oxford Health Plans could have settled the case much earlier for the same amount. 
 154. Oxford Health Plans, 182 F.R.D. at 45–46. 
 155. Id. 
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B. Collective Failure 
Before we can claim that a group performs poorly, we need to 
rethink our metrics for success or failure. Remember that lead 
plaintiffs fail in part because we expect too much of them. In nearly 
every other kind of class action (excepting antitrust, perhaps), we 
think of class representatives as figureheads.156 But we expect more 
from securities-class-action lead plaintiffs because many investors—
particularly institutions—are sophisticated and, if enough money is at 
stake, the lead plaintiff will be interested enough to monitor the 
attorneys. Because these plaintiffs must also be adequate 
representatives, we harness the rest of the class to their self-interest 
and heave a sigh of relief. 
Consider the lead plaintiff‘s obligations as primary 
responsibilities and secondary spillovers. In order of authority, the 
lead plaintiff must first and foremost serve as an adequate 
representative—a constitutional due process requirement embodied in 
Rule 23(a)(4). As a close second, the lead plaintiff must also monitor 
the class attorney, as Congress dictated through the PSLRA. Although 
Congress zeroed in on the monitoring function, monitoring is actually 
a more specific adequate-representation requirement: the faithful 
representative, as an agent for the class, should not hire another 
agent on her principals‘ behalf without ensuring that the second 
agent—the attorney—performs as promised. Consequently, if the lead 
plaintiff performs as hoped, she will adequately represent the class 
members by monitoring the class attorney. This, we predict, will 
generate important spillovers, too—monitoring means fewer strike 
suits, which means corporate behavior will be sanctioned only when 
fraudulent, which means corporate actors can avoid lawsuits by 
following the law, which means that securities class actions may deter 
fraud.157 
So, what does this say about measuring success or failure? 
Measuring success only in terms of monitoring through metrics like 
settlement size or reducing attorneys‘ fees only partially answers the 
bigger question of how the lead plaintiff performs her primary 
function as an adequate class representative. As illustrated by the 
potential conflicts between individual and institutional investors, class 
 
 156. See generally Burns, supra note 5, at 165 (―The role of the class representative in class 
actions has become something of an enigma.‖). 
 157. See generally Burch, supra note 91 (explaining how securities class actions generate 
positive spillovers). But see generally Rose, supra note 91 (suggesting that multiple enforcers, 
including private enforcement actions, do not make sense from a deterrence perspective). 
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members are diverse. Accordingly, we want a lead plaintiff to make 
better decisions on behalf of her principals. ―Better‖ has no objective 
quality as good or bad, but rather a subjective quality in that it 
reflects her principals‘ desires. As such, it is nearly impossible to 
measure ―better‖ in quantifiable terms. One could determine the 
number of collateral attacks on any given settlement, but that surely 
captures only the most dissatisfied members. Polling the class is 
likewise impractical. Thus, while no absolute metric exists, the best 
proxy is to judge adequacy ex ante by considering what a reasonable 
investor with particular interests would want in a representative. 
So far then, it is the representative quality that we are after in 
appointing a lead plaintiff, and we must take two fundamental 
assumptions into account to achieve this: (1) that average class 
members are diverse and (2) that the representative fulfills her 
obligations not by polling constituents but by pursuing her own self-
interest, which we presume is the same as those she represents. The 
problem is then obvious: these two assumptions point in different 
directions unless we have more than one representative. 
Enter the group. Ideally, group members represent the class‘s 
diverse interests such that when each member pursues her own self-
interest, the group resembles a microcosm of the whole class. But as 
we‘ve seen, courts pick groups based not on diversity, but on 
cohesiveness. Consequently, this Section considers critiques of current 
lead-plaintiff groups beginning with those by securities-class-action 
scholars. It then draws from the social science literature on group 
decisionmaking to offer an alternative explanation for lead-plaintiff 
groups‘ poor performance. 
1. Legal Academics‘ Criticisms 
Most academics disfavor aggregating lead plaintiffs. But their 
criticisms focus on the lead plaintiff‘s monitoring function, not her 
primary role as an adequate representative. Though these criticisms 
vary, they fall into three interrelated categories. First, some contend 
that aggregating is inconsistent with the PSLRA‘s text and legislative 
history and that the word ―group‖ is an anomaly.158 The PSLRA 
 
 158. Fisch, supra note 35, at 69–71 (2001). Part of Jill Fisch‘s argument centers on the 
inappropriateness of aggregating the alleged losses to determine whether the group has the 
largest financial interest and a significant incentive to litigate. After her article was published in 
2001, however, the Supreme Court decided Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., which 
overruled Zahn v. International Paper Co. (a case on which she relied), and Congress enacted the 
Class Action Fairness Act, which allows class members to calculate the amount in controversy by 
determining the aggregate loss. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2006) (―In any class action, the claims of 
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typically uses ―plaintiff‖ in its singular form. While not addressed in 
the legislative history, critics contend that Congress meant the word 
―group‖ to ―encompass associated institutions such as different funds 
from the same mutual fund group.‖159 Most courts, on the other hand, 
give the term its plain meaning and select groups when they are small 
enough to monitor their attorneys.160 Although legislative history on 
the word‘s meaning is sparse, Congress‘s goal of instilling a client 
monitor is unmistakable. Thus, as explained shortly, some then argue 
that aggregating lead plaintiffs fails to fulfill this goal and thereby 
undermines the statute‘s objectives.161 
Second, academics worry that aggregating shifts control from 
lead plaintiffs to their attorneys and fails to decrease agency costs. 
Several rationales motivate this claim including: group 
decisionmaking is less efficient, members‘ smaller individual stakes 
reduce their incentives to participate actively, and if the attorney 
engineers the group she is likely to direct and manage it too.162 The 
claim that group decisionmaking is less efficient because it ―divides 
decisionmaking‖ and thus ―slow[s] litigation‖ when decisionmakers 
disagree163 may or may not be true as judged by pure decisionmaking 
time—one person can easily make a fast judgment call, but it may 
result in less informed and thus less representative decisions.164 As 
 
the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs.‖); Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (holding that the supplemental-
jurisdiction statute permits additional class members to join the action even when they do not 
meet the minimal amount-in-controversy requirement). These changes undermine the argument 
that it is inappropriate to aggregate claims for jurisdictional purposes. It does not, however, 
change the incentives for pursuing the litigation. Accordingly, this Article argues that group 
members should still have the largest losses to maintain lead plaintiffs‘ litigation incentives. 
 159. Fisch, supra note 35, at 70 & n.118 (citing Elliott Weiss, Remarks at Conference on 
Complex Litigation, Inst. for Law and Econ. Pol‘y (Apr. 14, 2000)); see also Cox & Thomas, supra 
note 7, at 1616–17 (―This may well cause us to wonder if ‗persons,‘ as used in the act, poorly 
expresses Congress‘s vision because the plural usage was never intended to include natural 
persons but institutions.‖). 
 160. But see In re Donnkenny, Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(noting that the statutory language did not forbid appointing a group, but refusing to appoint 
aggregated investors because it contravened legislative history). 
 161. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 35, at 69–71 (arguing that aggregation is contrary to the 
legislative history). 
 162. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1596 (listing reasons to oppose aggregation); 
Fisch, supra note 35, at 71–73 (same). 
 163. Heck, supra note 48, at 1221. 
 164. Some studies even show that groups take no longer to make decisions than individuals, 
but that they do consistently outperform them. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, Are 
Two Heads Better than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking 
(Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7909, 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7909 (finding that, contrary to popular belief, groups do not make 
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recent research has revealed, diverse groups often make more 
informed decisions than a single expert alone.165 So, while efficiency is 
important, it should not automatically outweigh adequate-
representation concerns. Plus, courts have addressed these academic 
concerns, in part, by continuing to appoint the plaintiffs with the 
largest financial stake as group members, limiting group size, and 
occasionally selecting groups with a mix of individuals and 
institutions. 
Third, and related, commentators suggest that groups generate 
additional free-rider and collective-action problems: if each lead 
plaintiff believes that the other is monitoring then each will shirk her 
responsibilities, leading to collective failure.166 This concern echoes the 
worry that group members lack ample incentive to monitor, or have 
―no greater incentive‖ than an individual with the largest loss.167 But 
empirical data cast some doubt on whether collective-action problems 
truly inhibit all groups; some groups are more successful than others, 
particularly when they include an institution.168 Although this 
collective-action problem is the most worrisome, it is not only 
indigenous to groups; in theory, it pervades all securities class actions. 
An institution receiving only its pro rata settlement share has little 
reason to take on monitoring costs or open itself up to discovery. 
Empirical data and descriptive statistics from smaller case 
samples underscore these concerns. In 2006, Jim Cox and Randall 
Thomas published a study using several datasets on published cases 
in Westlaw and LexisNexis, such as one dataset on thirty-five 
securities-class-action settlements from 1996–98 and one dataset 
including 388 pre- and post-PSLRA cases from multiple sources.169 
From their data, they suggested a few observations. First, 
institutional lead plaintiffs tend to cherry pick cases where there are 
larger estimated losses, substantially capitalized defendants, and the 
SEC has filed a parallel action.170 Thus, while institutions add value, 
that value is ―perhaps not as much as was expected by the architects 
 
decisions more slowly than individuals and that there is no significant difference in 
decisionmaking time between majority rule and unanimity rule). 
 165. See infra Part III.A. 
 166. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1617; Heck, supra note 48, at 1220–21. 
 167. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1617. 
 168. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 169. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1619–20, 1622–23.  
 170. Id. at 1629–30; see also Choi et al., supra note 38, at 870 (finding that private 
institutional lead plaintiffs are not associated with larger class recoveries, that public pension 
funds are, but that public pension funds may also ―cherry-pick‖ the cases ―with the largest 
potential damages and the strongest evidence of fraud‖). 
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of PSLRA‘s lead plaintiff provision.‖171 Second, among noninstitutional 
lead plaintiffs, individuals best increase the settlement size in smaller 
cases, whereas individual-investor groups and noninstitutional 
entities perform better in larger ones.172 And third, individual-investor 
groups ―perform better than individuals as lead plaintiffs in larger 
cases, while groups that include an entity yield larger settlements and 
greater provable loss ratios than those that occur‖ in individual-
investor groups.173 Accordingly, as among noninstitutional 
plaintiffs,174 Cox and Thomas conclude that courts should consider the 
case size and select individual plaintiffs in cases against firms with 
less capital and groups in bigger cases with larger recoverable 
losses.175 
More recently, Stephen Choi studied all securities class actions 
filed between 2003 and 2004 (482 actions) to determine which kind of 
lead plaintiff (institutions, individuals, or various mixes of the two) 
reduced attorney agency costs as measured by the requested 
attorneys‘ fee and the number of hours worked.176 First, he found that 
mixed groups with institutional and individual investors ―are more 
effective in generating economically significant, lower attorney fees 
compared with groups of non-institutional investors.‖177 Second, 
noninstitutional-investor groups do not perform better than a single 
individual.178 Finally, institutional-investor groups ―correlate with 
significantly lower attorney agency costs,‖ but ―labor union pension 
funds do not follow this general trend and may, in fact, correlate with 
increased agency costs.‖179 In short, groups can improve class welfare 
only when the members converge through a competitive process and 
include institutions.180 When the group includes a mix of diverse 
 
 171. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1636. 
 172. Id. at 1632–33. 
 173. Id. at 1638–39. 
 174. It is not clear where mixed groups, containing institutions and individuals fall in these 
broader conclusions, but tables early in the article suggest that these groups might be combined 
into the institutional category. See id. at 1624–27 & tbls.4, 5, 6, 7, & 8 (combining categories 1 
(―institution‖) and 3 (―institution-individuals‖) into one total ―Institutional Lead Plaintiffs‖ line 
and ―All Other Lead Plaintiffs Post-PSLRA‖ into a separate line). 
 175. Id. at 1639. 
 176. Choi, supra note 100, at 1–2. 
 177. Id. at 35. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 36. 
 180. Id. at 27, 35. 
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perspectives—both institutions and individuals—it outperforms more 
homogeneous groups with just individuals.181 
2. Due Process and Group Decisionmaking Critiques 
Social science evidence suggests that cognitively diverse 
groups—groups with diverse perspectives, interpretations, and 
heuristics—can be more capable problem solvers and reach more 
representative solutions than homogeneous ones.182 Consequently, 
traditional academic criticisms only partially explain why lead-
plaintiff groups underperform. The group decisionmaking literature, 
which ranges in discipline from political science, organizational 
theory, social choice, and psychology to economics and mathematical 
modeling, provides an alternative explanation. Admittedly, no 
empirical study directly examines whether diverse groups in securities 
class actions make better decisions; on the other hand, empirical data 
is not likely to tell us much about whether someone is an adequate 
representative or whether settlements reflect most class members‘ 
viewpoints.183 Thus, both this critique and Part III‘s prescription 
include conceptual integrations and empirical generalizations from 
robust principles in the available literature on group decisionmaking 
and cognitive, as opposed to visible, diversity. 
Remember that if we measure a lead plaintiff‘s success only in 
monitoring terms, we fail to capture how the lead plaintiff performs 
her primary duties as an adequate class representative. Our two basic 
assumptions so far have been: (1) that class members‘ interests are 
diverse in some significant respects and (2) that the representative 
fulfills its obligations by pursuing its own self-interest, which must be 
similar to those it represents. As noted, without more than one 
representative, these two assumptions are incompatible. We thus have 
two related reasons to pursue a diverse group: ensuring adequate 
representation and avoiding group polarization through cognitive 
diversity. 
Presently, courts look for group cohesiveness and members 
who, ideally, have a prelitigation relationship. They want 
homogeneous groups with like-minded members who collectively push 
 
 181. Although the fact that mixed groups perform better based on traditional metrics lends 
support to the argument that groups with diverse perspectives outperform homogenous groups 
according to those indicators, the indicators themselves may not reflect whether group members 
are adequately representing class members‘ preferences. 
 182. See infra Part III.A. 
 183. Studies on the number of opt-outs may give researchers a rough idea, however. 
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a single agenda.184 Only occasionally do courts appoint groups based 
on adequate representation. As a notable exception, the court in In re 
Host America Corp. Securities Litigation observed that the two 
putative lead-plaintiff groups each contained ―institutional and 
individual investors,‖ which provided ―a diversity of representation 
reflective of the makeup of the class as a whole.‖185 And some courts 
mix institutional and individual investors because they each bring ―a 
unique perspective to the litigation‖186 and maintain ―balance among 
the demographics of the lead plaintiff group members, [which] 
improves diversity of experience.‖187 But these courts are outliers; 
most overlook the issue and actively pursue cohesiveness, cooperation, 
and homogeneity. 
Sameness and homogeneity provoke group decisionmaking‘s 
most detrimental effects: confirmation bias,188 group polarization, and 
possibly groupthink. Confirmation bias enters into group 
decisionmaking when, for example, group members‘ conviction makes 
them discount contrary evidence and retain their presently favored 
approach.189 Emphasizing group consensus over dissent and contrary 
evidence, at its extreme, permits groupthink, a mode of 
decisionmaking where group members identify so coextensively with 
the group that dissenting thoughts never emerge.190 Cohesiveness—
the principal trait courts use in appointing lead-plaintiff groups—is 
 
 184. In general, increased homogeneity among group members correlates with greater group 
cohesion, fewer conflicts, and more cooperation. See Eden B. King et al., Conflict and Cooperation 
in Diverse Workgroups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES 261, 278 (2009); Daan van Knippenberg et al., Work 
Group Diversity and Group Performance: An Integrative Model and Research Agenda, 89 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1008, 1009 (2004).  
 185. 236 F.R.D. 102, 106 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 186. Laborers Local 11298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Co., No. CIV.A. 00–152 (JEI), 
2000 WL 486956, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2000). 
 187. Holley v. Kitty Hawk, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 275, 280 (N.D. Tex. 2001); see also In re 
Universal Access, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 379, 384 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (―[T]he appointment of a group of 
persons to acts [sic] as lead plaintiff is appropriate under the PSLRA and, indeed, is sometimes 
favored in light of the diversity of experience and interests of the group members.‖). 
 188. Unlike group polarization and groupthink, confirmation bias is an individual bias that 
can be exacerbated or mollified by group decisionmaking. See Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased 
Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 656–58 
(2000). 
 189. See Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, in DECISION MAKING FROM A 
COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 385, 385–87, 398 (Jerome Busemeyer & Reid Hastie eds., 1995); 
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 178, 210 (1998); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and 
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 504–05 (2002). 
 190. See generally IRVING JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982) (explaining how ―groupthink‖ 
inhibits the expression of dissenting or alternative viewpoints). 
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also a principal precursor to groupthink.191 Other conditions 
contributing to groupthink include group isolation and insulation, 
which prevent members from introducing outside information; partial 
leadership; poor decisionmaking procedures; and group members with 
homogeneous ideologies and backgrounds.192 
Despite its popularity, groupthink has received little support in 
laboratory testing.193 Many researchers today would categorize it as 
an extreme version of group polarization.194 That is, if the group 
deliberates but is comprised of people who are principally like-
minded—let‘s say risk averse (such as, attorneys with a significant 
stake in the litigation‘s financing or a lead plaintiff with the most at 
stake vis-à-vis her overall wealth)—then deliberating makes a 
cautious group even more cautious and vice versa.195 Simply put, 
group members may take more extreme positions after discussing 
them with like-minded others.196 Confident people—those likely to be 
general counsel of institutions, on corporate boards, or law firm 
 
 191. Id. at 176. 
 192. Id. at 176–77; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 32 (2002) (explaining that ―[b]oardroom culture 
encourages groupthink‖).  
 193. David D. Henningsen et al., Examining the Symptoms of Groupthink and Retrospective 
Sensemaking, 37 SMALL GROUP RES. 36, 38–41 (2006). Although Janis‘s views still predominate 
popular notions about groups, research in the years since his publication has been quite 
skeptical. See Robert S. Baron, So Right It‟s Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of 
Polarized Group Decision Making, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 219 
(Mark P. Zanna ed., 2005) (―A review of the research and debate regarding Janis‘s groupthink 
model leads to the conclusion that after some 30 years of investigation, the evidence has largely 
failed to support the formulation‘s more ambitious and controversial predictions, specifically 
those linking certain antecedent conditions with groupthink phenomena.‖); Norbert L. Kerr & R. 
Scott Tindale, Group Performance and Decision Making, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 623, 640 (2004). 
 194. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 142 (2003) (―Janis‘s 
examples are best seen as case studies in group polarization.‖); Glen Whyte, Groupthink 
Reconsidered, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 40, 40–41 (1989); Glen Whyte, Recasting Janis‟s Groupthink 
Model: The Key Role of Collective Efficacy in Decision Fiascoes, 73 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 185, 185–86 (1998). Others might characterize groupthink as having more of an 
element of social conformity. See, e.g., Clark McCauley, The Nature of Social Influence in 
Groupthink: Compliance and Internalization, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 250 (1989). 
 195. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 3–4 
(2009); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 184–85 (2005); Michael A. Hogg & Scott A. 
Reid, Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Communication of Group Norms, 16 COMM. 
THEORY 7, 18–19 (2006). 
 196. See Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Small Group, in 
UNDERSTANDING GROUP BEHAVIOR: SMALL GROUP PROCESSES AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 
227, 234 (Erich Witte & James H. Davis eds., 1996) (―[T]raditional explanations of group 
polarization fall into two broad categories: (a) those that emphasize compliance, for self-
presentational motives, with the culturally valued position as it is represented by the 
distribution of ingroup positions, and (b) those that emphasize the intrinsic persuasiveness of 
novel arguments brought up in discussion that support one‘s original position.‖). 
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partners in charge of multimillion dollar securities-fraud lawsuits—
are even more likely to polarize groups.197 Similarly, group 
polarization and bad decisions occur with greater frequency and 
intensity when group members are connected through friendship, 
mutual affection, or solidarity,198 which is far more likely in groups 
with prelitigation relationships. 
Dissenters thwart group polarization and confirmation bias by 
challenging the status quo and introducing new information into the 
discussion.199 But the appointment of cooperative, homogeneous 
groups combined with the trend toward opting out removes dissent, 
leaves only like-minded members in the group, and thus exacerbates 
group polarization.200 As Albert Hirschman rationalized, if exit is an 
easy and economically viable option, people will leave rather than 
dissent.201 This is particularly true when dissent has no outlet or 
where, even if an outlet theoretically exists, dissent will fall on deaf 
ears. In a diverse, representative group, members can dissent in two 
settings: (1) in initial strategy sessions and meetings geared toward 
settlement design, and (2) if those efforts fail, by objecting to the 
settlement‘s fairness during the court‘s Rule 23(e) fairness hearing. 
Currently, like-minded groups and opting out constrict and 
weaken these opportunities. Once defendants and lead plaintiffs strike 
a bargain, they have little incentive to change the terms at the 
fairness hearing unless the judge sends them back to the bargaining 
 
 197. SUNSTEIN, supra note 194, at 129; Maryla Zaleska, The Stability of Extreme and 
Moderate Responses in Different Situations, in GROUP DECISION MAKING 163, 164 (H. 
Brandstatter et al. eds., 1982). Individuals working alone do, however, tend to brainstorm more 
ideas than groups. Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N + 1 Heads Better 
than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 527 (1982). Although individuals working alone may generate 
more ideas, they also tend to overlook the flaws. Bainbridge, supra note 192, at 29. 
 198. SUNSTEIN, supra note 194, at 129–30; Michael A. Hogg & Sarah C. Hains, Friendship 
and Group Identification: A New Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in Groupthink, 28 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 323, 323–35 (1998). 
 199. SUNSTEIN, supra note 194, at 129–30; Ulrich Klocke, How to Improve Decision Making 
in Small Groups: Effects of Dissent and Training Interventions, 38 SMALL GROUP RES. 437, 437–
38, 460–62 (2007).  
 200. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 194, at 131–32; Felix C. Brodbeck et al., The Dissemination of 
Critical, Unshared Information in Decision-Making Groups: The Effects of Pre-Discussion 
Dissent, 32 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL., 35, 35–39 (2002). 
 201. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 46 (1972). John Coffee and Samuel Issacharoff have introduced and 
incorporated Hirschman‘s work into the class-action context. Coffee, supra note 35, at 407; John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative 
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Coffee, supra note 6, at 288; Issacharoff, supra note 
70, at 366–67.  
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table.202 Judicial self-interest factors in, too. It‘s much easier to 
approve the deal, know that any appeal is subject to the abuse-of-
discretion standard, and thereby clear the docket for other matters. 
In sum, current lead-plaintiff groups tend to make poor 
decisions—as data on attorneys‘ fees and settlement size shows—in 
part because they are cohesive, cooperative, and like-minded. They 
may thus fall prey to quintessential group problems like confirmation 
bias and group polarization. Moreover, because they are cohesive, 
group members fail to represent the class‘s diverse interests. 
III. DIVERSIFYING AND OPTIMIZING LEAD-PLAINTIFF GROUPS 
A richly representative group could alleviate adequate-
representation problems without jeopardizing class certification, 
hence the counterintuitive remedy: Appoint a diverse lead-plaintiff 
group and link diversity to members‘ heterogeneous preferences. In 
general, group decisionmaking is optimal when: (1) each member has 
unique but unshared information, as diverse class representatives 
would and (2) the group can make the best decision only by sharing 
and incorporating this information, which is likewise necessary for 
reaching a settlement that reflects the class‘s diverse interests.203 
Accordingly, this Part relies on social science studies to paint a clearer 
picture of why court-appointed groups might have performed poorly in 
the past based on settlement size and attorneys‘ fees and to postulate 
ways in which courts could designate more effective groups. 
After using this literature to construct the case for diversity, 
the remaining sections make six conceptual moves to support and 
execute the normative claim that judges should appoint representative 
lead-plaintiff groups. First, I link cognitive diversity to adequate 
representation through their mutual indicators: dissent and 
information sharing. Diversity is beneficial because it adds a 
dissenting voice and prompts people with unique information to share 
and discuss it.204 Likewise, we expect an adequate representative to 
dissent when the group‘s direction conflicts with her own interests and 
to support her position by sharing information. Second, appointing a 
small, representative group means considering who the putative class 
members are: what is their training and experience; do they have 
different sophistication levels, financial interests, risk preferences, 
 
 202. Plus, changing the agreed upon outcome creates cognitive dissonance for participants. 
See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 189–90 (1957). 
 203. Klocke, supra note 199, at 437–38. 
 204. Hogg & Reid, supra note 195, at 18–19. 
2b. Burch_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/2011 11:43 AM 
1156 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:4:1109 
external fiduciary obligations, and desired remedies; and what is their 
relationship with lead counsel? Third, encouraging a competitive lead-
plaintiff appointment process fosters dissenting norms and opens up 
the legal-services market, which may reduce attorneys‘ fees and 
encourage agents to faithfully represent their principals‘ interests. 
Fourth, because certifying the class typically marks the litigation 
process‘s near-end, whenever possible, judges should evaluate 
adequacy when initially selecting lead plaintiffs and, when necessary, 
subclass those with fundamentally diverse preferences. Fifth, 
consistent with the PSLRA‘s aim of client control, once a richly diverse 
lead-plaintiff group adequately represents the class‘s interests, the 
group should wield more decisionmaking authority through a 
supermajority voting procedure. Finally, I conclude by contrasting this 
proposal with opting out and explain how this voice-based reform 
outperforms exit in pragmatic, institutional, and regulatory terms. 
 
A. The Case for Cognitive Diversity: Definitions, Explanations, 
 and Limitations 
Making the case for a cognitively diverse lead-plaintiff group 
necessitates a basic knowledge of the rifts in the diversity literature, 
which is as varied as its subject matter. Accordingly, I do not attempt 
to provide a full, positive account. Instead, I introduce the theories in 
a foundational way to define diversity for this Article‘s purposes, to be 
transparent about which approach best fits lead plaintiffs, and to note 
some problems and limitations with that approach. 
The diversity literature divides into two rough perspectives.205 
First, the optimistic view posits that cognitive diversity—diverse 
knowledge and expertise that fosters contrasting perspectives, 
interpretations, and heuristics—leads to creative solutions, novel 
insights, and enhanced problem solving in complex decisions when 
group members interact constructively and exchange information.206 
 
 205. There is, however, an emerging ―hybrid‖ view that integrates the social categorization 
and information/decisionmaking theories by suggesting that the ―visibility of demographic 
diversity variables would influence affective conflict (which in turn should influence affective 
outcomes), whereas job relatedness of demographic diversity variables would influence 
substantive conflict (which in turn should influence cognitive task performance).‖ King et al., 
supra note 184, at 274 (citing Lisa Pelled, Demographic Diversity, Conflict, and Work Group 
Outcomes: An Intervening Process Theory, 7 ORG. SCI. 615 (1996)). 
 206. Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, What Differences Make a Difference?: The 
Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 31, 33–34, 42–
43 (2005) (―[T]he information-processing view tends to be at odds with the trait approach to 
diversity and tends to avoid measuring what are sometimes known as ‗demographic proxies‘ such 
2b. Burch_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/2011 11:43 AM 
2011] OPTIMAL LEAD PLAINTIFFS 1157 
That is, cognitively diverse groups will likely have more dissenters, 
engage in more debate, base that debate on additional information, 
avoid premature consensus, and thereby reach creative solutions that 
reflect the class‘s interests.207 This theory is known as the 
information-processing or decisionmaking approach. Achieving its 
benefits requires group members to exchange information, which, in 
turn, means they must be willing to endure some task conflict (as 
opposed to relational or emotional conflict), such as debate and 
discussion.208 
Second, the pessimistic view, which includes both the 
similarity-attraction paradigm209 and the social-identity and self-
categorization theories,210 tends to focus on either visible differences 
such as race, ethnicity, age, gender, physical disabilities, and other 
demographic dissimilarities, or employment tenure.211 This view 
 
as gender, race, or age.‖); see also, e.g., SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF 
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 7–8 (2007); L. Hoffman & 
N. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem Solutions by Members of Homogeneous and 
Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 401 (1961); C. Nemeth, Differential 
Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 23 (1986). 
 207. King et al., supra note 184, at 272; Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Dissent as a Facilitator: 
Individual- and Group-Level Effects on Creativity and Performance, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 149, 150–55 (Carsten K.W. De Dreu 
& Michele J. Gelfand eds., 2008). 
 208. See D.H. Gruenfeld et al., Group Composition and Decision Making: How Member 
Familiarity and Information Distribution Affect Process and Performance, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1 (1996); King et al., supra note 184, at 267, 272–75; E. Mannix & K. 
Jehn, Let‟s Norm and Storm, but Not Right Now: Integrating Models of Group Development and 
Performance, in RESEARCH ON MANAGING GROUPS AND TEAMS: TIME IN GROUPS 11, 21 (E. Mannix 
et al. eds., 2004); Pelled, supra note 205, at 615; T. Simons et al., Making Use of Difference: 
Diversity, Debate, and Decision Comprehensiveness in Top Management Teams, 42 ACAD. MGMT. 
J. 662 (1999). 
 209. The similarity-attraction paradigm predicts that those with surface-level similarity are 
attracted to and communicate well with one another, whereas heterogeneous groups (in terms of 
racial diversity, for example) run into process-related problems that cause communication 
difficulties. See generally M.E. Rosenbaum, The Repulsion Hypothesis: On the Nondevelopment of 
Relationships, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1156 (1986); A. Townsend & K. Scott, Team 
Racial Composition, Member Attitudes, and Performance: A Field Study, 40 INDUS. REL. 317 
(2001); H. Triandis, Cognitive Similarity and Communication in a Dyad, 13 HUM. REL. 175 
(1960). 
 210. As two commentators explain, ―[s]elf-categorization is the process by which people 
define their self-concepts in terms of membership in social groups,‖ and ―[s]ocial-identity theory 
provides both a cognitive and motivational perspective on the origins and consequences of group 
identification.‖ Mannix & Neale, supra note 206, at 40; see also, e.g., MICHAEL A. HOGG & 
DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
AND GROUP PROCESSES (1988) (social identity theory); John C. Turner, Social Categorization and 
the Self Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory of Group Behavior, in ADVANCES IN GROUP 
PROCESSES 77 (Edward J. Lawler ed., 1985) (social-categorization theory).  
 211. King et al., supra note 184, at 267–68, 276; Mannix & Neale, supra note 206, at 41–42; 
see also, e.g., K.A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of Diversity, 
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posits that identity diversity causes social rifts, poor group cohesion, 
difficult intragroup relations, and thus negative group outcomes.212 
Put differently, diversity increases relational conflict and decreases 
cooperation. To oversimplify then, a group incorporating and relying 
on members with diverse but relevant perspectives and skills may 
outperform one that simply cobbles together members with visible 
demographic or identity diversity.213 
Given the two varied outcomes, the natural question becomes 
to what extent identity diversity produces cognitive diversity. 
Unfortunately, the answer largely depends on the context. We form 
our identities based on a variety of factors—race, gender, sexual 
orientation, disabilities, culture, and socioeconomic status, to name a 
few. As Scott Page, a professor of complex systems, political science, 
and economics, explains, if every group member ―grew up in an upper 
middle-class household, went to the same prep school, and then went 
to Yale, where they studied the same texts under the same professors, 
they may not be that cognitively diverse, regardless of how diverse 
their identity classifications may be.‖214 So, identity diversity is not 
always a predictable proxy for cognitive diversity, although, as 
explored shortly, cognitive diversity does correlate with interest 
diversity.215 
In the context of securities class actions, intraclass conflicts 
between investors and institutions are based not on differences such 
as race or gender (as an employment-discrimination class action might 
be), but on factors such as derivatives trading, equity holdings, desired 
remedies, risk preferences, sophistication levels, and information 
access. These factors affect which remedies the lead plaintiff requests 
and pursues as well as how she makes litigation decisions. 
Consequently, the optimistic, information-processing/decisionmaking 
approach that focuses on cognitive as opposed to demographic or 
identity diversity is a better fit for securities class actions. 
Notice, however, that courts implicitly take the opposite view: 
that they should appoint cohesive, cooperative groups. It makes sense 
intuitively—that conflict undermines rather than improves 
performance—yet, these groups likely lack divergent perspectives, 
 
Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741 (1999); T. Kochan et al., The 
Effects of Diversity on Business Performance: Report of the Diversity Research Network, 42 HUM. 
RES. MGMT. 3 (2003) (studying racial and gender diversity).  
 212. See King et al., supra note 184, at 268; Mannix & Neale, supra note 206, at 41–42;  
 213. See David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for 
Managing Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 79.  
 214. PAGE, supra note 206, at 359. 
 215. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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motivations, and interests. This means that they do not represent the 
whole class, may reach consensus prematurely, and are prone toward 
group decisionmaking‘s negative effects—confirmation bias, group 
polarization, and perhaps groupthink. 
Wide-ranging group decisionmaking research supports the 
claim that diverse groups outperform homogeneous ones in problem-
solving tasks that demand analysis and evaluation.216 The rationale is 
simple: if everyone is the same, then collectively they are limited in 
the same ways and by the same perspectives and heuristics that limit 
them individually.217 We thus have two reasons to pursue diversity in 
appointing lead-plaintiff groups. First, cognitively diverse group 
members who represent disparate interests, dissent when those 
interests differ from others‘ interests, and share information with each 
other are apt to make more representative decisions and are less 
susceptible to typical group problems like confirmation bias and group 
polarization. Second, because institutional interests diverge from 
individual investors‘ interests, institutions pursuing their own self-
interest are unlikely to adequately represent the whole class. 
With regard to the first rationale, one might object that 
because many individuals comprise an institution, an institution 
already makes cognitively diverse decisions. But most institutions 
have an oligarchic decisionmaking structure, which means that a few 
can direct and siphon off the ideas of the many. The institution‘s 
general counsel may be the final decisionmaker,218 or a handful of 
people may be involved in the decisionmaking process.219 In Adrian 
Vermeule‘s words, if the decisionmaking process ―requires or allows 
few minds to accept or reject the many-minded judgment, or even just 
to interpret it, then the resulting decision may be little better than if 
 
 216. Hill, supra note 197, at 533; Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 207, at 162–63. 
 217. PAGE, supra note 206, at 157. 
 218. See, e.g., R. Randall Roche, My Experience as a Lead Plaintiff, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
ADVOC., 4th Quarter 2000, at 1, 3, available at http://www.blbglaw.com/news/publications/ 
advocate/2000/04/_res/id=sa_File1/adv2000Q4.pdf (―[In my capacity as general counsel], I had 
primary responsibility on behalf of the Louisiana Retirement Systems for supervising the 
prosecution of the action. In that capacity, I reviewed all of the important pleadings in the case, 
and attended the hearing on defendants‘ motion to dismiss the complaint. I was consulted on all 
major strategic decisions. I also participated in several face-to-face meetings with defense 
counsel regarding the scope of discovery and defendants‘ objections.‖). 
 219. Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by 
Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 704–10 & n.311 (2002) (principally citing and relying on 
interviews with institutions‘ general counsel as evidence of how institutions select lead counsel 
and supervise the litigation process in securities class actions); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 6 (2007) (―When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible 
or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer 
should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization.‖). 
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the one mind had simply decided for itself, right from the start.‖220 If 
only a few sophisticated people in an institution make decisions,221 
they will probably lack the contrasting perspectives (the ability to see 
and construe possibilities in different ways), heuristics (the method 
that people use to solve problems), and interests that foster multiple 
solutions.222 Either way, the many ideas of institutional 
decisionmakers all concern what‘s best for the institution, not what‘s 
best for the class as a whole. 
B. Design Fundamentals 
1. Appointing and Incentivizing a Small,  
Representative Group 
Thus far, two literatures—one vast interdisciplinary literature 
on group decisionmaking and one constitutionally based literature on 
adequate representation—both point toward diversifying the lead-
plaintiff group. But the two are not necessarily synonymous: one could 
easily assemble a cognitively diverse group of an astronaut, lawyer, 
scientist, teacher, and engineer who have no incentive or 
qualifications to adequately represent investors in a securities class 
action. Though less likely, it is also possible to have a representative 
group that lacks cognitive diversity. In most cases, however, selecting 
qualified representatives based on their diverse interests will create a 
cognitively diverse group filled with dissimilar preferences and 
heuristics. 
To explain, short of looking inside someone‘s head, assembling 
a cognitively diverse group requires some assumptions, some of which 
I‘ve engaged already while critiquing lead-plaintiff groups. Thus, it‘s 
easier to achieve cognitive diversity by considering what we want 
diverse group members to do—share new information and dissent.223 
Picking group members with new information who will dissent means 
 
 220. Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 33 
(2009). 
 221. Institutions are often lauded for possessing superior knowledge and financial 
sophistication, which makes them better suited to act as litigation monitors. See, e.g., Weiss & 
Beckerman, supra note 23, at 2126–27 (―[Institutions] have the knowledge and financial 
sophistication necessary to serve as effective litigation monitors.‖). 
 222. See PAGE, supra note 206, at 7–8, 144–52. 
 223. What one insider observed in the corporate context—―The highest-performing 
companies have extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as an obligation and that treat 
no subject as undiscussable‖—is equally true in the lead-plaintiff context. Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, 
What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2002, at 106, 111. 
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searching for plaintiffs who represent various points along the 
spectrum of class members‘ interests.224 
This avoids cognitive diversity‘s main pitfall—it‘s too hard to 
judge someone‘s training and experience (the two direct causes of 
cognitive diversity) from the information plaintiffs provide. 
Speculating about who will dissent and possess different information 
based on class members‘ interests is simple but effective. Because 
class members‘ aims and preferences vary, a representative group will 
likely include dissenters who challenge the status quo and inject new 
information into the discussion (as opposed to just being 
contrarian).225 
When group members dissent and share information, their 
actions dovetail with adequate representation‘s aims. Having someone 
represent you means that they will dissent on your behalf when your 
interests are in danger, vocalize your interests to the group, and, if 
that fails, to the judge. Adequate representation protects against the 
risk that one‘s attorney ―might skew [the litigation] systematically‖ to 
favor some class members over others ―on grounds aside from 
reasoned evaluation of their respective claims.‖226 In practice, this 
means two things: (1) appointing someone to speak on behalf of a class 
member‘s unique interests when deciding critical matters, such as 
settlement negotiations and terms; and (2) actually voicing those 
interests, particularly when they could be subverted, by using and 
disclosing relevant information. In short, adequate representation 
means more than mere loyalty; it means participating in the process, 
speaking up, dissenting, objecting, and if need be, leading the charge 
to opt out. 
Coming full circle then, judges and attorneys can leverage 
structural conflicts to ensure relevant diversity in appointing lead-
plaintiff groups. In this way, dissent and information sharing allow 
representative groups to reap cognitive diversity‘s principal benefits—
making decisions that reflect the group‘s preferences and avoiding 
dangerous group tendencies. Although each lead-plaintiff group will 
differ depending on the class definition, to appoint a representatively 
diverse lead-plaintiff group, courts should consider each dimension of 
the following six variables: 
 
 224. See generally Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Productive Conflict in Group Decision Making: 
Genuine and Contrived Dissent as Strategies to Counteract Biased Information Seeking, 88 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 563, 582–83 (2002) (explaining that genuine dissent 
counteracts group polarization and proposing that appointing heterogeneous group members 
with different functional and educational background will produce dissent). 
 225. See PAGE, supra note 206, at 344; SUNSTEIN, supra note 194, at 84–85. 
 226. PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, § 2.07(a)(1)(B). 
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1. Putative Class Composition.—Typical securities-fraud class 
members run the gamut from individual investors to institutional 
investors. Institutional investors include mutual funds, hedge funds, 
private pension funds, public pension funds, insurance companies, and 
state and local governments (though individuals ultimately own stock 
held by insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds).227 As 
outlined in Part I, predictable divides regularly exist between 
institutions and individual investors. Consequently, this variable 
gives courts a rough proxy for some additional factors mentioned 
shortly, such as the decisionmaker‘s training and experience 
(institutions typically rely on their general counsel), repeat 
relationships with counsel, and legal and financial sophistication. 
Mixing institutional and individual investors into the lead-
plaintiff group encourages them to deliberate over the group‘s 
litigation aims. Recall that an institution with a diversified portfolio 
may rationalize that, in the long run, its gains and losses will be a 
wash so it makes less sense to incur expensive litigation-related 
transaction costs.228 Individual investors, on the other hand, 
particularly those with less diversified portfolios, may litigate with 
enforcement, deterrence, and increased compensation in mind.229 
2. Financial Interest and Risk Preferences.—Just as they do 
now, courts should consider which investors suffered significant 
financial loss and select those with the largest losses. But in choosing 
a diverse group, they should also factor in risk preferences.230 Recall 
that decisionmakers are more willing to take risks when less money is 
at stake,231 but who counts as a ―small stakeholder‖ in any given case 
and what counts as ―peanuts‖ depends on how much is at stake vis-à-
vis a claimant‘s overall wealth. Courts can use this ―peanuts effect‖ as 
a proxy—it suggests that investors with less at stake overall will be 
less risk averse when litigating and more willing to press forward 
toward trial and vice versa.232 Granted, an institution with only 
 
 227. See SEC. INDUS. ASS‘N, supra note 89, at 70–72 (listing equities ownership by type of 
investor); Choi et al., supra note 38, at 877–80 (surveying institutional investor participation in 
securities-fraud litigation and noting the absence of mutual funds as lead plaintiffs). 
 228. Fisch, supra note 48, at 546. 
 229. See id. (contrasting the litigation objectives of institutional investors and individual 
investors). 
 230. For more information on risk preferences and how this factors into adequate 
representation, see supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 231. Markowitz, supra note 57, at 153–54; Prelec & Loewenstein, supra note 57, at 773, 774–
75; Weber & Chapman, supra note 57, at 31–33. 
 232. See Gousgounis, supra note 58, at 5 (―[A] small claimant would prefer litigation when 
the probability of winning 100 dollars is 0.1 . . . . To the contrary, a large claimant going for 100 
million dollars would prefer the settlement (certain value of 10million [sic] dollars).‖). 
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peanuts at stake might not think it worth the time to act as a lead 
plaintiff. But that sentiment likely changed after the influential 
articles by James Cox and Randall Thomas suggested that institutions 
were ―leaving money on the table‖ and thereby violating their duty of 
care.233 Although the Cox and Thomas articles addressed the failure to 
file securities claims to recover settlement funds, the careful 
institution may take a more active role. 
These risk preferences likewise affect whether a group member 
would continue investing resources in a failing litigation venture or 
rationally decide to dismiss the lawsuit. Although both groups and 
individuals can fall prey to ―sunk-cost‖ effects, groups with strong 
affective ties who share a task-relevant cognitive framework are more 
susceptible than cognitively diverse groups.234 As discussed shortly, 
allocating more decisionmaking authority to lead plaintiffs as opposed 
to lead counsel may further diminish sunk-cost risks; when one‘s own 
money is at stake—as is the lead counsel‘s when investing in the 
lawsuit—one may be more likely to make sunk-cost errors.235 
Accordingly, an attorney who has invested heavily in her litigation 
venture may be less inclined than those she represents to abandon the 
 
 233. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional 
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 860–67 (2002) 
[hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Money on the Table] (discussing the duty of various institutions to 
file claims in settled securities class actions); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting 
Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of 
Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 
418–19 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Slip Through Your Fingers] (concluding that there is 
a widespread failure of institutions to file claims in class actions and stating that ―institutional 
investors have a legal duty to file claims in securities fraud class action settlements‖). 
 234. See Beth Dietz-Uhler, The Escalation of Commitment in Political Decision-Making 
Groups: A Social Identity Approach, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 611, 625 (1996) (showing a positive 
correlation between coherent group identity and counterproductive decisionmaking); Christine 
M. Smith et al., Investment Decisions by Individuals and Groups in „Sunk Cost‟ Situations: The 
Potential Impact of Shared Representations, 1 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 175, 178 
(1998) (reviewing literature that discusses the relationship between group affinity and sunk-cost 
effects); Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A 
Prospect Theory Approach, 54 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430, 447–48 (1993) 
(finding that minorities that wanted to escalate the group‘s commitment were more influential 
than majorities that argued against it). Granted, if the plaintiffs are emotionally invested in the 
lawsuit this may make them more prone to sunk-cost effects. 
 235. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985) (suggesting that people may continue to pursue an activity 
with negative value because they have already invested in that activity); Hal R. Arkes & Peter 
Ayton, The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational than Lower Animals?, 
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 597 (1999) (―Justification plays another role in the analysis of the sunk 
cost effect. Beginning with a study by Staw (1976), it has been shown a number of times that if 
the decision maker bears personal responsibility for an initial investment, that person is more 
likely to ‗throw good money after bad‘ compared with the situation in which the decision maker 
bears no personal responsibility for the initial investment decision . . . .‖). 
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endeavor if it proves less fruitful or meritorious than initially 
expected. 
3. Other Fiduciary Obligations.—Institutions typically have 
other fiduciary obligations that may occasionally cause their interests 
to differ from the rest of the class‘s interests. For instance, private 
pension funds owe fiduciary duties to their pensioners through 
ERISA; public pension funds may owe fiduciary obligations to their 
pensioners through state, county, and municipal legislative 
requirements; and mutual-fund managers owe fiduciary duties to 
their investors through the Investment Company Act of 1940.236 
Keeping these extrajudicial obligations in mind when appointing lead 
plaintiffs may thwart or counterbalance what could develop into a 
debilitating intraclass conflict. 
4. Remedies.—Institutions are more likely than individual 
investors to continue to hold stock in the defendant company and, 
thus, to request corporate-governance reforms in their complaint.237 
Therefore, an institution-only lead plaintiff may trade increased 
compensation for internal reforms, whereas a class member who sold 
her stock would prefer to maximize her recovery. Part III.C.1 returns 
to and elaborates on this variable since it may mean that plaintiffs 
have fundamentally incompatible ends that necessitate subclassing. 
5. Counsel-Selection Process and Repeat Relationships with 
Lead Counsel.—To claim that lead counsel plays a vital role in the 
decisionmaking process is an understatement. They have the 
expertise, finances, and incentives to sue and thus tend to plot the 
legal strategy and make day-to-day litigation decisions. They, like 
some pension funds, are repeat players in the process. 
Courts have, from time to time, selected multiple law firms as 
lead counsel when necessary to protect the class‘s interests, when 
assigning a group as lead plaintiff, or where it would further resource 
sharing and access to particular expertise.238 Still, a handful of law 
 
 236. Cox & Thomas, Money on the Table, supra note 233, at 860–67 (discussing the duty of 
various institutions to file claims in settled securities class actions). 
 237. See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text. This makes them ―poorly suited to 
represent investors who are no longer invested in the company.‖ Fisch, supra note 48, at 546. 
 238. See, e.g., In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46–47 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(appointing three law firms as co-lead counsel); Vincelli v. Nat‘l Home Health Care Corp., 112 F. 
Supp. 2d 1309, 1315–16 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (discussing reasons for appointing multiple lead 
counsel); In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 176 (D.N.J. 1999); Sakhrani v. 
Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854–55 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (appointing two law firms plus 
local counsel); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(appointing three law firms); In re Advanced Tissue Scis. Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 353 (S.D. 
Cal. 1998) (appointing two firms). On the other hand, courts shy away from multiple 
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firms dominate the securities-class-action market, which tends to box 
out new entrants.239 On the positive side, these firms have a wealth of 
experience and expertise. But using only the same law firms has a 
negative side, too: they may be beholden to particular institutions.240 
Established law firms may adjust their litigation tactics and the 
settlement‘s terms to favor those that they will likely meet again—
institutions or one another. Recall that law firms monitor institutions‘ 
portfolios, alert institutions to potential litigation in which they could 
be lead plaintiff, and may employ lobbyists or engage in pay-to-play 
practices.241 There is thus an additional, pragmatic concern over 
whether such a firm can adequately represent the whole class. 
Consequently, judges should be open to appointing more than one firm 
where the situation warrants it. 
6. Decisionmaker‟s Training, Experience, and Sophistication.—
Cognitive diversity comes directly from training and experiences.242 
Training, whether from formal schooling or on-the-job skills, 
influences which perspectives we accumulate and incorporate into our 
thinking and how we interpret, categorize, and understand the world 
around us.243 Someone trained as a lawyer tends to analyze and solve 
problems differently than an investment banker, a scientist, or an 
 
appointments when the firms may duplicate services, fail to coordinate, or usurp control of the 
litigation. See, e.g., Vincelli, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1318–19 (finding that multiple lead counsel 
would not promote efficiency); In re Oxford Health Plans, 182 F.R.D. at 50 (appointing multiple 
lead counsel on condition that there is no duplication of services or increase in fees). 
Consequently, consistent with the PSLRA‘s goal of avoiding lawyer-driven litigation, some courts 
require a showing that ―the lead plaintiff will be able to withstand any limitation on, or 
usurpation of, control, and effectively supervise the several law firms acting as lead counsel.‖ In 
re Milestone Scientific, 187 F.R.D. at 177. 
 239. Choi, supra note 100, app. d (listing a handful of law firms that are frequently selected 
as lead counsel); Coffee, supra note 6, at 323–24 (listing market shares within securities 
plaintiffs‘ bar). 
 240. Interestingly, Judge Baer recently reasoned that because the proposed class ―includes 
thousands of participants, both male and female, arguably from diverse backgrounds,‖ securities 
class counsel must ―make every effort to assign . . . at least one minority lawyer and one woman 
lawyer‖ to the case. Class Action Order at 1, In re Gildan Activeware Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 
05048–HB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews 
/top_stories/docs/9_20_order_gildan.pdf. While this effort might be commendable for a host of 
other reasons, it is not clear that identity diversity correlates in a meaningful way to cognitive 
diversity or interest diversity in the securities class action context (as it might, for instance, in a 
civil rights or employment discrimination context). 
 241. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 242. PAGE, supra note 206, at 300, 302–05. 
 243. Id. at 302–03. For an overview of the potential biases that might increase or decrease if 
groups relied solely on experts, see Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and 
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 491–508 (2002) (positing that 
expertise exacerbates the egocentrism bias and overconfidence, but likely mitigates technical 
errors in decisionmaking, the availability heuristic, and the use of irrelevant information). 
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engineer. Similarly, our experiences demand that we develop unique 
knowledge and abilities, which we then use in solving problems. For 
instance, an investor who lost her savings in the Enron scandal and 
realized that she might have predicted its collapse by comparing its 
free cash flow with its net income would likely start doing just that 
before buying stock in the future. Professional investors know how to 
read a company‘s 8K and 10K filings, what constitutes a material 
event, and how to carefully analyze a 10K filing‘s Management‘s 
Discussion and Analysis (―MD&A‖) section, whereas less sophisticated 
investors might prefer to rely on Morningstar ratings. Of course, this 
does not matter for reliance in open-market fraud, but experience does 
change how plaintiffs make litigation decisions. 
Unfortunately, most lead-plaintiff motions contain relatively 
little information about the plaintiff although they occasionally 
discuss business ventures, investments, sophistication levels, and 
litigation experience.244 Still, as a rule of thumb, if the putative lead 
plaintiff is an institution, its general counsel typically makes its 
litigation decisions. Judging from the PSLRA‘s rationale, we tend to 
assume that institutions have greater financial and legal 
sophistication as well as better access to information.245 But individual 
investors, sometimes even those with undiversified portfolios, can be 
highly skilled and consistently outperform the market.246 Encouraging 
experienced investors and institutions to serve as lead plaintiff and 
giving the judge more leeway to appoint qualified representatives 
suggests that judges should likewise consider lifting the PSLRA‘s 
―professional plaintiff‖ ban for experienced plaintiffs with good track 
records.247 
 
 244. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of the Motion of Inter-Local Pension Fund GCC/IBT 
for Consolidation, Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and for Approval of Selection of Lead Counsel 
at 2, Reimer v. Ambac Fin. Group, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-00411-NRB, 2008 WL 2073931 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 17, 2008) (noting experience supervising counsel in complex securities cases); Declaration of 
Fred Crosetto in Support of the Crosetto Group‘s Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiffs and 
Lead Plaintiffs‘ Selection of Counsel at 1, In re Nature‘s Sunshine Prods., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 
2:06cv00267 TS, 2006 WL 2380965 (D. Utah. Aug. 16, 2006) (describing experience in business 
ventures). 
 245. See Fisch, supra note 48, at 545. Some courts have suggested that the PSLRA requires 
sophisticated lead plaintiffs. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(―[T]he goal of the Reform Act‘s lead plaintiff provision is to locate a person or entity whose 
sophistication and interest in the litigation are sufficient to permit that person or entity to 
function as an active agent for the class . . . .‖). 
 246. See Webber, supra note 45, at 13–19 (comparing and contrasting institutional and 
individual investors). 
 247. Congress added the so-called ―professional plaintiff‖ prohibition to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 as part of the PSLRA. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2006) (barring 
someone from serving as a lead plaintiff if she has served in that capacity five times during the 
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These six factors each have multiple dimensions—institutions, 
individuals, risk-seekers, risk-avoiders, experienced general counsel, 
those who want corporate-governance reforms, those who want 
monetary remedies, you name it. Assembling a small representative 
group means closely examining the class definition, the complaint, and 
the plaintiffs‘ motions to decide which interests require 
representation. Doing so ensures that dissenting voices are present, 
but it also requires judges to be flexible and willing to reassess the 
group‘s composition if conflicting interests emerge or the class 
definition changes. This does not mean, however, that a small, diverse 
group could not represent the class‘s interests. In fact, enduring social 
science research consistently demonstrates that small groups with 
between three and eight members outperform larger ones often 
because of the same collective-action problems legal academics have 
already identified.248 Preliminary anecdotal evidence also suggests 
that appointing diverse lead plaintiffs can result in higher 
settlements. For example, in Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, the court designed its own lead plaintiff group from three 
competing plaintiffs‘ groups to ensure adequate representation, 
resulting in one of the largest recoveries ever received from an 
accounting firm.249 
Further incentivizing plaintiffs to seek and take on the lead-
plaintiff role will help the judge too.250 Currently, lead plaintiffs 
receive only their pro rata settlement share plus some of their out-of-
pocket litigation expenses. Consequently, institutions worry about 
costly discovery, having to disclose proprietary information, devoting 
resources to overseeing the litigation, and the time it takes to 
 
preceding three years unless the court approves otherwise). For courts and commentators 
supporting this position, see Dees v. Colonial Bancgroup, Inc., No. 2:09cv104–MHT, 2009 WL 
1285424, at *2 (M.D. Ala. May 7, 2009); Kuriakose v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Co., No. 1:08–
cv–7281 (JFK), 2008 WL 4974839, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008); Smith v. Suprema Specialties, 
Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 627, 639–42 (D.N.J. 2002); Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1638. 
 248. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53–57 (2d ed. 1971) (citing 
examples of small group superiority); A. Paul Hare, A Study of Interaction and Consensus in 
Different Sized Groups, 17 AM. SOC. REV. 261, 267 (1952) (reporting that in one experiment a 
group of five found it easier to reach consensus than a group of twelve when time for discussion 
was limited); Susan A. Wheelan, Group Size, Group Development, and Group Productivity, 40 
SMALL GROUP RES. 247, 247, 256–58 (2009) (finding that groups with three to six members were 
more productive than those with seven to ten or eleven members or more).  
 249. In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 44–46 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
Chitwood Harley Harnes, one of the law firms involved in the litigation, lists this as an 
accomplishment on its website. Achievements, CHITWOOD HARLEY HARNES LLP, 
http://www.chitwoodlaw.com/practice/achievements.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). There is, 
however, some anecdotal evidence that the plaintiffs‘ lawyers in Oxford could have settled the 
case much earlier for the same amount. 
 250. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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monitor.251 Although successful settlements reimburse lead plaintiffs 
for their out-of-pocket costs, they are not always reimbursed at market 
rates for in-house staffing hours, which range dramatically from 40 to 
100 at the low end to between 250 and 1000 at the high end.252 
Accordingly, the better option today is to follow numerous 
commentators‘ suggestion of awarding lead plaintiffs more than their 
pro rata settlement share in addition to their out-of-pocket litigation 
expenses and costs.253 
2. Promoting a Competitive Selection Process 
Creating a competitive lead-plaintiff process will be easier with 
appropriately incentivized plaintiffs and attorneys who know that 
judges will appoint both experienced and new entrants into the 
securities-class-action field. To understand competition‘s benefits, 
consider a cautionary tale that partially led Congress to enact the 
PSLRA. Pre-PSLRA litigation involved management by committee, 
but attorneys compiled their own committee much as a political 
convention elects its own platform.254 Nominations and elections 
weren‘t based on credentials, but on friendships, brokered deals, and 
power players within the plaintiffs‘ bar.255 Accordingly, lawyers had 
little incentive to trim the fat, encourage competition, or select the 
most experienced litigators.256 As a result, Congress rejected proposals 
that would have institutionalized the plaintiffs‘ steering committee.257 
It was concerned that a committee of plaintiffs‘ attorneys would 
simply continue the then-current practice.258 
 
 251. Cox & Thomas, supra note 7, at 1602–10. 
 252. Id. at 1606–07. 
 253. See, e.g., id. at 1637–38 (proposing that courts use a variation on the lodestar method to 
determine the extra amount lead plaintiffs should receive). Granted, affording too much of a 
premium can lead to overzealous plaintiffs‘ attorneys. Thus, the key is to award just enough to 
incentivize plaintiffs. I do not take a position here on the best method for determining the 
optimal amount. For articles suggesting the inadequacies of the lodestar method, however, see 
John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903, 911 n.54 
(stating that the lodestar method results in excessive collusion); Charles Silver, Due Process and 
the Lodestar Method: You Can‟t Get There from Here, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1809, 1812–21 (2000) 
(arguing that the lodestar method is not the best method for minimizing conflicts).  
 254. Coffee, supra note 35, at 418–19. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 419–20. 
 257. See Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 2(a) (as passed by the 
House, Mar. 8, 1995) (mandating a steering committee comprised of no less than five members); 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. 240, 104th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. 
on Banking, June 19, 1995) (striking five-member steering committee provision). 
 258. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 418–19. 
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Unfortunately, competition post-PSLRA has increased little. 
Before the PSLRA, five law firms dominated the securities-class-
action market, constituting roughly 56.2 percent of the market; post-
PSLRA, five firms constitute 52.2 percent of the market.259 This is 
caused in part by law firms‘ repeat relationships with institutions, and 
in part by the PSLRA‘s restriction on discovery into adequacy as part 
of the appointment process.260 Although this restriction is meant to 
prevent the process from becoming ―an expensive and abusive 
sideshow,‖261 these concerns could be mitigated through protective 
orders and narrowly tailored discovery. Currently, the restriction 
inhibits competitors from determining why some plaintiffs and their 
counsel might have conflicting interests. Would-be competitors are 
caught in the midst of a circularity problem: the only way to obtain 
discovery into adequacy is to demonstrate ―a reasonable basis for a 
finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of 
representing the class,‖262 but that‘s hard to do without discovery. 
Reduced competition also means that the judge must take on more of 
an inquisitorial role, something that most judges trained in an 
adversarial culture find themselves ill equipped to do.263 
Knowing that judges will select a diverse, representative group 
is likely to increase competition by opening the market up to less 
established plaintiffs‘ firms. A competitive process has several 
benefits. First, it does not stress group cohesion and cooperation. If 
group members know they represent a subset of interests and that 
others‘ interests vary from theirs, then they are likely to monitor 
vigilantly. Likewise, competition helps establish dissent as an 
acceptable and encouraged norm, which, as explored shortly, is critical 
to better group decisionmaking.264 
Second, competition breeds choice both in terms of lead 
plaintiffs and lead counsel. As Stephen Choi explains, nondominant 
 
 259. Coffee, supra note 6, at 323–24. 
 260. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2006) (implementing a threshold pre-discovery 
requirement that there be shown a ―reasonable basis‖ for believing that the ―presumptively most 
adequate plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the class‖). 
 261. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 23, at 2109. 
 262. Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 547 (N.D. Tex. 1997). Courts occasionally 
allow discovery to determine the presumptive lead plaintiff. See In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. 
Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (discussing short depositions of lead-plaintiff 
candidates). 
 263. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 33 (2009); see also Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial 
Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2005–06 (1999) (pointing to ―emerging patterns of an inquisitorial 
justice system‖ in mass tort litigation). 
 264. See infra Part III.C.3. 
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law firms ―may lack securities class action-specific expertise to fight 
with larger plaintiffs‘ attorney firms,‖ ―have fewer contacts with 
investors who may potentially act as lead plaintiff,‖ and are often 
―smaller in size.‖265 Because only a few law firms dominate the 
market, their repeated interaction may lead to side deals that exclude 
new entrants.266 Thus, the more courts open up the selection process 
by appointing diverse representatives, the more competitive the 
process will become. 
Finally, competition and adequate representation have a causal 
relationship: less competition in the selection process means a weaker 
legal-services market, which means that there are fewer incentives for 
attorneys to ignore their own preferences when they conflict with the 
class‘s preferences.267 Plus, the economics literature routinely suggests 
that players in noncompetitive markets underperform.268 Accordingly, 
intensifying competition will expand choices and may thereby drive 
down legal fees, increase quality, and encourage attorneys to act as 
faithful agents. 
3. Ensuring Adequate Representation Throughout  
the Litigation 
Judges have the authority to appoint separate lead plaintiffs 
and lead counsel when conflicting interests exist.269 Yet, most refuse to 
do so because they claim, ―it is premature to determine before a full 
class certification hearing whether a Lead Plaintiff fairly and 
adequately represents the interests of class members.‖270 Instead, 
 
 265. Choi, supra note 100, at 11. 
 266. See id. app. d (listing a handful of law firms that are frequently selected as lead 
counsel). 
 267. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 412–15 (discussing conflicts of interest between clients and 
attorneys). 
 268. See id. at 414 (―[W]henever one detects slack or consistently substandard performance 
in a market . . . it is usually a safe diagnosis to predict that competition is lacking in the relevant 
market.‖); John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 1 n.2 (1995) 
(citing studies that provide evidence of the positive relationship between competition and 
productive efficiency). 
 269. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 149 (D.N.J. 1998) (appointing a separate 
lead plaintiff because of conflicts of interests); Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 402 
(D. Minn. 1998) (appointing separate lead plaintiffs and counsel for options purchasers and 
securities purchasers despite not finding a conflict of interest). 
 270. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 446, 451 (S.D. Tex. 2002); see also id. at 
451 (noting that ―well-founded and persuasive arguments for separate representation and 
classes or subclasses‖ exist, but putting them off until class certification or trial); Local 144 
Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Honeywell Int‘l, Inc., No. 00–3605 (DRD), 2000 WL 33173017, at 
*5 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2000) (finding that at the current preliminary stage of the litigation 
appointment of one lead-plaintiff group was appropriate); In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
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courts require only a preliminary showing of adequacy and typicality 
when appointing the lead plaintiff and read the PSLRA as a statutory 
presumption that ―one lead plaintiff can vigorously pursue all 
available causes of action against all possible defendants under all 
available legal theories.‖271 
Ignoring the need for separate representatives until plaintiffs 
certify the class or reach trial is inconsistent with the trend toward 
front-loading securities class actions. This trend is evident in three 
respects. First, securities class actions are increasingly difficult to 
plead: the PSLRA implements exacting pleading standards and, more 
recently, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. interprets the 
PSLRA‘s term ―strong inference‖ as requiring the scienter inference to 
be ―at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw 
from the facts alleged.‖272 As a result, plaintiffs must thoroughly 
investigate facts before discovery and include them in the complaint to 
counter a defendant‘s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—now the most 
formidable obstacle to settlement.273 
Second, a spate of appellate court decisions, principally in the 
securities-class-action context, have encouraged courts to look closer 
into the merits during class certification.274 Judges now resolve factual 
 
110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 431–32 (E.D. Va. 2000) (proceeding with naming lead counsel only after 
granting the motions to consolidate); In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 217–18 (D.N.J. 
1999) (applying a truncated Rule 23 analysis and presuming the adequacy of the proposed lead 
plaintiffs in light of lack of opposition, but acknowledging that opposition might have triggered 
discovery and a fuller hearing); In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 286, 293–97 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same as In re Microstrategy); Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 549–50 
(N.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that one lead plaintiff best serves the purposes of the PSLRA in most 
cases). 
 271. Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also 
Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8538, 2008 WL 2876373, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
2008) (―At this stage of the litigation, the moving plaintiff must only make a preliminary showing 
that the adequacy and typicality requirements have been met.‖); Reimer v. Ambac Fin. Group, 
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 411(NRB), 2008 WL 2073931, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008) (reciting 
preliminary-showing requirement); Weinberg v. Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 
248, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); In re Enron, 206 F.R.D. at 451 (―Thus their requests for 
splintering the action or appointing multiple Lead Plaintiffs to represent specialized interests . . . 
would undermine the purpose of the PSLRA.‖). 
 272. 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). The PSLRA implements heightened pleading requirements. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 273. See Cox & Thomas, Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 233, at 418–19 (―The most 
serious obstacle confronting the class action is withstanding the motion to dismiss.‖). 
 274. E.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008); Oscar 
Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Initial Pub. 
Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a court may certify a class only 
after it ―resolves factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement‖); Szabo v. Bridgeport 
Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (―Before deciding whether to allow a case to 
proceed as a class action, therefore, a judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are 
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disputes that relate to class certification by a preponderance of the 
evidence.275 Moreover, merits-related questions have leached into both 
the motion-to-dismiss and the class-certification stage.276 For example, 
the Second Circuit in In re Initial Public Offerings Securities 
Litigation required evidence of an efficient market as part of its 
certification inquiry,277 and the Supreme Court in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo required proof of loss causation to 
plead a securities-fraud class action.278 This may account, at least in 
part, for the increase in precertification dismissals—now between 
forty-one and forty-four percent.279 
Third, most work (and thus the representation) takes place 
before certification. Most cases settle soon after a judge certifies 
them.280 Even before Congress passed the PSLRA, courts typically 
ruled on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment before 
 
necessary under Rule 23.‖); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, § 2.06(a) (stating that a court 
must resolve questions of law and fact if relevant to the suitability of a class-action treatment). 
 275. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307 (―Factual determinations supporting Rule 23 
findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.‖); Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 
F.3d at 269 (―We hold hence that loss causation must be established at the class certification 
stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence.‖); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 
2.06(b) (stating that questions of fact relevant to the suitability of class-action treatment should 
be resolved by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).  
 276. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of 
Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 323, 
330–34 (2010) (discussing case law requiring proof of merits at class-certification stage and 
noting the effect of Tellabs on lower courts‘ treatment of motions to dismiss); Richard A. 
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 136–41 (2009) 
(discussing the distinction between ―necessary law declaration in the class certification context 
and unwarranted swallowing-up of summary judgment‖). 
 277. 471 F.3d at 42–43; see also Nagareda, supra note 276, at 136–37 (discussing the IPO 
case). 
 278. 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 (2005); see also Nagareda, supra note 276, at 137–39 (discussing 
the Dura Pharmaceuticals case). 
 279. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2009: A YEAR IN 
REVIEW 21–22 (2010), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2009_ 
YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2009_YIR.pdf (finding an uptick in dismissals and 
suggesting without concluding that Dura Pharmaceuticals is the cause); STEPHANIE PLANCICH & 
SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: 2009 MID-YEAR UPDATE 15–18 (2009), available at http://www.nera.com 
/extImage/Recent_Trends_Report_07_09.pdf (finding a slightly higher likelihood of dismissal 
after Dura Pharmaceuticals). 
 280. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1292 (2002) (―Other empirical studies, although few in number, . . . confirm 
what most class action lawyers know to be true: almost all class actions settle, and the class 
obtains substantial settlement leverage from a favorable certification decision.‖); Willging et al., 
supra note 27, at 142–44 (finding that, in the districts surveyed, certified cases were two to five 
times more likely to settle than non-certified cases). 
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ruling on class certification.281 But the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 
make this trend more explicit. The changes pushed the certification 
decision from ―as soon as practicable after commencement of an 
action‖ to ―an early practicable time.‖282 This allows the court to delay 
certifying the class until the parties finish conducting certification-
related discovery, put together an adjudication plan, and file motions 
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.283 
In sum, most key decisions in all class actions are made before 
certification, but securities class actions‘ unique lead-plaintiff process 
provides class members extra insurance—if only judges used it as 
such. Put simply, if pretrial is the new trial, then judges should take 
steps to ensure adequate representation earlier in the process. Rule 
23(g)(3), which was added as part of Rule 23‘s 2003 amendments after 
Congress enacted the PSLRA in 1995, implicitly recognizes this need 
and addresses it by allowing courts to appoint interim counsel to act in 
the putative class‘s best interests before certification.284 Likewise, 
judges selecting lead plaintiffs should not turn a blind eye to apparent 
conflicts by postponing the adequacy inquiry.285 
C. Litigation Governance Through Group Decisionmaking 
1. Avoiding Diverse Fundamental Preferences  
Through Subclassing 
Subclassing remains an important tool for ensuring adequate 
representation, but its benefit should be weighed against its potential 
to create a subclass with little to no settlement leverage. As beneficial 
as cognitive diversity is for reaching creative solutions and more 
reasoned decisions, diversity can also lead to significant problems if 
group members disagree on their background framework. In other 
words, if lead plaintiffs have fundamentally different goals, then that 
conflict causes difficulty in decisionmaking. Diverse preferences over 
ends, ―fundamental preferences,‖ are far more troubling than 
 
 281. See id. at 104–05 (discussing pre-PSLRA data showing that rulings on motions to 
dismiss and motions for summary judgment often preceded class certification). 
 282. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee‘s notes. 
 283. See id. (elaborating on reasons for the change in the rule). 
 284. Id. R. 23(g)(3). 
 285. Judges must also monitor adequacy throughout the litigation, particularly if counsel 
changes the class definition. Plus, increased rigor at the front end should neither change the 
plaintiffs‘ burden of proving adequacy at certification nor affect the defendant‘s right to 
challenge it. 
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differences over means, or ―instrumental preferences.‖286 The trick lies 
in distinguishing one from the other. 
It may help to consider a nonlegal example: a corporation‘s 
managers and board of directors may all share a common, profit-
seeking goal. They might differ over the means of achieving that goal, 
but they will all be satisfied when the company makes more money. 
On the other hand, the company‘s retail store manager may not be 
pleased if management implements a new commission policy that 
diminishes her take-home pay. The retail manager and company 
management thus have fundamentally diverse preferences.287 
In the securities-class-action context, preferences work much 
the same way—the plaintiffs‘ various interests affect whether a 
preference is fundamental or instrumental. If, for instance, plaintiffs 
want different remedies, say corporate-governance reforms versus 
monetary compensation, is this a conflict over instrumental means or 
a fundamental end? It might be that all plaintiffs have a desire to hold 
the defendant accountable and deter others from engaging in fraud, 
but differ over the best way to go about it. If so, the conflict is an 
instrumental one about how to achieve their desired result.288 On the 
other hand, if one lead plaintiff wants corporate-governance reforms 
not as a means for holding the defendant accountable, but to boost her 
stock value as a current owner, and another lead plaintiff wants to 
maximize her compensation or promote accountability and deterrence, 
then these are diverse fundamental preferences. As such, fundamental 
preferences require scrutiny to uncover—something that a competitive 
lead-plaintiff selection process will help do—and, to ensure adequate 
representation, the judge should subclass or encourage one group to 
opt out and maintain a separate action. Still, because subclassing has 
the potential to undermine subgroups‘ credible threat against the 
defendant, it should be used sparingly. 
Failing to subclass plaintiffs with diverse fundamental 
preferences when necessary can cause a host of problems, including an 
inability to reach consensus, arbitrary choices through group voting, 
and strategic behavior through withholding consent.289 If the group 
includes members with diverse fundamental preferences, then lead 
plaintiffs faced with more than two settlement-design alternatives 
 
 286. See PAGE, supra note 206, at 11–12 (distinguishing between fundamental preferences 
and instrumental preferences). 
 287. Scott Page offers similar examples. Id. at 256–57. 
 288. See id. at 250–51 (suggesting that even politicians who have vastly different preferences 
over how to achieve policy aims still have the same aims—such as better education systems and 
health care—and are thus instrumental rather than fundamental). 
 289. Id. at 256. 
2b. Burch_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/2011 11:43 AM 
2011] OPTIMAL LEAD PLAINTIFFS 1175 
may misrepresent their preferences and manipulate the outcome 
through strategic behavior. 
To illustrate one form of strategic holdout behavior, consider a 
well-known but semi-speculative example from the asbestos litigation. 
Before the Supreme Court decided Amchem, a plaintiffs‘ steering 
committee hit a standstill in negotiating with defendants; neither side 
could get past ―the lowest common denominator on their points of 
agreement.‖290 As anyone familiar with the litigation knows, both 
sides eventually struck a deal for future asbestos plaintiffs (with a 
side deal for current, ―inventory‖ plaintiffs), which the Supreme Court 
struck down in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.291 The objector 
bringing the appeal was none other than Fred Baron, who had a seat 
on the initial plaintiffs‘ steering committee.292 
To simplify a complex case for the purpose of this example, two 
things went wrong at two levels. First, the committee itself was 
comprised solely of lawyers who did not account for the diverse 
fundamental preferences of their purported clients: inventory 
plaintiffs with present injuries wanted to maximize their current 
payout, and those with injuries that might manifest in the future 
wanted to preserve defendants‘ assets. Second, but related, a fissure 
likely existed within the plaintiffs‘ bar: Fred Baron wanted to continue 
to litigate asbestos cases and thus preferred not to settle ―futures‖ 
cases, whereas Joseph Rice and Ronald Motley (of Motley Rice) were 
ready to move on to the tobacco litigation.293 Thus, the key plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys had fundamentally diverse preferences that, as Richard 
Nagareda describes it, ―form[ed] a blueprint for holdouts.‖294 
Several design lessons emerge from this example. First, when 
preference differences are fundamental and predictable, like the 
futures versus the inventory plaintiffs, subclassing may help avoid 
strategic behavior when one group can succeed only at the other 
group‘s expense. It could likewise help to avoid the inadequate 
representation problems that arise when one representative attempts 
to represent both groups.295 The caveat is that subclassing diminishes 
 
 290. Georgene v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 266 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 291. 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
 292. Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 966 
(1996) (citing Andrew Blum, Asbestos Counsel, NATL. L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 2). 
 293. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 93 (2007). 
 294. Nagareda, supra note 292, at 966. 
 295. To be sure, lead-plaintiff groups will likely include many members with diverse 
instrumental preferences. So long as those interests are represented within the group, members 
should be able to compromise to reach an acceptable settlement. It is when plaintiffs have 
fundamentally incompatible ends requiring separate legal representation that subclassing 
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a subgroup‘s settlement value by carving it out of the group that 
creates the credible threat against the defendant. Subclassing the 
future claimants in Amchem, for example, may have alleviated an 
adequate-representation problem, but it would have likewise divorced 
future claimants from present claimants—those who held most of the 
settlement leverage. Depending on the circumstances, the same might 
be said of smaller investors‘ litigation stakes compared with an 
institution‘s investment. Consequently, subclassing as a matter of 
course provides an unsatisfactory answer to the adequate 
representation problem.  
The second lesson that emerges from the Amchem example is 
that requiring lead plaintiffs with incompatible ends to achieve 
unanimity will cause some to withhold consent, vote strategically, or 
otherwise misrepresent their preferences. Finally, because we mostly 
trust lead plaintiffs to oversee the litigation and the attorneys, if we 
give them enough authority, their involvement in decisionmaking and 
negotiating may reign in attorney-client agency problems and thwart 
the self-interested behavior that different business strategies caused 
in Amchem. 
Although similar problems could emerge when lead plaintiffs 
have diverse instrumental preferences, they are less likely. When 
people share a common goal, they have weak incentives to 
misrepresent their preferences.296 Moreover, they have incentives to 
share information—not hide or distort it. 
Whether preferences differ fundamentally or instrumentally 
affects both when judges should subclass and how they construct 
broadly representative decisionmaking groups. Using subclasses too 
liberally could pose a real danger. Subclassing instrumental 
differences rather than just fundamental ones risks allocating finite 
resources—attorneys‘ time and money—too thinly. Plus, over-
subclassing dilutes plaintiffs‘ credible threat against the defendant, 
which may translate into a smaller settlement and a worse overall 
outcome. 
 
becomes necessary. Even then, the potential for compromise remains, but constitutional notions 
of due process (and the practical decisionmaking problems mentioned in this section) require 
separate representation. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 (―Rule 23(e) . . . protects unnamed class 
members ‗from unjust or unfair settlements protecting their rights when the representatives 
become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are to secure satisfaction of their 
individual claims by a compromise.‘ ‖) (quoting 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797 (3d ed. 2008)). 
 296. PAGE, supra note 206, at 274, 280–81. 
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2. Lead Plaintiffs‘ and Lead Counsel‘s Obligations 
Before suggesting how a properly constituted lead-plaintiff 
group should make decisions, it helps to identify which decisions 
belong to the lead plaintiffs versus lead counsel and when lead 
plaintiffs should have input versus decisionmaking authority. Lead 
plaintiffs‘ participation and decisionmaking responsibilities are not 
synonymous. They make some decisions on their own such as selecting 
counsel and negotiating the fee arrangement, but they participate 
alongside counsel in key activities such as discovery, litigation 
strategy, and settlement negotiations.297 For example, Jill Fisch 
reports that institutions ―review pleadings, sometimes making 
substantial revisions or edits,‖ ―discuss litigation strategy,‖ ―monitor 
settlement discussions,‖ review time sheets, and sometimes 
participate in settlement negotiations.298 
Despite pinning a myriad of private obligations and public 
aspirations on the lead plaintiff, her formal decisionmaking 
responsibilities are limited.299 Often at counsel‘s urging, lead plaintiffs 
file a complaint, review and certify the complaint, and request 
appointment as lead plaintiff. Ostensibly on their own, they select lead 
counsel and negotiate counsel‘s fee arrangement, which is still subject 
to court approval.300 Their decisionmaking authority in other areas, 
such as settlement, is less certain. As the Eighth Circuit has noted: 
 
 297. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class 
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 707 (2002) (―[Institutions] place considerable 
importance on identifying a firm with which they can develop a good working relationship, and 
cite joint decisionmaking and regular reporting as important priorities.‖); Roche, supra note 218, 
at 1 (noting that the law firm ―welcomed our involvement in all facets of the litigation from the 
pleading of the complaint through the settlement negotiations‖). 
 298. Fisch, supra note 297, at 709. 
 299. Given the number of responsibilities some courts delineate to class counsel, one wonders 
what is left for the lead plaintiff to do. See, e.g., Cortese v. Radian Grp., Inc., No. 07–3375, 2008 
WL 269473, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) (requiring counsel to coordinate briefing and arguing 
motions, written discovery, and witnesses examination as well as appointing a spokesperson, 
calling meetings of plaintiffs‘ counsel, conducting settlement negotiations, directing trial 
preparation, transmitting correspondence to plaintiffs, and supervising ―any other matters‖); In 
re Sterling Fin. Corp. Sec. Class Action, No. 07–2171, 2007 WL 4570729, *7–8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 
2007) (same); In re Flight Safety Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 133 (D. Conn. 2005) 
(same); In re Catalina Mktg. Corp. Sec. Litig., 225 F.R.D. 684, 687–88 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (same); In 
re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig. II, 203 F.R.D. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (same). 
 300. See 15 U.S.C. § 78–4(a)(2), (3)(B)(v) (2006) (listing the lead plaintiff‘s responsibilities, 
including selecting lead counsel); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 199–200 (3d Cir. 
2005) (―The paramount goal . . . is to give the lead plaintiff . . . authority over class counsel.‖); In 
re Network Assocs, Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (―The lead 
plaintiff owes a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest quality representation at the lowest price.‖). 
The court still oversees these responsibilities, however. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA 
Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1102 (D. Minn. 2009). 
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[The PSLRA] is silent on the other responsibilities and rights that lead plaintiffs have to 
control, direct, and manage class action securities litigation. In particular, [the PSLRA] 
says nothing about whether the lead plaintiff must either approve a settlement or be 
replaced for actions inimical to class interests before a district court may review and 
approve a proposed settlement. In addition, it says nothing regarding how a district 
court should deal with a fractured lead plaintiff group that advocates inconsistent 
positions. . . . Looking at the narrow issue that is presented, namely, what weight a 
district court must give to objections from a fraction of a fractured lead plaintiff group, 
we find no guidance in the [PSLRA] . . . .301 
This leads to a curious juxtaposition: we expect so much from 
lead plaintiffs, but give them little decisionmaking autonomy. Even 
their discretion to select lead counsel does not give them the authority 
to fire them. So, if a lead plaintiff decides that the class is better off 
going to trial or thinks the precedent valuable, but the attorney-as-
financier disagrees, there is little the lead plaintiff can do apart from 
objecting or opting out.302 The rationale is sound: the lead counsel 
must act in the class‘s best interests, not just the lead plaintiff‘s best 
interests.303 But up until settlement, courts willingly assume that the 
lead plaintiff‘s interests closely align with the class‘s best interests. 
Granted, the disgruntled lead plaintiff has options. She can 
voice her objections to the court, which has a duty both to listen to 
those objections and to ensure that the class settlement is ―fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.‖304 If the court approves the settlement over 
her objection, then she, like other objectors, could either opt out or 
appeal the court‘s settlement approval. But focusing singularly on 
settlement where the judge enters the picture misses the need for 
 
 301. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 350 F.3d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 2003); see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., What Should a Lead Plaintiff Do?, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 2002, at 5 (―[T]he actual duties 
of the lead plaintiff are largely unspecified.‖). At least one court has been more hospitable to a 
lead plaintiff‘s objections. See Moore v. Halliburton, No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
18187, at *13–20 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004) (recognizing a lead plaintiff‘s objection to a settlement 
agreement as a reason for not approving the agreement). 
 302. Although there is a chance that the judge will reject the settlement, judges tend to favor 
settlement because it clears their dockets and may enhance their managerial reputation with the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 
 303. See In re BankAmerica, 350 F.3d at 751 (discussing safeguards that ensure that the 
interests of the class, and not solely the interests of the lead plaintiff, are represented in the 
litigation); Laskey v. Int‘l Union, 638 F.2d 954, 957 (6th Cir. 1981) (―That the class counsel 
proposed a settlement which the named representatives opposed does not prove that the 
interests of the class were not protected.‖); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 
1176 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing the class attorney‘s failure to appeal because he felt that such an 
appeal would not be in the best interests of the class, not only the lead plaintiffs); Koehler v. 
Green, No. CV 405–367–JFN, 2006 WL 5605002, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2006) (―[A] fraction of a 
fractured lead plaintiff group may not singlehandedly veto a class action settlement to the 
detriment of the class as a whole.‖); Thomas v. Albright, 77 F. Supp. 2d 114, 122 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(―Class counsel is required to act in the ‗best interests of the class considered as a unit.‘ ‖) 
(quoting Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 304. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
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representative decisionmaking and input along the way in identifying 
claims, requesting particular remedies, participating in discovery, 
plotting litigation strategy, and taking part in settlement 
negotiations. Settlement, after all, typically takes years. 
If courts begin appointing truly representative lead-plaintiff 
groups, then judges and lead counsel should likewise allocate lead 
plaintiffs more decisionmaking autonomy and give their input more 
weight. Class counsel should consult and take direction from a richly 
representative lead-plaintiff group in much the same way that an 
attorney consults with her client in individual litigation. Usually, 
lawyers must discuss their client‘s litigation objectives, keep their 
clients reasonably informed, ensure that clients ―have sufficient 
information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be 
pursued,‖ ―explain the general strategy and prospects of success,‖ and 
―consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant 
expense or to injure or coerce others.‖305 
In general, clients have the right to make decisions that affect 
the case‘s merits, such as whether to waive the right to plead an 
affirmative defense.306 Given the well-known wedge between class 
counsel‘s interests and class members‘ interests, lead plaintiffs should 
also review and make critical decisions about pretrial motions and 
discovery; otherwise, an attorney operating on a contingent-fee basis 
may be tempted to skimp on cost and quality or could fall prey to 
sunk-cost effects.307 In short, if lead plaintiffs are to adequately 
represent class members‘ interests, monitor the lawyers, and 
minimize agency costs, then, consistent with the PSLRA‘s goal of 
increasing client control, lead plaintiffs should have decisionmaking 
authority over key decisions as well as decisions that implicate their 
values and litigation objectives.308 
 
 305. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.4, cmts. 2, 5. 
 306. See id. R. 1.2(a) (discussing the decisions that the client, as opposed to the attorney, is 
entitled to make); MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7–7 (1980) (―[I]t is for the client to 
decide whether he will . . . waive his right to plead an affirmative defense.‖). 
 307. Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal 
Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 124 (1979). 
 308. Id. at 125 (arguing that client decisionmaking ―maximize[s] the client‘s ability to 
monitor the lawyer and . . . minimize[s] expense‖) (1979); See also Koehler, 2006 WL 5605002, at 
*5 (noting that the plaintiff played an active role in the previous suit by participating ―with class 
counsel in discovery and the development of legal theories and strategy‖ as well as in ―the 
mediation with class counsel‖). Granted, just because lead counsel should consult the lead 
plaintiff group on certain decisions, the group can still decide to forgo discussion on tangential 
matters. 
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3. Decisionmaking Procedures 
How then should groups decide these matters? As evidenced by 
the few lead-plaintiff groups that actually describe how they decide, 
decision rules could take multiple forms—consensus, majority voting 
with a one-vote-per-group-member system, supermajority voting, or 
even voting based on proportional litigation stakes. And the group 
may prefer to mix these models depending on the task.309 For instance, 
discovery and pretrial preferences might be uncontroversial enough 
for the group to reach consensus, whereas settlement terms might 
entail a vote. 
Regardless of the decisionmaking rule, the process preceding 
the decision must include opportunities for dissent and information 
sharing.310 Both are critical to adequate representation and fully 
informed decisionmaking.311 And recall that dissent is key to avoiding 
group polarization and confirmation bias. It also improves creativity, 
performance, and quality by exposing group members to novel views 
(even when those views are incorrect) and revealing hidden 
information.312 Discussions where members voice dissenting views 
tend to last longer, to exchange more information, and to produce 
more alternatives than do those without dissent.313 
 
 309. See P.R. Laughlin & A.L. Ellis, Demonstrability and Social Combination Processes on 
Mathematical Intellective Tasks, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 184–87 (1986) 
(suggesting that groups implicitly prefer different decision rules depending on the task). 
 310. This means, of course, that the group must make decisions as a group and work 
together toward that end. If group members simply operate separately, this creates a problem 
with oversight and hampers other members‘ ability to monitor class counsel. See Fisch, supra 
note 297, at 717 n.363 (describing the Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Co. 
litigation where the court appointed a group and ―forced the institution to work with a law firm 
that it had not selected and with which it had no personal or formal contractual relationship, 
thus limiting the institution‘s ability to engage in . . . ongoing monitoring and control‖). 
 311. On the value of sharing information and participating in group discussion, see Jamonn 
Campbell & Garold Stasser, The Influence of Time and Task Demonstrability on Decision-
Making in Computer-Mediated and Face-to-Face Groups, 37 SMALL GROUP RES. 271, 271 (2006); 
Michael A. Hogg & Scott A. Reid, Social Identity, Self-Categorization and the Communication of 
Group Norms, 16 COMM. THEORY 7, 18–19 (2006) (―There is also evidence that group members 
who communicate shared information are viewed more favorably than are members who bring 
up unshared information.‖); Edward G. Sargis & James R. Larson, Jr., Informational Centrality 
and Member Participation During Group Decision Making, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP 
REL. 333, 343–44 (2002) (finding that group members get the most value from sharing 
information previously unknown to the other members of the group in making decisions). 
 312. Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 207, at 150–55; Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Group 
Decision Making in Hidden Profile Situations: Dissent as a Facilitator for Decision Quality, 91 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1080, 1090 (2006). 
 313. F.C. Brodbeck et al., Improving Group Decision Making Under Conditions of Distributed 
Knowledge: The Information Asymmetries Model, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 459, 461–62 (2007); C.J. 
Nemeth & J.L. Kwan, Minority Influence, Divergent Thinking and Detection of Correct Solutions, 
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Research suggests that four factors encourage group members 
to express dissent: participation, dialectical leadership, critical norms, 
and—more questionable in the litigation context—a unanimous 
decision rule.314 First, participation lies at the crux of several vital 
dimensions: procedural justice, adequate representation, and 
compliance with the outcome.315 Voicing one‘s views is the lynchpin for 
adequate representation and the means for taking part and being 
heard in the deliberation and adjudicatory process.316 Likewise, the 
more members participate in the decisionmaking process and 
influence the outcome, the more participating and dissenting become 
embedded in the group‘s norms, and the more willing members are to 
participate in the first place.317 
Second, research on small groups consistently indicates that 
successful group deliberations require a clear agenda and a leader who 
ensures that everyone has an opportunity to share information.318 
Conversely, unstructured, free-flowing discussions tend to center 
around information everyone already knows; new information is not 
presented.319 A ―dialectical leader‖ encourages dissent and discussion 
about ideas and alternatives that run contrary to the majority 
position.320 
Leadership, however, is a tricky question. Realistically, an 
attorney from one of the firms appointed as lead counsel is in the best 
position to facilitate group discussion, subject to some caveats. By 
having much at stake financially and reputationally, she has the most 
incentive to lead and, because most information flows through her, 
will know when critical decisions need to be made. On the other hand, 
if lead counsel has an ongoing relationship with an institution, then 
she may bias the discussion in the institution‘s favor. Plus, the PSLRA 
took a clear position against lawyer-driven litigation. Yet, if a member 
feels ignored, then she can lead the charge to opt out, which 
 
17 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 788, 796–97 (1987) (finding that exposure to minority dissent 
facilitates creative ideas and solutions, whereas majority dissent stifles novel ideas); Schulz-
Hardt et al., supra note 207, at 156–57, 160–61. 
 314. Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 207, at 165–67. 
 315. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–39 (2006). 
 316. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 269 (1992); Burch, supra note 263, at 38–39; Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 
207, at 166. 
 317. Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 207, at 166. 
 318. SUROWIECKI, supra note 195, at 182–83; Garold Stasser, The Uncertain Role of 
Unshared Information in Collective Choice 49, 49–51, in SHARED KNOWLEDGE IN ORGANIZATIONS 
(Leigh L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999). 
 319. SUROWIECKI, supra note 195, at 182–83; Stasser, supra note 318, at 49–51. 
 320. Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 207, at 166. 
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ultimately diminishes counsel‘s contingent fee.321 And external 
constraints through lead plaintiffs‘ voting and participation keep the 
dialectical leader in check. Still, it is best to think of a ―facilitator‖ 
rather than a ―leader.‖ Attorneys-as-facilitators harmonizes with their 
duties as agents and their clients‘ role as principals. What‘s 
important, however, is that the facilitator—whether lead counsel or a 
lead plaintiff—emphasize the need for dissent, discussion, and 
information exchange and avoid suppressing contrary views. 
Third, group decisionmaking benefits from a norm in which 
members value independence, critical thought, and discussion as vital 
to the group‘s collective work.322 Consider the converse: if members are 
friends tied through their preexisting, cohesive relationships and fear 
that dissenting, pointing out counterarguments, and objecting will 
violate the group‘s norm of conformity, then they will refuse to reveal 
their private information.323 Norms that promote conformity, 
nondisclosure, and solidarity can lead to the same kind of socially 
destructive decisionmaking that covered up the Catholic Church‘s 
child sex-abuse scandal.324 Accordingly, by adopting a critical norm 
that does not shun dissenters as disloyal and values openness, lead-
plaintiff groups can improve their decisionmaking and avoid group 
polarization and confirmation biases.325 
Finally, employing a unanimous decision rule guarantees that 
the group must listen to dissent to achieve consensus; dissenting and 
exchanging information are built into the model. But there are 
stronger countervailing reasons not to require group consensus or a 
unanimous decision rule when considering when and whether to 
settle. The danger is the classic holdout problem, where one group 
member withholds consent and threatens to hijack the settlement 
until the group meets her demands.326 
 
 321. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of Class Actions, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 173–74 (explaining how opting out might encourage competition and 
thereby bolster adequate representation). 
 322. Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 207, at 167. 
 323. SUNSTEIN, supra note 194, at 79. 
 324. Id. 
 325. See Rebecca Mitchell et al., The Role of Openness to Cognitive Diversity and Group 
Processes in Knowledge Creation, 40 SMALL GROUP RES. 535, 536 (2009) (discussing studies that 
show that there is value to openness surrounding cognitive diversity). 
 326. See Nagareda, supra note 292, at 966 (discussing one such case example); see also In re 
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 350 F.3d 747, 749–50 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in approving a class settlement over the objections of three 
members of a seven-member lead plaintiff group); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: 
Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 422 
(2000) (discussing the holdout problem in the context of public interest groups).  
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Accordingly, a supermajority vote after vigorous discussion 
maintains most of a unanimous decision rule‘s benefits while avoiding 
the holdout problem.327 Of course, a supermajority vote will vary 
somewhat depending on group size. For instance, a five-member group 
might demand an eighty percent supermajority, or four out of five 
members; whereas an eight-member group might require a seventy-
five percent supermajority, or six out of eight members. Although the 
group might easily achieve consensus on less controversial matters, 
requiring a supermajority vote after ample time for members to 
discuss and voice alternatives that they might all be able to agree to 
can put to rest controversial matters, such as settlement. Likewise, 
judicially imposed timing deadlines can solve a group‘s inability to 
make decisions. 
A supermajority vote on a settlement offer or counteroffer 
should bind class counsel unless the settlement is somehow 
unethical.328 Of course, while a vote binds lead counsel, the judge must 
still independently review the settlement to ensure that it is fair, 
reasonable, and adequate. This gives the dissenters outside the 
supermajority ample incentive and opportunity to voice their 
objections, which makes objections more meaningful. 
D. Voice Versus Exit: Why Dissent Works Best 
The preceding sections have explained how cognitive diversity 
and adequate representation go hand in hand and how judges and 
attorneys can assemble lead-plaintiff groups using these metrics to 
leverage better decisionmaking to the class‘s benefit. But, as Part I 
mentioned, opting out has become a trend. And, as Professor John 
Coffee has observed, exit has something to commend: it has the 
potential to ―encourage real competition in the market for class action 
professional services.‖329 His hope, in short, is that the trend toward 
exit will provide an ex ante incentive in future class actions for 
counsel to adequately represent the entire class.330 Accordingly, this 
 
 327. A supermajority vote also provides the court with clear direction from the lead-plaintiff 
group. This avoids the problem presented in the Cendant litigation, where only one group 
member appeared to contest the attorney‘s fee award, but the other group members provided no 
direction or response. Fisch, supra note 297, at 717 n.363. As Jill Fisch points out, this made it 
difficult for the court to determine the group‘s position. Id.  
 328. For similar proposals in nonclass aggregation, see PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, § 3.17(b) 
(using a ―substantial-majority vote‖), and in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb) 
(2006) (employing a seventy-five percent vote). 
 329. Coffee, supra note 35, at 409. 
 330. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class 
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (2004). 
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concluding Section responds to his argument by pulling together this 
Article‘s themes and explaining how selecting a diverse lead-plaintiff 
group—a voice-based reform—is a normatively better solution than 
exit. It does so by considering pragmatic concerns, including due 
process, adequate representation, and institutional legitimacy; 
institutional concerns, such as efficiency and fairness; and regulatory 
concerns, including deterrence. To be clear, I am not suggesting that 
we should restrict opt-out rights, but rather that the number of 
institutions opting out is symptomatic of a larger problem with 
inadequate representation that exit alone cannot fix, but that voice 
can. 
1. Pragmatic Concerns: Strategic Defendants,  
Exit‘s Unavailability, and Objectors 
Pragmatically, exit presents three concerns. First, defendants 
will adjust their litigation strategy over time to account for increased 
opt outs by reducing class settlement amounts or deterring opt outs 
through coercive settlement design. Second, exit is available only to 
large investors and institutions that receive individual legal advice, 
which leaves most individual investors without realistic recourse. 
Third, opting out makes meaningful objections less likely, removes 
dissent, makes the fairness hearing less adversarial, and forces the 
judge to act inquisitorially. 
As to the first concern, securities-class-action defendants will 
likely take a page from mass-tort defendants‘ playbook to deter 
investors from opting out. Mass-tort defendants have become adept at 
pushing the line between creating settlement terms that are just too 
good to turn down and offers that claimants can‘t refuse in the Don 
Vito Corleone Godfather sense.331 Tactics include liens on the 
defendant‘s assets in favor of the settlement class; walk-away or right-
to-withdraw provisions, where the defendant withdraws the 
settlement offer if too many class members opt out; and most-favored-
nation clauses, where the defendant promises to give those remaining 
in the class the benefits of any deal it makes with the opt-outs 
(thereby ensuring that it will vigorously defend the opt-out cases).332 
 
 331. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The 
Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 143 (discussing parallels between 
class action litigation and The Godfather). 
 332. See, e.g., In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(permitting liens on defendant‘s assets that were ultimately eliminated in the final deal); Coffee, 
supra note 35, at 437–38 (discussing how defendants can defer opt-outs); Kathryn E. Spier, The 
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Thus, opting out is still available theoretically, but is heavily 
restricted pragmatically. 
Moreover, wise defendants will withhold funds from the class-
action settlement to litigate and pay competing claims. Yet, numerous 
variables make it impossible to accurately predict how much money to 
set aside. Plaintiffs‘ attorneys encourage institutions with the 
strongest claims to opt out, may file in more favorable state-court fora, 
bring additional claims, and exert more economic leverage over the 
defendant through shareholder voting power.333 This leads to 
inequitable recovery among claimants.334 Put differently, if all 
claimants remained in the class, then an administrator should 
distribute the settlement‘s proceeds based on pairwise comparisons, 
where those with larger losses would receive a proportionally large 
recovery.335 Thus, opting out creates inequity. The cost-wise defendant 
will hold more than necessary in reserve, which means that those with 
similar claims will receive dissimilar amounts. When outcome 
inequality becomes clear to all involved, it negatively affects 
institutional legitimacy.336 
The second, and related, pragmatic concern is that opting out is 
realistically available only to those receiving individual legal advice. 
Thus, the opt-out conundrum disadvantages smaller investors: on one 
hand, opting out isn‘t a realistic option for them; on the other, when 
they remain in the class, opt outs reduce their settlement share 
disproportionately and lead plaintiffs tend not to adequately represent 
them. As Jill Fisch has pointed out, ―to the extent that the [PSLRA] 
allows small shareholders to file suit but permits institutional 
investors to take control of the litigation away from the filing plaintiff, 
it preserves for the small investor only the opportunity to incur the 
costs associated with drafting and filing a complaint and eliminates 
meaningful access to the judicial system.‖337 
Third, because exit has become the norm, few institutions 
object to the settlement terms at Rule 23 fairness hearings. A recent 
study of pension funds reported that only five percent objected to the 
 
Use of “Most-Favored-Nation” Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. ECON. 78, 78 
(2003) (discussing most-favored-nation clauses). 
 333. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 440 (―[B]ecause the typical opt out recovers more than the 
typical class member, the corporate defendant would need to set the amount of the reduction at a 
level well above the amount that the opt out would have received under the class action . . . .‖). 
 334. Id. at 409. 
 335. See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 14–15, 76–77 (1994). 
 336. See id. at 146–47 (―An allocation is transparently unequal if some claimant‘s portion 
contains more of every good than another claimant‘s portion. A transparently unequal allocation 
generates envy that is evident to everyone.‖). 
 337. Fisch, supra note 48, at 547. 
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proposed settlement, which includes objections on both outcome 
fairness and inadequate representation.338 Admittedly, the debate over 
class objectors and whether they add value or simply delay the process 
is a long and heated one.339 Suffice it to say, however, that having a 
representative lead-plaintiff group incorporates dissent into the 
litigation process and if one member remains in the minority, she is 
likely to be an informed, meaningful objector. Because she has 
participated in the decisionmaking process, she can voice her concerns 
to the court without needing additional time or discovery, her motives 
are transparent, and she—not her attorney—is likely leading the 
charge. Still, there is one troubling aspect: a disgruntled lead plaintiff 
may not know how the court will rule on her objection until it is too 
late to opt out, which may tempt her to abandon the endeavor and opt 
out early. On one hand, in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, objectors have 
standing to appeal; in other words, opting out is not their only 
remedy.340 But once they do opt out, they have no standing to 
challenge the court‘s decision.341 Accordingly, the best practice is for a 
court to ensure that the opt-out period ends after it approves the 
settlement so that unsuccessful objectors still have that option.342 
Professor Coffee has several theories about why these 
pragmatic, fairness concerns should be less troubling: (1) because 
public pension fund recipients tend to be poorer retirees and smaller 
investors are ―typically wealthy and diversified,‖ distributive-justice 
concerns favor collusive behavior and opting out;343 (2) exit exerts 
competitive pressure on class counsel that will, over time, improve 
class settlements; and (3) courts can lessen the inequality caused by 
opting out by paying more attention to the potential to collude in the 
 
 338. Choi & Fisch, supra note 59, at 331–32 tbl.3 (noting that five percent objected to a 
proposed settlement, but twenty-five percent objected to the proposed attorney fee award). 
Granted, five percent may still be higher than the average percentage in other types of class 
actions. One study showed that, on average, ―about 1 percent of class members object to class-
wide settlements.‖ Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in 
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2004). 
Eisenberg and Miller did find, however, that ―[s]ecurities and antitrust cases have lower 
objection rates.‖ Id. at 1533. 
 339. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness 
Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403 (arguing that enhancing the ability of third parties to 
present their input in class action litigation can advance fairness and efficiency policies). 
 340. Churchill Village, LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 572–73 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 341. E.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 342. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (allowing the court to ―refuse to approve as settlement‖ 
unless there is an additional opportunity to opt out).  
 343. Coffee, supra note 6, at 327; Coffee, supra note 35, at 441. 
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fairness hearing.344 There is, however, some room for doubt as to 
whether these answers fully address fairness concerns. 
First, contrary to popular belief, individual investors are 
underdiversified and hold an average of only four stocks.345 Second, 
although competition may make settlements more adequate over time, 
institutions still have ample incentive to free ride on the class‘s 
efforts; they can easily opt out later and use the information they‘ve 
gathered to leverage an even better deal. Plus, relying principally on 
institutions to serve as lead plaintiff not only disincentivizes small 
investors from investigating fraud and hiring an attorney, but also 
diminishes competition among the plaintiffs‘ bar. In any market 
where a few big players monopolize the rest, there is little incentive to 
reduce costs or innovate. Because courts typically select institutions 
and those institutions tend to select the same law firm, there is less 
competition, less cognitive diversity, and the very real potential for 
inadequate representation. Finally, lessons from mass-tort practice 
suggest that judges are ill-equipped to investigate a settlement‘s 
fairness: they are trained in adversarial culture and have few 
resources to investigate the case on their own, the settling parties 
have no incentive to produce facts or information adverse to their 
settlement posture, and judicial self-interest favors docket clearing.346 
2. Institutional Concerns: Economy, Legitimacy,  
and Fairness 
Even taking Coffee‘s suggestions at face value leaves 
significant institutional concerns. If class actions and consolidation 
promote judicial economy, exit thwarts it. Granted, our litigation 
system often prioritizes individual autonomy at economy‘s expense. 
Rule 20 permissive joinder is but one example. Forcing all litigants 
with claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence to sue 
together would promote judicial economy, but Rule 20 allows plaintiffs 
to decide when, whether, and where to sue.347 Although it is 
significant that opting out undermines judicial economy, it is not a 
 
 344. Coffee, supra note 6, at 307–08. 
 345. Barber & Odean, supra note 60, at 73; Goetzmann & Kumar, supra note 60, at 433–34, 
460. 
 346. Burch, supra note 263, at 33–34, 43–45; Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 44–48. Of 
course, if the lead-plaintiff selection process becomes more competitive, then the competitors will 
have an incentive to point out why another contender is an inadequate representative. This 
means that the judge will be better equipped to handle the selection process. 
 347. FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
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decisive factor. More importantly, opting out and inadequate 
representation can impact judicial legitimacy. 
When opting out leads to inconsistent outcomes and staying in 
means inadequate representation (and thus questionable due process 
protections), litigants will lose faith in the judicial system.348 Adequate 
representation isn‘t just a hurdle to class certification; it is part of the 
due process litmus test when litigating someone‘s rights in absentia.349 
Securities class actions, like all class actions, afford no individual 
opportunity to agree to settle. Instead, they hinge on someone else—
the lead plaintiff—safeguarding and representing the absentee‘s 
rights. And when that representative disregards her fundamental 
duty, the absentee can challenge the judgment‘s preclusive effect.350 
When conflicts-of-interest routinely threaten this bond and opting out 
is available in theory only, there is cause for concern about both the 
class action‘s and the judicial system‘s continued legitimacy. 
To put this point differently, joinder rules governing class 
actions and preclusion doctrines work in tandem, like bookends, to 
minimize outcome inequality between similar cases.351 Together, they 
reflect a broader commitment to fairness through consistency.352 
Consistent outcomes reflect, in part, a system that is not arbitrary or 
biased. A system that repeatedly produces inconsistent outcomes 
(such as when opt outs consistently fare better than their class-
member counterparts) or systematically disfavors certain litigants 
 
 348. Courts are unpredictable in finding adequate representation violations, due, in part, to 
the doctrinal muddle over what adequate representation means and when inadequate 
representation permits a collateral attack on the settlement. The three judicial opinions in 
―Epstein III‖ provide a nice illustration. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999). In 
that case, Judge O‘Scannlain thought that the only question should be whether the there was a 
full and fair opportunity to raise the question of adequate representation, id. at 648–49 (majority 
opinion); Judge Wiggins asked whether adequate representation was litigated and determined in 
the first court, id. at 650–51 (Wiggins, J., concurring); and Judge Thomas, in his dissent, would 
allow adequate representation to be relitigated when due process concerns were present. Id. at 
651–52 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 349. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1940). 
 350. E.g., Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45–46. The scope of preclusion and how principles of full 
faith and credit should apply when the previous court has considered and rejected adequate-
representation challenges are the subject of much debate. Compare Issacharoff & Nagareda, 
supra note 63, at 1685–91, with Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for 
Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 388 (2000); see also Epstein, 179 
F.3d at 641 (presenting three competing views of how preclusion doctrines should interact with 
adequate representation). 
 351. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equity in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1865, 1893–94 (2002) (―A host of procedural design choices and procedural rules, more or 
less implicitly, attempt to protect against outcome disparities.‖). 
 352. The PSLRA mirrors this concern for consistency by requiring courts to appoint the most 
adequate plaintiff after the actions are consolidated. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2010). 
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(like individual investors) threatens an institutional commitment to 
fairness.353 In other words, process defects—such as inadequate 
representation—lead to outcome inequality and thus link outcome 
equality and procedural fairness. Accordingly, exit—at least as a 
systemic palliative to structural conflicts-of-interest—may generate 
more problems than it solves. 
3. Regulatory Concerns: Deterrence 
The regulatory concern is that opt-outs lead to sub-optimal 
deterrence by further Balkanizing enforcement, thereby making 
finality harder for defendants to achieve, adding to overall transaction 
costs, and increasing informational asymmetries on the plaintiffs‘ side. 
To be sure, measuring deterrence and thus quantifying optimal 
deterrence is nearly impossible; empirical data cannot quantify fraud 
that‘s been deterred. But we can hypothesize based on known 
quantities such as transaction costs and wealth-transfer problems. As 
Professor Coffee has explained, ―securities class actions face a 
circularity problem; in reality, investors are paid by investors, and 
often the result is a pocket-shifting wealth transfer among the same 
diversified investors.‖354 Opting out fractures enforcement efforts, 
makes final resolution elusive, and further contributes to this 
circularity problem by increasing transaction costs. 
Recall that the class action, at its core, procedurally enables 
investors to enforce their substantive rights. Its use should not be 
divorced from the substantive policies it promotes. Securities class 
actions supplement SEC regulation and chiefly aim (though some 
would disagree) to deter fraud and, secondarily, to compensate 
investors‘ losses.355 When institutional lead plaintiffs exchange higher 
 
 353. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189, 257–58 (2004) 
(―[F]or adjudicative procedure to perform its action-guiding function well, procedures and their 
outcomes must be regarded as legitimate sources of authority for officials, third parties, and 
litigants. . . . If the system is seen as illegitimate or without authority, then the system may 
fail.‖). 
 354. Coffee, supra note 35, at 444. 
 355. Granted, using this logic alone might raise the question of why we should care at all 
about process so long as the end result is deterrence. But process is an important part of the 
causal chain. Regulatory responses through the SEC and private class actions seek to deter fraud 
by holding the wrongdoers (and perhaps too often their employers) accountable; class actions rely 
on entrepreneurial plaintiffs‘ attorneys to make this happen; without client oversight and 
monitoring, the attorney might trade a cheap settlement for steep attorneys‘ fees and thereby 
undermine deterrence. If the class action is viewed as an illegitimate mechanism for 
enforcement, then its availability and viability is threatened, as are the public and private 
benefits its use generates. For a defense of the securities class action‘s use in securities 
enforcement, see Burch, supra note 91, at 63. 
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damage awards for corporate-governance reforms, they may 
undermine deterrence. To the extent that class actions achieve 
deterrence by forcing individual actors and the corporation itself to 
pay an amount that leaves them worse off, corporate-governance 
reforms are unlikely to deter the officers and directors who can 
easily—and relatively costlessly—implement them.356 
What we emphasize in the now familiar voice-loyalty-and-exit 
typology should advance the deterrence goals underlying substantive 
law, but should do so in a way that does not undermine the class 
action‘s legitimacy as a form of representational governance.357 It is in 
this governance structure, where the voices of a few must protect the 
interests of many, that internal disunity threatens constitutional due 
process through inadequate representation as well as the institutional 
arrangement‘s legitimacy.358 Accordingly, if voice-based reforms 
through additional representatives and subclassing can alleviate 
conflicting interests and make opting out less necessary, then voice 
raises fewer pragmatic, institutional, and regulatory concerns than 
exit alone. 
Appointing cognitively diverse, richly representative lead-
plaintiff groups can further private enforcement‘s substantive aims of 
deterrence and (secondarily) compensation through horizontal 
monitoring. In passing the PSLRA, Congress hoped to improve 
attorney monitoring, which would, in turn, minimize strike suits and 
thereby make lawsuits a more predictable consequence of bad 
behavior. If corporate actors cannot adapt their behavior to avoid suit, 
then lawsuits have little deterrent value.359 Thus, the lead plaintiff‘s 
ability to pursue monetary remedies and monitor the attorneys (which 
thereby prevents strike suits or encourages dismissal) is tied directly 
to deterrence. 
But monitoring is currently a vertical relationship—lead 
plaintiffs watch the attorneys, but who watches them? As Stephen 
Bainbridge observes, ―A hierarchy of individuals whose governance 
structures contemplate only vertical monitoring cannot resolve the 
 
 356. Webber, supra note 45, at 38. 
 357. Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 390. This reference to voice, exit, and loyalty dates to 
Albert Hirschman‘s seminal work. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 201.  
 358. See Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 340 (arguing that legitimacy is the governance 
question at the heart of the most troublesome class action cases). 
 359. See generally Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 115, 116 (1993) (―Deterrence theory assumes that the psychological linkage between tort 
law and safer behavior is that people are cognizant of the likelihood of tort sanctions for 
proscribed behavior and choose safer alternatives to avoid those sanctions.‖). 
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problem of who watches the watchers.‖360 When lead-plaintiff groups 
act as horizontal monitors by watching one another and the class 
attorneys, they solve this problem. This furthers private enforcement‘s 
principal deterrence goal and preserves the judicial system‘s 
institutional legitimacy by ensuring that the settlement terms and 
claims-administration process do not favor some claimants over 
others. While an institution might engage in self-dealing for the 
reasons already discussed—preferring corporate-governance reforms 
or making claims filing difficult for noninstitutional investors with 
less meticulous record keeping—mutual monitoring within the lead-
plaintiff group should prevent this from occurring.361 
Using a horizontal monitoring system likewise mitigates but 
does not eliminate the possibility that a group member will no longer 
actively participate in discussions or decisionmaking. Because each 
group member represents a subset of class interests, this could 
endanger adequate representation. Moreover, other group members 
may have weak incentives to socially sanction or otherwise pressure 
that member to perform since her indifferent behavior makes it easier 
to push one‘s own agenda. There are a few fail-safes: (1) lackadaisical 
behavior occurs less frequently in smaller groups; (2) lead counsel will 
likely watch out for the interests that group member represents to 
avoid opt outs and preserve her litigation investment; (3) the court 
must still approve any class settlement; and, (4) barring all of these, 
class members could opt out.362 The strongest fail-safe, however, is 
that the group member herself has a significant stake in the litigation; 
if the group contemplates acting adversely to those interests, then she 
will likely make her interest (and thus the interests of those she 
represents) known. 
CONCLUSION 
Representation in securities class actions is no longer 
adequate. Yet, courts feel quite comfortable certifying these classes—
after all, relying principally on federal law and the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine avoids sticky questions about choice of law and 
 
 360. Bainbridge, supra note 192, at 35. 
 361. Id. at 35–36. 
 362. It is possible, however, for a court to certify a class and not allow a second opt-out period 
after settlement. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (noting that the court ―may refuse‖ to approve a 
settlement without new opportunity to opt out, but not requiring a second opt-out period). But, 
as the advisory committee notes suggest, ―a decision to remain in the class is likely to be more 
carefully considered and is better informed when settlement terms are known.‖ Id. advisory 
committee‘s notes. 
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individual reliance. So, in practice if not in print, courts define 
interests in much the same way that Harry Kalven and Maurice 
Rosenfield did in 1941, when class members opted into rather than out 
of class actions. 
Broadly defining ―interests‖ makes it easier to certify securities 
class actions and thus promotes private enforcement‘s public function 
by holding the government and corporations accountable. But right 
now, the public good comes at some class members‘ expense—
principally those small investors who have no other viable remedy. 
And adequate representation isn‘t a right that can give way in the 
cost-benefit shuffle; it is an integral part of class members‘ 
constitutional due process. To address this critical shortcoming, this 
Article has argued that judges should understand their role in 
appointing lead plaintiffs as one that incorporates qualified 
representatives into class governance and thus legitimizes the 
institutional arrangement. This entails appointing cognitively diverse, 
representative lead-plaintiff groups to ensure adequate representation 
by fostering information sharing and dissent. 
In sum, one might interpret this Article‘s recommendations in 
one of two ways. My broad, ideal view is that given the current and 
predictable divides between institutional and individual investors, 
courts should routinely determine whether to appoint additional lead 
plaintiffs to satisfy due process concerns. This should increase lead-
plaintiff groups, which—if carefully constructed to adequately 
represent the group and ensure cognitive diversity—is a positive 
development. As such, any resulting settlement would take into 
account class members‘ diverse preferences. Alternatively, one might 
take these recommendations as a second-best solution to appointing a 
single institution as the lead plaintiff. In other words, for those who 
maintain that institutions act as the best attorney monitors and who 
are less concerned about adequate representation (or who reason that 
adequate representation follows from monitoring), these 
recommendations optimize group performance in second-best 
scenarios where individual institutions decline to serve or the court 
appoints a lead-plaintiff group. 
 
